On War

AVOID THE PENGUIN EDITION AT ALL COSTS! Yes, it is the most widely available version of Clausewitz' famous work, "On War", a great book that should be in everyone's library, but the Penguin edition is to be avoided at all costs. The Penguin Classics edition is poorly edited and uses the Graham/Maude translation from the original 19th century German. It was put together by Anatol Rapoport, a self styled 60's renaissance man with an axe to grind against Henry Kissinger (a Clausewitz devotee) and a viceral hatred of Claucewitz himself. Rapoprt misleadingly abridged Clausewitz's own writings, while retaining many of the errors introdced by Maude and Graham that when combined with Rapoport's hostility toward Neo-Clausewitzean ideas (and Clausewitz himself) create a volume found in the Penguin edition that is so badly misleading as of Clausewitz's ideas as to be worthless. Clausewitz is worth a read but if you have the Penguin Classics or Graham/Maude translations I strongly advise you to burn the book and look instead for either the Jolles or Paret translations.

"On War" is essential reading for the professional military and for historians, and is of great value to those with an interest in public policy.That said, it is not easy to read. There are three primary reasons for this:First, it is unfinished. The first chapter ("book" as Clausewitz called it) is sharp, well-organized and focused, other chapters are so-so, and still others are almost formless collections of notes.Second, Clausewitz is thinking philosophically. Most people, including many or most in his target audience, are unaccustomed to thinking this way, and find it difficult to re-orient themselves.Third, parts of it are firmly locked in a particular time and place. The reader must work to determine what (if any) lessons in those parts are of enduring value and must understand references that, however clear they would have been to his contemporaries, are today obscure.So, given all of the above, it is fair for the reader to ask why he should bother. The reason is the power of Clausewitz's answers to:(1) What is the nature of war itself?(2) What is war's relation to the larger world in which it exists?(3) How can success in war be achieved?Clausewitz's answer to question (1) is that war in itself is a duel on a large scale, which unless acted on from the outside, tends towards the maximum possible amount of violence. This discussion of "pure war" has probably been responsible for more mis-interpretations of Clausewitz than anything else he wrote. He is writing philosophically - trying to understand the nature of the thing, and some readers mis-read him as writing prescriptively - that because "pure war" (or "ideal war") tends towards maximum violence, that those conducting war should employ maximum violence.Clausewitz's answer to question (2) is one of the major reasons why "pure war" doesn't, can't, and shouldn't exist in the real world. First, real war occurs over time - not as a single event but as a series of events. This provides the opportunity for other forces to act upon it. The most important outside force acting upon it is political - war it is only a means - and the end is the political purposes which the war serves. The means cannot and must not trump the end. This is his famous dictum "War is a continuation of policy by other means". The level of effort is conditioned by the end which the war serves as well as all the other ends the state is pursuing which may or may not be compatible with the war.It is in his answer to (3), how success in war can be achieved, that Clausewitz is at his most period-bound. He draws heavily from examples that would have been as familiar to his contemporaries as the Gulf War is to us, but time has rendered them often obscure. Further, many of his recommendations are completely tied to how war was conducted on land in the early 19th century. Those who say that they got little out of Clausewitz are often referring to this subject area.* There is quite a bit of value here, but it is obtained at effort

This is not an easy book to understand. It takes sustained attention, several readings of the most important parts, guidance from supplementary articles, time and interest. After the required investment, the diligent reader will come to understand Clausewitz's system and the remarkable way that it stills aides in understanding the phenomenon of war. Readers who know of what I speak will agree that the results of the recent NATO war against Serbia over Kosova can be explained very accurately in Clausewitzian terms. Much has been made of the fact that Clausewitz died before he could complete the work. We will never know what added insights the Prussian philosopher may have been able to come up with or the additional nuances that he may have added to the framework that he had established. While true, this attitude detracts from what he was able to accomplish. The only finished portion of the book, Part 1 of Book 1 is also the most important. The rest of Book 1, Book 2, Book 3 and Book 8 (the last) are in Bernard Brodie's words, "pure gold". The other books have relevant information for our times too, but one must shift through much which belongs to the past. Clausewitz's theory of war considered war to be "a remarkable trinity" of rational action (policy), irrational action (passion) and the play of chance (friction versus genius). These three points act as poles above which "theory" itself is suspended like a magnet. Alan D. Beyerchen has pointed out that Clausewitz was talking about a non-linear system in that the course the magnet will take as it hovers above and in and out of the three fields of attraction produces an irreproducible trajectory highly sensitive to the initial conditions which set it in motion. In addition we have other important concepts such as the duel nature of war, the importance and uses of theory, friction, war's psychological element, tactical and strategic centers of gravity, and of course the primacy of policy over purely military concerns in strategic planning. All of these are still of interest today. Not bad for a work that was published initially in 1832!One additional note. I recommend the Everyman's Library Edition of On War. First it is the Michael Howard / Peter Paret translation which is the best in English. Second it contains four interesting and enlightening articles by Howard, Paret and Bernard Brodie and last it is a hard cover book printed and bound in Germany and of excellent quality.

Adorned with many historical examples, this book is certainly history's greatest masterpiece. Continuously emphasizing that war is 'a continuity of policy by other means', Clausewitz, in his 20 years' work, has defined perfectly the theory of war, its tactical and strategic purposes;the means of attack and defense,before firstly defining clearly what war really is, how it works,and how its nature works in practice, and delightfully summarizing all the means of war in the book of 'War Plans'. This book explains what had been a cloud of uncertainty for people before his age, and closely examines the strategies of history's greatest generals, that is, Frederick the Great and Napoleon I(whom he said to be the God of War)during the Seven Years' War and down to the battle of the first until sixth coalition, and finally owing much spaces to the battle of Jena (1806),the wars of liberation (1814-15), and the disastrous marches to Moscow (1812).This book is certainly presented to military officers and anybody interested in the course of war. Moreover, you need not worry about your age or nationality. This book declares about strategy in general; and gives delight even to an Indonesian 11-year old girl like me. If you're truly interested in the course and history of war, I bet that this book will give you *BEAUCOUP DE MOMENTS INTERESSANTS*. NE ME CROIS PAS? ALORS,TU PEUX LE LIS ET LE PREUVE!

A word of caution to anyone ordering the paperback edition of this work. It is incomplete with some of the books missing. If you are genuinely interested in strategy, buy the hardcover Everyman's edition rather than the Penguin edition.