Waterloo: New Perspectives: The Great Battle Reappraised

I am the author. I wish to answer the sustained attacks on my books over the last fifteen years by Micheal Le Vean et als. This man and his friends have spent years attacking my books and defaming me, they do so because I would not take part in and opposed their undemocratic coup d'etat to oust Robert Snibbe as president of the Napoleonic Society of America in 1994. Le Vean evens quotes the late Col. Elting to discredit me putting words into his mouth, which cannot now be disputed. Their friend and colleague Peter Hofshroer and his `partner' David Hollins also try to denigrate my work, in Hofshroer's case my book came out first and stole his thunder vis a vis the Prussians , Dutch-Belgian and Germans true role in the Campaign.I have been severely disabled for the last thirty years due to a spinal injury and now a severe heart and lung condition from being housebound and it's been too traumatic for me to counter their lies until now. I cannot, however, continue to accept this venomous spite from these persons without answering them as it's embarrassing to my family. Many people have faulted my sources, (quite rightly) and I have been too unwell to answer but I do so now. I was approached by Arms and Armour press in 1991 on the recommendation of two historians that I had corresponded with for many years. I was commissioned to write a book about the fall of Napoleon and Waterloo. This I did. However, in 1993, seven weeks before my manuscript was due to be handed in, I had a panicked editor on my doorstep who said that he needed a book on Waterloo and to scrap "the politics"! Being a first time author I was coerced in to starting my manuscript again from scratch, either that or they said they would not publish it. In six weeks I wrote New Perspectives from start to finish, culling it from the original work; Writing, assembling photographs and maps and proof reading this "new work in just six weeks was huge undertaking and one I have never been happy with. It meant that many of my citations were either copied wrongly or numbered incorrectly. I was not even allowed a bibliography on the grounds of cost so I tried to cite as many works in the footnotes as possible. The bibliography appeared in my other book "The Fall of Napoleon" published a few weeks later. This was the first part of my original book, the second part (unpublished) was the machinations leading to Napoleon's return from Elba and King Murat's campaign against Austria in 1815; Waterloo and St.Helena (unpublished) being the last part. Thirty years work cut up and badly produced. Such is the power of the publisher. I also cringed at what the PR said on the jacket, but there again I had no say. Having been disabled for over three decades, I have spent my enforced isolation in researching Napoleonic archives(cited in "The Fall of Napoleon") and obtaining international accounts of the period, mainly by correspondence. Due to my injuries, I have been able to devote all my time to studying

This book provides an excellent account of the entire Waterloo campaign and not just the Battle of Waterloo itself. The author touches on the injustices created by Siborne's model & account of the battle that badly portrayed the non-British contingents of the Allied army. Unfortunately, Sibornes account became accepted as historical fact. The book briefly covers the demise of Napoleon in 1814 (and the treachery of key people in this), his return, and the intriguing political manoeurving and squabbling amongst the Allies at the Congress of Vienna. It was perhaps Napoleon's misfortune that the Allied leaders or representatives were gathered in one place to reach agreement on what action to take against him. The author gives a good account of the initial French thrust into Belgium and the twin battles of Ligny & Quatre Bras. The author shows that Wellington's slow reaction to the invasion could have cost him dearly if troops of the Netherlands did not decide on their own initiative to hold the position at Quatre Bras. Marshal Ney is given more credit than what normally is given to him in that he had very little time to familiarize himself with his forces & disposition, and that his forces were still closing up to be able to launch an early attack on the Quatre Bras cross roads. However, it was probably Napoleon's biggest errors in not totally confiding with his Marshals, ultimately leading to the mishandling of d'Erlon's troops (that could have decisively defeated the Prussians at Ligny) and delaying the decision to pursue the defeated Prussians. The author also emphasizes Napoleon seems handicapped by the lack of presence of his old Chief of Staff. The Battle of Waterloo itself is well covered off and the author draws on various accounts and references of the battle. The author gives credit where it is due, especially the non-British Allied forces whose actions are well covered and explained and thereby dispelling many myths that have arisen. In fact, all participants in the campaign are given good coverage and evaluation. Overall, the book shows how closely fought the Battle of Waterloo was, and that d'Erlon's main assault almost succeeded in breaking Wellington's line (if it wasn't for the perfect timing of the British cavalry that was Uxbridge's brilliance not Wellington's). There has been much controversy over the use of French cavalry charges, but as the author points out, Napoleon had nothing else but with to maintain pressure on Wellington's line and this had worked previously at Eylau against the Russians. The books tends to show there are key moments of decision or indecision that may win or lose a battle/campaign. e.g. Rebecque's & Perpocher's decision to hold Quatre Bras, the tussle for the use of d'Erlon's troops at Quatre Bras or Ligny, the Prussian retreat to Wavre rather than along their lines of communication and supply, the delay in the pursuit of the Prussians, the perfect timing of British cavalry, the delay in the u

