Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla War, from the American Revolution to Iraq

This book offers further proof that those who don't understand history are destined to repeat it It is a comprehensive and clear discussion of the history of insurgency from the American Revoloution through the current mess in Iraq. I think of it as an education in one book. I found the history of the troubles in Ireland especially enlightening. Anyone who can continue to defend our incursions into Vietnam and Iraq after reading this book is delusional.

An extraordinary review of the political history of terrorism from a master of the history and culture of the middle east.

This is an important book. William Polk reviews important insurgencies from the American Revolution to Iraq. He lays out principles of successful and failed insurgencies and equally importantly why interventions fail. Shelby Foote, the great Civil War historian, relates a brief story about a Union officer interrogating a captured Confederate soldier that summarizes an important part of William Polk's thesis. The officer asks,"Why are you rebels fighting so hard?" The Confederate responds, "Because you are here." The most disturbing aspect of this book is the repeated failure of governments to learn the lessons of insurgency, despite repeated costly failures that have been widely recorded. A common line currently about the Iraq war is that if the U.S. had only planned better, we would have a better result. William Polk argues otherwise. In addition, he is rightly critical of the Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which is riding such a wave of popularity that it was published by the University of Chicago Press. On the other hand, "Violent Politics" has had very few reviews.I do not believe it has been reviewed by a single major newspaper. Each of the books chapters is a worthwhile read, but perhap the most intertesting is Chapter 1 on the American Revolution. It is the best brief discussion of the American Revolution that I have ever read. The chapter on Iraq and Afganistan are very painful. Doug Wilson Boston

This is a book about insurgency and some of its major tools--terrorism and guerilla warfare. William Polk begins by observing that one factor is common to insurgencies (page xiii): "no matter how they differ in form, duration, and intensity, a single thread runs through them all: opposition to foreigners. Occupation by outsiders creates the conditions for insurgency, then. That is the central thesis of his book. Throughout the book, he explores his thesis by examination of a number of case studies--some well know and some less so. The first case study has an ironic twist to it--it is the American Revolution. He then considers, in order by chapter, the Spanish resistance to Napoleon, the Philippine insurrection, the Irish case, Yugoslav partisans in World War II, Greece after World War II, Kenya and the Mau Mau, Algeria, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. One commonality across many (but not all) of these examples is that the insurgency begins with a ludicrously small number of militants. However, there are circumstances where this small group will expand and, in the end, triumph over the occupation. Other trends: as the small bands successfully carry out ambushes and otherwise annoy the foreigners, others within the occupied country begin to pay attention. Often, the dominant government then seeks to suppress the rebellion. Sometimes, they become so oppressive and repressive that it begins to trigger larger and larger numbers of people joining the insurgency. Another factor that is important is Mao's famous argument that in a successful insurgency, the rebellious ones are like "fish" in a "sea" of sympathetic people, able to hide among and operate within the supportive masses. One interesting tidbit in this book focuses on current American counterinsurgency theory. The current handbook, the 2006 Counterinsurgency Field Manual, has as one of its authors Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, currently in charge of the American action in Iraq. Many people assess the current counterinsurgency doctrine as sound (and, indeed, if you read Petraeus' manual, you will find it pretty convincing), but Polk demurs. He contends that despite its apparent freshness, the American doctrine is still flawed. Polk remains deeply skeptical of any occupying power being able to determine beforehand if the occupation will be successful or if insurgency will develop and, in the end, triumph over the occupier. I'm not sure that I am in accord with Polk in all details (his conclusion does not convince me), but it is a thought provoking work, and the various case studies provide historical examples of what can go right and what can go wrong for both insurgencies and occupying powers. Worth a read. . . .

Foreign Service and State Department people are immensely knowledegable about their areas. It means learning an odd language or two, absorbing many volumes of history and past international relations, becoming respectful of myriad social customs and religious practices and consequently forming a political astuteness that will be useful to the boss in Washington. Of course, when the boss communes with God and gets direction from a higher authority, all this can be ignored. Just bring'em on. William Polk examines eleven insurgencies from 1776 to the present. This is a short book. The author has distilled hundreds of books and many years of service into 223 refined pages of text. The simple message is that occupiers are always unwelcome. Supression may succeed temporarily, but the day of reckoning eventually arrives. This book is filled with important history lessons that our leaders have ignored.