Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat

Every citizen should read this book so they can instruct their elected representatives and vote for military reform. As things now stand, we will lose the war on terrorism over time because of the perennial flaws in our system that this book identifies.Don't Bother Us Now. The U.S. political system is not structured to pay attention to "early warning". Kosovo (as well as Croatia and Serbia beforehand and later Macedonia) were well known looming problems, but in the aftermath of the Gulf War, both Congress and the Administration in power at the time said to the U.S. Intelligence Community, essentially: "don't bother us anymore with this, this is inconvenient warning, we'll get to it when it explodes." We allowed over a hundred thousand to be murdered in genocide, because our political system was "tired.""Modern war" is an overwhelming combination of micro-management from across the varied nations belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; a reliance on very high-tech weapons with precision effect that are useless in the absence of precision intelligence (and the lawyers insist the intelligence be near-real-time, a virtual impossibility for years to come); and an obsession with avoiding casualties that hand-cuffs our friendly commanders and gives great encouragement to our enemies.Services versus Commanders. The military services that under Title 10 are responsible for training, equipping, and organizing the forces--but not for fighting them, something the regional commanders-in-chief must do--have become--and I say this advisedly--the biggest impediment to the successful prosecution of operations. The detailed story of the Army staff resistance to the use of the Apache helicopters is the best case study I have ever seen of how senior staff generals with political access can prevent operational generals with field responsibilities from being fully effective. In combination with the insistence of the services that forces be held back for Korean and Persian Gulf threats that might not be realized, instead of supporting a real war that existed in Europe, simply stated, makes it clear that there is a "seam" between our force-creating generals and our force-fighting generals that has gotten *out of control.* The fog of war is thickest in Washington, and the greatest friction--the obstacles to success in war--are largely of our own making.Lawyers, Fear, and Micro-Management. Just as we recently witnessed a lawyer overruling the general to avoid killing the commander of the Taliban, General Clark's war was dominated by lawyers, a fear of casualties, and micro-management, from Washington, of his use of every weapons system normally left to the discretion of the field commander. This has gotten completely out of hand. Within NATO it is compounded by multi-national forces whose commanders can refuse orders inconsistent with their own national view of things, but reading this book, one is left with the clear understanding that General Clark was figh

General (Retired) Clark writes the best account of the tensions and competing demands of senior military leaders trying to bridge the divide between politics and military operations. He also clearly explains the linkages between our national security strategy (NSS) and national military strategy (NMS). As an insider during the Dayton Peace Accords, he had the benefit of understanding the development of a NSS with regard to the Balkans. He was able to transmit his unique insights during Dayton into an effective military campaign to bolster the credibility of NATO and keep soldiers from needlessly getting injured.Anyone on the staff or getting ready to assume a political office which relates to our NSS should read this book to understand the frustrations of competing demands placed on military commanders in a highly complex environment. Likewise, all future field grade officers should read and understand General Clark's insights. Given the complex nature of military engagement and the blurring of strategic, operational, and tactical realms due to new technology and the media, military leaders would do well to study this book. Warfare has changed in many substantive, as well as subtle ways. Thoughts on the subjects that General Clark exposes could save allied soldiers lives in the future.This book is a great addition to any military library and those interested in strategic thinking.

Although it is primarily a memoir chronicling General Clark's experiences during Operation Allied Force (the air campaign against Serbia during the Kosovo crisis), it is also a sobering look at waging war during the 21st Century. General Clark offers a revealing look at political intrigue in the Pentagon and the State Department during the second Clinton administration. More importantly, he demonstrates how such intrigue had an adverse impact on his duties as NATO's supreme military commander in Europe. Clark makes a strong case that NATO's involvement in future European conflicts will require mutual consensus among NATO members; a difficult political minefield he successfully navigated. Furthermore, he also stresses the need for more flexible, more mobile, American military forces in future wars. Needless to say, his splendid prose is probably unsettling news to some Pentagon and State Department planners. Without a doubt, this is an important book for military historians and one which should be read by those involved with - or interested in - American military strategy and tactics for the 21st Century.

General (retired) Clark writes an excellent piece on both the events leading up to our entry into Kosovo and the continued decline of the American warrior spirit.I served seven months in Kosovo with KFOR 1B on Camp Monteith. General Clark's book answers many of the questions we all had while patrolling the trash strewn streets of Kosovo, "Why the hell are we here?". General Clark gives a great lead up to the Serbian aggression in Kosovo and the Albanian provocations which we once again see in Macedonia. His thoughts are well written and easy to read. Starting with the Dayton peace accords, which he was a key player in, Clark takes us through the twisted negotiations and difficulties of the Balkans. His story shows the inherent difficulties in coalition warfare and how I (and thousands of other soldiers) eventually arrived to put "boots on the ground." The other interesting aspect of this book is to watch how the military was severely restricted, almost to the point of endangering American lives, to protect a weak and unclear political agenda. Not only did General Clark have to fight Serbs, NATO, the air power pundits and the media, he also had to fight against his leadership in SecDef Cohen. A great read and interesting story about NATOs first war. Lets hope we never have to go through an experience like the Kosovo Campaign again. Buy this book. You'll throughly enjoy it! -CPT S

Obviously, General Clark is not out to win a lot of friends with the publication of this book, a damning account of how politics and war make, at best, awkward bedfellows and at worst, the potential for inadvertent sabotage. More telling (for me, anyway) than the tone of the book, which shows how political claptrap can tie a commander's hands from committing intelligently (no lessons learned from previous conflicts?), Clark shows throughout the entire book that everything we have been taught regarding the basic principles of warfare, from Sun-Tzu to Clausewitz and beyond, have been completely done away with in the Bosnian conflict. Through technology in our weaponry, the delivery platforms, the intelligence, and most pointedly, in our communications networks (particularly the media), by which we more or less spoon-fed Milosevic our every move well in advance, thus eliminating the vital element of surprise.Another notion that has brought angst to most Americans is that of the "no-civilian-casualties" conflict. Clark echoes, point-blank, the same words that every commander throughout the history of modern warfare has muttered - war is hell, and people will be killed, combatants and non-combatants; that's the nature of war. With smart technology at our feet, and brilliant weapons technology knocking at the door, we have come to expect that firing a missile onto a bridge where a bus is passing will somehow have allowed the bus to escape unharmed. It's not possible now, nor will it be possible in the future. The weapons, as Clark states, can only be as perfect as not only the people who develop them, but as the people who upload them, arm them, test them, engineer them, and ultimately fire them. I would take it a step further and add that the weapons are only as good as the intelligence which feeds them.Clark has written a book that deserves recognition as a bold step in Warfare Theory literature, and should be on the Airman's and Soldier's official reading lists for officers and enlisted alike.