Even though the author's credibility is being questioned, his account of the battle should not be as easily ignored. One should always remember that historical "facts" are always tainted by those who write them. After all, it is usually the victor who writes of the battles and campaigns, and there always seems to be a political motivation in "sprucing" up of the truth.I would suggest to anybody wishing to purchase the book to use one's best judgement. To truly be able to judge an author's work, one must remain open to all possible ideas and points of view. In the case of this book I would take it for what it is, and then proceed to further study the conflict, and then draw a conclusion.I would not recommend a complete dismissal of this title. I just strongly suggest that the reader remember that to all points there is a counter, and not everybody will share the same opinion on any topic. The book is worth reading, because it causes people to think, and opens discussion about an issue that may never be resolved to anybody's satisfaction.

Mr. Hamilton Williams analyzes the entire hundred days campaign in a catholic and imperious manner. What is most striking about his work are the many levels at which it can be read. At the most rudimentary level, the book provides an elegantly written and clearly presented account of the factual events of the hundred days campaign. Woven in to this factual narrative are nuggets of analysis. Mr. Hamilton-Williams draws unorthodox yet reasonable conclusions about the hundred days campaign. One of the more controversial arguments the book posits suggests that Waterloo was lost due to the incompetence of Napoleon Bonaparte's subordenates, and not the failures of Napoleon himself. And this suggestion does not lack merit. When he returned from Elba, Napoleon was faced with grave disadvantages; some self wrought and others unavoidable. Most dicisive (argues Hamilton-Williams) was the loss of Marshal Berthier, Bonaparte's long time (nearly 20 year's) Chief of Staff. Without Berthier's gift of clear translation of the often garbled and confusing verbal orders of Bonaparte, the cogs of the French military machine began to fall apart, and grave miscommunications occured, miscommunications that led to the downfall of Bonaparte at Waterloo. The other disadvantage worthy of recap was the loss of Marshal Murat, Bonaparte's brilliant cavalry captain. It was his absence, an absence caused by Bonaparte, that resulted in the dismal failure of Marshal Ney's cavalry charge at Waterloo, and the consequent failure of Napoleon Bonaparte at that battle. All of this is fully and more elegantly explained in Mr. Hamiliton-Williams penetrating and scholarly work. In short, Mr. Hamilton-Williams has provided in Waterloo: New Perspectives an historical gem, that should be read by all scholars of the Napoleonic era.

I found Hamilton-Williams' book to be most enlightening, despite certain flaws in its source material. To my knowledge, and I may be incorrect, Waterloo: New Perspectives was among the first english-language books to seriously challenge the long-held notion that the British defeated Napoleon at Mont St. Jean. Simply by challenging the status quo, well-founded or not, Hamilton-Williams appears to have made the battle of la Belle Alliance once again an issue of intense controversy. Whether "meticulously researched" or not, I remain in doubt as to whether subsequent works on the battle emphasizing the Dutch, German and Prussian roles would ever have been written. As for the account itself, it seems well-enough written work, and very informative in areas where citation is not so necessary, such as the depictions of the musket smoke clouding the battlefield, and descriptions of the horrors of receiving artillery fire. The general narrative is also good, especially regarding the Prussians' travails.