Warfare in Roman Europe, AD 350-425

The underlying notion behind Hugh Elton's work was the fact that "if" the Roman Army had been so ineffective to the point of utter failure, would the administration not have evolved the system to something that was effective? As history has shown us, the Romans had the capacity to grow and evolve to meet the constant challenges placed against them. The fact that the composition of the army stayed the same signalled a sense of effectiveness on the current needs of the Empire. If it weren't for this effectiveness, the Roman Empire would have been swept away long before then. Hugh Elton's book is essential in understanding the Roman period in the 4th and 5th century. Rather then relying on textual sources, the author has chosen instead to focus on current archeologically discoveries in order to piece together the composition of the Roman and Barbarian armies in the period mentioned. Using this information the author openly criticises myths and literary sources on points where the evidence shows that they are blatantly wrong. To his credit as well, the author also points at gaps in archeologically data and attempts to deduct from other sources and common sense the most likely answer. For example, a number of literary sources stated that body armour had fallen out of use during this period. Sustaining this argument was the fact that there are very little traces of Roman body armour from this period due to their composition (iron rings are almost impossible to date due to the inevitable corrosion that occurs to them). However, looking at different sources (mosaics and monuments for example which show troops in combat still wearing armour) as well as a bit of common sense (that body armour was still very effective), the author reasons that armour had in fact not been eliminated as standard issue. The author continues by also looking at the different demands placed on the Empire during this time period (invasions, insurrections, etc.) and the (somewhat) standardized responses of the Roman Army to them, both strategically and operationally. For example, a barbarian invasion could be dealt with either militarily or diplomatically in order to re-establish the status quo (whichever required the least amount of resource expenditure). An insurrection on-the-other-hand would be dealt with brutally with an expectation of eliminating ones potential rivals through whatever means possible. Hugh Elton goes through each step discussing in detail the known evidence and the reasoning behind these major decisions. For example, trying to eliminate an entire barbarian tribe would have been a futile attempt. It was better to try and peacefully coexist with them and perhaps even attempt integration into the Empire, whereas trying to coexist with a usurper was next to impossible. Overall, Hugh Elton's work goes along way in displacing the ruin of the Western Roman Empire at the army's feet. Structurally sound, the army was still an effective force i

This book offers a great insight into the workings and fighting capabilities of the late roman army. It is rigorous, well-argumented and not afraid of taking the academic establishment head on when it comes to dispelling several "myths" about the late roman army and the empire. For instance, it has become common place to say that the barbarization of the late roman army led to a decline of its effectiveness on the field. Elton correctly poses the question of why, if a "barbarized" army was ineffective, the Romans did not stop recruiting barbarians; indeed, the Eastern Empire, which survived, continued to recruit barbarians well into the 6th century. The rationale for using barbarian troops must be searched beyond the trite arguments that the romans had become "corrupt", and Elton sheds lights on the economics of the choice "make" (ie raise additional roman troops) versus "buy" (ie "rent" barbarians for a specific campaign). On the same topic, Elton also proves that there is no clear trend towards barbarization of the higher ranks. More generally, Elton proves convincingly that there is no evidence that the late roman army was ineffective. In my opinion, arguing that the army's inability to stop the invasions is a proof of its defectiveness would be equivalent to arguing that since the US lost the Vietnam war, then its army must have been weak...Elton's main thesis is that the crisis of the Empire was not a military one, ie the army did not have structural faults that "explain" the fall of the empire. His arguments are always stimulating and supported by research work which is often startling. Hopefully, after this book historians of the late roman empire will have to look elsewhere for an explanation of its fall. But I am not optimistic. After all, other ridiculous myths on the decline's causes survive to this day: among others, that the fall of the empire was caused by a decline in moral values, or by class struggle, or by a crisis in manpower, or by the use of lead in bowls and the related illnesses...

This book came out the same year as Southern and Dixon's _The Late Roman Army_, covering the same period. Unlike that of S & D, Elton's work is no mere recital of artifacts and programs. It shows how each side was able to employ its manpower, finances, organizational skills, leadership talents and weapons procurement capabilities to defend or expand it's living space against a flesh and blood antagonist.Dixon and Southern show the evolution of the various factors, but don't really seem to relate them to the heart of the matter: the fighting man at the bloody point of contact. Elton never loses sight of this ultimate rationale for mobilization, recruitment, and strategy-making -- combat. His book is all the better for it. He does for the twilight struggle of the Western Empire what Adrian Goldsworthy did for it's high tide in his equally relevant and absorbing _The Roman Army at War_. I grow tired of books that pretend to explain Rome and her enemies and end up being mere outlines of unconnected factors, replete with organizational charts and nifty drawings of weapons and uniforms. Elton writes for the serious student of warfare in late antiquity, but in a style that will appeal to the military buff as well as the classicist. Highly recommended to afficionados of ancient warfare, classicists,war-gamers, armchair strategists ...or anyone who wants to examine the military side of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.

This thought-provoking study of Roman warfare, tactics, weapons and military life is spell-binding from the opening paragraph to Hugh Elton's closing remarks. A brilliant and definitive book, its sophisticated analysis of later Imperial age warfare is both accurate and innovative; Hugh Elton goes where few authors have before.