Wiser in Battle: A Soldier's Story

I couldn't stop reading this book. The details he gives is so vivid. How this man full of honor did not sell his morals in these days of convenience and shallowness. I'd recommend it to anyone.

As someone deeply involved in activities for the promotion of the German-American Partnership, I had the good fortune to meet Ricardo and Maria Elena Sanchez here in Germany before Ric was sent to Iraq. I was very impressed by Ric's honesty, humility, devotion to duty and his willingness, despite his unbelievably crowded schedule, to devote quality time to helping us promote cross-cultural understanding. Since he was one of the few high-ranking people that I found really impressive, I followed his subsequent career with great interest. As the tragic events in Iraq unfolded, I knew there had to be more to the story. I am extremely grateful to Ric for having the courage to write this outstanding book. Generations after us will use it as primary source material to help understand how the combination of ignorance, incompetence and hubris exhibited by the Bush administration has so severely diminished America's image in the world and inflicted damage on the country's institutions that will take decades to repair. Ric Sanchez by emphasizing the importance of truth, honesty and self-criticism in overcoming the legacy of our failures has served his country once again in an exemplary fashion. David T. Fisher Former President of the German-American Steuben Schurz Society

As a civilian and liberal opponent of this war, I was generally not favorably disposed to both civilian and military leaders involved in this conflict. However, I was intrigued by this book and decided to hear from the main military personality on the ground and I was not dissappointed. Not because of political affiliation, but like Cobra II, I felt this was a great addition to the historical record when years from now we would have a better perspective on the war. I loved the narrative style. It was very easy to read and I'm not sure if this is a function of Sanchez or Phillips or both, but the writing is a credit to the book. Sanchez tells a good story about himself and values and his military life of service. As you read through the book, sometimes you wonder why some points are belabored such as the value of integrity he learned in his community, the idea of "if God wills it," or working in the IG office, or training out in California and as a leader being "in the box," etc, and then as the story goes on, you see how the authors masterfully incorporate his life lessons into the narrative of the Iraq War. I'm glad that he finally has had the opportunity to reveal his side of the Abu Ghraib story and his ultimate vindication. As a war opponent, I was as willing as most to paint all the leaders as guilty, but this book makes one appreciate the complexities of the situation and this is a man who did his job as best he could and he did a fine job given the circumstances. I read some reviews of this book which chastised Sanchez for seeming to blame others and not shoulder any blame. I didn't see it that way. I think he makes his shortcomings clear, especially his underestimating of the reaction of the Sunni population when they cracked down to create a more secure environment. The bottom line here is that we see how bad policy and politics affects and brands good people. I think Sanchez's problem is that he doesn't know how to play the media game. Overall Petraeus and Abizaid have come off as Media darlings because we've been presented with this great media narrative about them. Sanchez, I think should have paid more attention to playing the media and political game and that would have given him more leverage in dealing with politicians. I watched Sanchez give an interview regarding the book recently and it was very uninspiring and uncharismatic. I think if he could turn his media image around it would be helpful. I was very happy to have read this book and am the wiser for it. If nothing else, as non-insiders we learn about the process and the complexities that we all don't see or get to appreciate. I completed this book on vacation in two days. It is a substant work but quite well written. I recommend it.

I was serving in the Green Zone during some of the period described in this book, and still recall the unimaginable confusion Sanchez writes about. When CENTCOM and the Army component commander, LTG McKeirnan, withdrew leaving the V Corps Commander in charge of all military operations, the circuit overload peaked beyond comprehension. To learn near the end of the book that Sec Def Rumsfeld claimed he never knew about Sanchez having to manage the war on the ground with only a skeleton staff makes one's gorge rise. My analysis: too many elites each running his own stovepipe, leaving Sanchez to make the best of it. Worst of all, the soldiers and marines were jerked around needlessly with predicable consequences. Sanchez makes a lot of wanting to retire with 3-stars. This may seem a little selfish, but who can fault him for keeping his pride intact?

"Wiser in Battle" begins with the story of Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez's early life, including what motivated him to join the Army. He then goes on to provide the inside story of events in Iraq after "Mission Accomplished," when he took over military command, up to summarily being scapegoated and relieved over Abu Ghraib, followed by retirement. Throughout "Wiser in Battle" Sanchez makes clear that Rumsfeld's micromanagement created confusion and frustration due to constant changes. Further, Sanchez believes Bush's declaring the Geneva Conventions inapplicable opened the door for gross negligence via subsequent failure to publish new standards, and ignoring the lessons of prisoner abuses at Bagram in Afghanistan. (Sanchez also declared the Geneva Conventions in force almost immediately after taking over in Iraq; unfortunately, his command did not extend to the CIA and special operations people involved there.) Directly after taking over in Baghdad, Sanchez addressed the looting and fires, with his leaders identifying 350-500 sites to protect. Securing the innumerable ammunition dumps, as staffed, was estimated as requiring 3-5 years, so Pentagon leaders outsourced the job. Bremer arrived just in time to reverse plans to use Iraqi Army and some of its leaders in managing Iraq. Sanchez also highlights the confusion caused by landing in the midst of orders to send Gen. Franks' troops home, as well as suddenly releasing Sanchez's men who had been "stop-lossed." Sanchez pulls no punches - clearly stating that the resulting problems cost billions as well as many American soldiers lives. LG Wallace's sudden reassignment for an off-hand comment about not planning to fight a potential insurgency (actually we had no plans at all) didn't help any-one's confidence in taking charge either. (Sanchez also references Gen. Shinseki's being slapped down for his honest response to a Congressional question.) Bremer also took over police training that Army personnel were beginning the job; ultimately the job was given to Bernie Kerik who accomplished little other than endanger U.S. troops by his failure to coordinate with them. Additional problems included lack of effective police, sporadic fuel and electricity, banks not being open, a non-existent judicial system, the Army's refusal to send lawyers to help with interrogation issues, severe restrictions on the use of foreign troops and the U.S. failure to provide promised trucks etc., unnecessarily stirring up Shiites by closing Sadr's newspaper and capturing one of his deputies, and unclarity of the relationship between Bremer and Sanchez. The latter became especially clear when Bremer ordered Sanchez to withdraw the Marines from Fallujah due to concern about affecting Bush's 2004 re-election - Sanchez refused, then settled for a unilateral cease-fire; later the battle was refought at a much higher cost. The final pages were very eye-opening. Sanchez was visiting a new school named for him and caught si