Whatever Happened to Good and Evil?

Many of the reviews that give this book less than 5 stars often do so because they do not see one issue or another the same as the author. Although I also disagree with some of the authors conclusions I really think that misses the purpose and *importance* of this book. I do not see this book as the authors attempt to give rigorous argument for his own views. Instead this book is an excellent introduction to the study of meta-ethics. Without, at all, reading like you would imagine a book entitled "introduction to meta-ethical theory" would read. It lays the groundwork for further study that would otherwise be inaccessible to most people. It does so in a more enjoyable way than any other book I have seen. I think this makes this book one of the most important books of our time - if only more people would read it! In this book you will learn the basic concepts and vocabulary of meta-ethics. This book is a bridge between the discourse of those who are knowledgeable about meta-ethics and those who just have vague inklings of the topic. If there is a book that does a better job of this please let me know. Because I think this one is considerably better than any other I have read. With a book like this we have no excuse to remain ignorant of the basic concepts and issues underlying our ethical views. If your understanding of this topic is hazy, then read this book. You won't regret it. Our ethical foundation is what we base all of our actions in life. It's important.

Russ Shafer-Landau's *Whatever Happened to Good and Evil?* is the more reader-friendly counterpart to his *Moral Realism: A Defence*. After a brief introduction of the philosophical terrain that he is to cover, Shafer-Landau begins his case for "ethical objectivism" (moral realism) by urging a powerful prima facie case against the varieties of moral skepticism. The moral skeptic is unable to account for the seeming possibility of moral error, moral disagreement or moral progress; affirms a position that, ironically, yields a kind of moral dogmatism (because each person's moral views are "correct" in the only possible sense that the skeptic can allow) and is unable to ground the value of tolerance, and must hold the implausible position that the respective moral views of a Mother Theresa and a Charles Manson are morally equivalent and arbitrarily espoused. The entire section is well done as it puts the moral skeptic on the defensive and challenges the common assumption that skepticism is the "default" position. A strong positive case for some variety of moral realism in the final section, Part Three, would, when combined with th e conclusions of Part Two, provide a powerful case for moral realism indeed. However, in my opinion, Part Three does not ultimately deliver the goods. He opens this section with a chapter noting that ethical objectivism solves the various problems raised by moral skepticism, and this is surely correct. He also argues, convincingly, I think, that the fact of moral disagreement--even intractable disagreement--yields no conclusions of philosophical importance. (If we thought that it did, then what should we make of the fact that there is intractable *metaethical* disagreement? Shall we conclude that there is no truth of the matter of whether there is any truth of the matter?) And his final three chapters, which take on a variety of skeptical arguments, are quite good, I think. Chapter 20, in particular, "Why Be Moral?," takes on the "Argument from Rationality," which urges that (1) one is morally required to do A only if one has a reason to do A, (2) one has a reason to do A only if doing A serves one's own interests (Rational Egoism), (3) that what is in one's interests is fixed subjectively, so that, (4) moral requirement is itself a subjective matter. Though Shafer-Landau observes that "most philosophers" embrace (2), he displays, I think, good philosophical instincts in rejecting it, and offers some plausible counterexamples to it. Good chapter. The weaknesses of the book are in chapters 15, 16 and 17. In chapter 15, Shafer-Landau takes up the question of whether the existence of God is necessary for the truth of ethical objectivism. He suggests that people who think so would appeal to the need of a "law maker" in order to have moral laws. Against this, he notes that there are all sorts of "laws," such as physical laws, that do not seem to require a law maker. And then he raises the standard Euthyphro argument against t

This book is a very nice, and very basic, introduction to meta-ethics, the field of philosophy studying the metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and psychological issues concerning morality. Though it might help to have had some prior philosophy, it should be accessible to anyone who is interested in what philosophers might have to say about the these issues. Shafer-Landau has decided to introduce meta-ethics through an extended argument concerning a single topic: the objectivity (or lack thereof) of morality. And while this is only one of the issues that meta-ethicists discuss, it's perhaps the single most important and general issue in the field. Shafer-Landau writes a clear and accessible style, and his book isn't jargon-laden. He is, moreover, up-front about the nature of his arguments, what he's assuming, and where people might respond to his arguments. He doesn't expect the reader to piece his arguments together for herself or to expend a great deal of effort trying to figure out just what he means. He makes his points lucidly and succinctly, and then he moves on to the next one. And despite its brief length, this book is packed full of interesting and important arguments both for and against the objectivity of ethics. (There's also a helpful short appendix that summarizes the main arguments of the book and Shafer-Landau's analysis of them.) Importantly, though, this is not a work covering the literature on this topic. Shafer-Landau refers to other philosophers only occasionally, and he tends to refer to major historical figures when he does refer to philosophers. Nor is this a work covering the various positions that have been defended in meta-ethics. It introduces meta-ethics by developing and defending a position on a particular topic in meta-ethics rather than by presenting and criticizing all the views that are of importance in the field. And this is the source of my only substantial criticism of this book. It would be nice if Shafer-Landau had engaged with the literature a little more. While this isn't such a major problem, it would have been nice if the book could work as a entry to the literature on the topic. Indeed, the book doesn't even include a guide to further reading on these topics, and so it provides no suggestions about where the reader might go from here.Now for something about the relevant philosophical issues here. First, the most obvious question: What would it be for morality to be objective? According to Shafer-Landau, it would be for there to be right and wrong, good and bad, etc. independent of what human beings think or feel or desire. And Shafer-Landau's aim in this book is to argue that morality is indeed objective. What would someone who argues against this position think? What would it be for morality to be subjective? Shafer-Landau considers three different versions of subjectivism: nihilism, the view that there are no moral facts of any type; subjectivism, the view that the moral

This may be a short book but it is serious. It presents cogent arguments for serious consideration by serious students. It is a "philosophical conversation." "Our moral duties are determined by us, and so are our reasons. The perfect coincidence of duty and reason explains why it is always rational to do one's duty: our duties, like our reasons, are determined entirely by the ends we select for ourselves." But "Why from a rational point of view, am I the only one who counts?"I found it just right to be the ethics text for a course that includes an ethics portion.

Shafer-Landau clearly presents and discusses a very difficult issue and does it in a way that is informative and not condescending. Whether good and evil is relative or absolute may be high browed philosophy stuff for some people, but this book brings it us in an understandable and interesting way. I appreciate his thoughtfulness and his talent.