War in the Falklands: The Full Story

This year marks the 25th anniversary of the Falklands War. I was a kid when this war broke out. It seemingly came out of nowhere, even though there was a long history associated with it. I first read this book not long after the conclusion of the war. Reading it again 25 years later it still comes across as a nice, concise history of the conflict. To most Americans the Falklands seemed an absurd confrontation. This book provides a pretty good background for events leading up to and including the war. The determined Argentine position is contrasted by the almost absent-minded policy of the British Foreign Office. Included are the bumbling US efforts by Reagan and Haig to try and halt the war at the last minute. The US finally had to throw its lot in with the UK after several embarrassing episodes involving Jean Kirkpatrict at the UN. The war itself was a throwback to another time. Similarities to Queens Victorias Little Wars of the 19th Century were certainly there, but that is where it ended. This would be a late 20th century conflict with all the modern military technology in play. Both sides would have pros and cons. The more professional and stronger British military was balanced somewhat by logistics, and by the advanatges Argentina had with closer land-based aircraft. Both sides would make the most of their positions, and each played a strong game. The Argentine Air Force, considered the weaker player within the military Juanta at the time, actually put in the best performance. The vulnerability of the Royal Navy at San Carlos, aptly called Bomb Ally, could have lost the conflict for the British. British resources, while superior, were not abundant, and the Task Force sent under Sandy Woodward was only just adequate for the job. In the end it was the vastly superior quality of the British infantry, Royal Marines, Paras, Guards and Gurkhas that decisively tipped the balance on land, despite heavy odds. One is struck by the relatively light casualties in the conflict, especially on land. Argentine losses were higher for sure, but it seems both sides could have lost a lot more men considering the open nature of the fighting on land. The single greatest loss of life was the sinking of the aging Belgrano Cruiser, itself a very controversial act. The war provided a fascinating study for NATO weapons systems, with both sides using them to advantage. This book, put together by the British Times News experts on scene provides a very readable, and for the most part balanced account of the war. The tone may be slightly pro-British at times, but not excessively so. Most of the eye-whitness descriptions are British, and if the book suffers at all it is from a lack of Argentine perspective. Still, as an introductory book on the war I found that it holds up well after 25 years! What the fate of the Falkland Islands will be in the future only time will tell. Could we see a second Falkland's War on the Horizon?

The Falkland Islands, (Islas Malvinas), are a windswept, rainy archipelago in the South Atlantic, peopled by persons of British descent who are largely engaged in sheep raising. Not a place to fight a bloody war over, you say? Wrong, and the Sunday Times Insight team does a most excellent job of explaining how and why the war came about, how it was fought, and how the British prevailed.My fellow reviewer has excellently reported the problems faced by the United States in this war, and I can add nothing. Instead, I would like to address the Insight team's analysis of the problems faced by the Argentines and the British, commencing with the latter. The lack of British anticipation of the Argentine invasion is detailed, as are the reasons for it. The Argentine plan was to present a fait accompli to the world, but the British were not prepared to abandon the islands so easily, even though they were 8,000 miles away. Instead, a makeshift armada was jury-rigged, and plans were made as the ships proceeded south. Distance continued to plague the British in terms of air battles, as heavy bombing was almost impossible. The Argentine planes had superior speed, but the British carrier-based Harriers were more manuverable and carried the day. Heavy weather equally bothered both sides.The Argentine Navy was no match for the British and immediately retired to port after a single cruiser was torpedoed and sunk. The Argentine Air Force had no real bombers and used Skyhawks and Mystere fighter jets as bombers. The Argentine Exocet missile raised hob with British ships and the war may have gone differently had a few more been available. The key difference was in the armies. The Argentines occupied the Falklands with a great many more troops than were available to the British, yet the British easily routed the Argentines. I agree with the Insight teams's conclusion that the reason lies in the fact that British soldiers are trained for warfare, which includes such things as washing clothes and dishes, digging latrines, making tents, and like menial tasks, as well as fighting battles. Argentine troops came from an army trained to break up riots, keep civil order, and the like, and the referenced menial tasks were deemed beneath their dignity. In a cold, windy, rainy place like the Falklands, under battlefield conditions, the Argentine Army broke down, and although many of their troops fought bravely, their units were simply "outtrained" and outmatched.We now know that the Falklands, and their surrounding continental shelf, show extremely promising oil formations, and that Argentina's action may have been a prelude to further sub-Antarctic and Antarctic territorial claims. This the British could not endure, and so they fought.This war had larger implications than first seen. Certainly, the course of Argentine history was greatly affected, as the country's military government fell after the defeat, and was replaced by a civilian-led democracy. Naval str

The war in the south Atlantic over the Falkland Islands (Isles Malvinas) between Britain and Argentina in 1982 was one that seemed inevitable, and yet at the same time pointless. The historical record of ownership, well explained in the book, is a murky one, with neither nation having a paramount one. At that time, the military junta ruling Argentina was in a desperate state. The Argentine economy was in trouble again, and there was a growing undercurrent of popular discontent. Therefore, the leadership decided to launch a foreign war of expansion, based on two assumptions, only one of which was true. They correctly believed that a successful invasion of the Falklands would unleash a wave of patriotism throughout Argentina that would submerge all the other problems in their society. However, they underestimated the resolve of Britain to maintain their control of the islands, and completely misread the position of most of the other nations in the world, especially the United States. It should have been obvious to the Argentines that the United States could not allow their NATO ally to be defeated, and therefore the Reagan administration ultimately would come down on the side of Britain. The series of negotiations that led to war, described so well in the book, was a situation where both sides felt that they could not budge from their rigid positions. In many ways, there was a sense of inevitable tragedy about the positions taken by both the Argentines and the British. In this atmosphere, not even personal intervention by President Reagan could avoid the conflict. Of course, there was posturing between the major figures handling foreign policy for the Reagan administration. Specifically, Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick had opposing views that were played out in the press and served to complicate the issue. Two major points in the book made a significant impression on me. The first was how outnumbered the British really were. Some of their victories were successful assaults against an entrenched enemy where they were outnumbered three and four to one. This is not to say that the Argentine forces simply gave up. They fought very well, in many cases the fighting was vicious hand-to-hand that was to the death. It truly was a war that was won by the bravery and tenacity of the British troops, and not really due to the technical prowess of the weapons. The second was the fact that a few more Exocet missiles could have led to an Argentine victory. The ones they had were able to inflict great damage to the British ships, and had the Argentines been able to hit the British aircraft carriers, it is most unlikely that the British could have won. To sum it all up, the clear conclusion is that while the British victory was total, it could have easily gone the other way. While it will go down in history as a minor war over a very minor set of islands, the Falklands war ushered in a new era in warfare, i