U.S. V. Microsoft: The Inside Story of the Landmark Case

I admit I have not read the entire book, but what I've read so far has been very interesting. Its a book worth picking up if you're interested in Microsoft and/or the Microsoft trial of the late 90s (U.S. v. Microsoft). The book really does not go either prosecution or defense. It simply reports on what happened, and goes over the entire story. It is well written, as well. The only problem I have is that the book repeatedly uses articles by either Steve Lohr and Joel Brinkley (also the authors of this book). I didn't pick this book up for newspaper clippings. That's why the newspaper articles bother me, and I also believe the articles throw the reader off, because there's no flow of words. While talking about the trial, the authors will throw in an article. It's really a pain, although the articles are well written. I'd prefer a continous story.

Looking for an excellent story that seems to deliver both sides of the law suit brought against Microsoft, than this book is a must read for you. The authors take on a delicate subject and give you the best opportunity to make an informed decision.Using actual court transcripts, documents and company emails, a story develops with a natural curiosity that kept this reader going along and following the story as if it was actually taking place in the present time frame. The story does not read like a mystery novel, a thriller or action story, instead the blend of legal-ease and objective opinion makes the book enjoyable. The overall reality of the storyline is what gives this book a real shot in the arm. Over 350 pages are not near enough to completely cover this story, as there is room for 350 more. The refreshing blend of investigative journalism and objective reporting are certainly the high points of the book. Overall this is one the best books I have read this year.

If you want to understand the Microsoft case - the people behind it and the evolving context of antitrust law - this is the book. What it is, really, is a reference work - the New York Times coverage - surrounded by additional reporting and writing from the authors Joel Brinkley and Steve Lohr. It begins with a long lead-in chapter that traces the investigative origins of the case and the hardening position of the Justice Department and state investigators - and the early lost opportunities to settle the case by Microsoft. It has profiles of the key players in the case, it explains the shifts in antitrust doctrine over the years, and it has an intriguing piece on the tricky role played by Microsoft's competitors in encouraging the government to pursue the case. And Judge Jackson's comments, based on interviews during and after the trial, provide a fascinating and controversial glimpse of how his views of the company became increasingly negative as the case went on. Microsoft is basing its appeal partly on its claim that the judge's comments to the press, especially granting interviews to the New York Times before the case had left his courtroom, were improper. But what this book is not is a Microsoft book. What you learn about the company is based mainly on the testimony for the company and against it, and the evidence in the trial. What emerges is a picture of a company convinced that it is right, even virtuous, and whose win-every-point mentality that served it so well in the marketplace worked against it in the antitrust case. And oddly, after reading the book, I had the impression that while Microsoft is going to lose this case, it will probably not end up, after all the appeals, as the one-way shellacking it was in Judge Jackson's courtroom. The importance of that is that it will affect the eventual sanctions against Microsoft. In short, don't bet on a breakup of the company. This case isn't over yet.

The personal computer software industry has changed the modern world. At the beginning of the 1980s Japan was viewed as eclipsing the United States as the technology leader. Yet a new embryonic industry was about to change all this. The personal computer industry, led by a group of very talented and creative entrepreneurs, was emerging. Without question, Microsoft has been a leader of this industry in the decade of the 80s. In the first half of the 90s Microsoft repeated and built upon its premier leadership. Microsoft's success provided a foundation for the success of the personal computer industry and the many companies associated with it-AOL, Sun, Dell, Gateway, Compaq, Apple, Intel, and others. In late 1994 a connection between personal computers and the Internet was forged by Mosaic-the first World Wide Web browser. During the next several years the personal computer industry would be fundamentally altered. This was an "inflection point" (or paradigm shift) as described by Andy Gove in Only the Paranoid Survive. Sensing an opportunity to unseat Microsoft as the premier software developer Netscape viewed its web browser as a new platform for software development. Marc Andreesen boasted that the Netscape browser with java technology would reduce Microsoft Windows to a "poorly debugged set of device drivers." The prevailing platform would be the Netscape browser. Without question, Microsoft was caught off guard by the rapid emergence of the Internet. When Microsoft finally "got it" Netscape had established a solid installed base of satisfied users. Netscape had Microsoft in its sights. With the help of other competitors of Microsoft it embarked on a campaign to unseat Microsoft and allow for new competition to determine technology supremacy. When Microsoft finally figured out what was happening they went into battle mode. What else would we expect in a free market competitive economy? Now the challenge was to see who would emerge victorious. Microsoft had some advantages. Although it was late to understand and develop browsing software technology, it did have a dominant position in the old (then current) operating system technology. The personal computer technology was changing rapidly. Either Microsoft would adapt to this new Internet technology or it would eventually perish. What were its options? It could build a browser that competed with Netscape and fight head to head. It did this. Microsoft knew that if they lost the browser war they would place the leadership position of their corporation at risk. But in this head to head browser war Microsoft was at a distinct disadvantage. After all, Netscape did not simply want to become the premier browser program, they wanted, with the help of rivals, to replace the operating system supremacy of Microsoft with browser technology that would become the new operating system platform for application software. In short, Netscape wanted to unseat Windows. Obviousl