Thunder on Dnepr: Zhukov-Stalin and the Defeat of Hitler's Blitzkrieg

This book, published 13 years after "Operation Barbarossa" clarifies, complements and confirms the key points of the first book. Mr Fugate is a Russian historian and enthusiast and as such writes from a Russian perspective. Loaded with new information, the author goes back and enhances his first book. In his first book, the author not only presents the key facts of Operation Barbarossa but also presents a profile that Russia, despite making tactical mistakes, had a viable battle plan with a deliberate defense posture that enabled the Russians to eventually contain the German onslaught in front of Moscow in December 1941. From the author's prose in the first book, the reader can tell that the author feels the world has underestimated the Russians and wholeheartedly tries to correct that misconception. In the authors' new book certain topics are enhanced and expanded. On the section of prewar history, the authors include the influence that Russian strategists like Suvorov, Tukhachevsky, Kutuzov, Shaposhinikov and others will have on the thinking of Stalin and Zhukov when they frequently order counter-attacks. In addition to this new prewar history, new slivers of information on the Bialystok Salient, Smolensk, Yelnya, Kiev, and Velikie Luki is presented. The fighting at or near the Dniepr River is an essential part to the author's scenario of a Russian defense profile. Also Stalin's mistake at Kiev, the wrangling of the German officers (Halder, Jodl and especially Guderian) that caused so much trouble was expanded. Mistakes of the German offensive attacking Moscow so late in the year and the refusal to allow 2nd PzG to move with AGS into the Caucasus and the weaknesses of the Blitzkrieg tactics are also highlighted. There are a few maps and photos to add to the story. There is a Notes section and a Appendix which includes a number of secret documents that have been declassified that the author uses to buttress his defense of Russian capabilities. Much of this book is a holdover from "Operation Barbarossa" and was mildly disappointing by not having more new information but if you don't have the first book, I would recommend this book for the authors present a Russian scenario that is quite plausible and is a counter balance to the many German-centric books on the market. Even if you have "Operation Barbarossa", the low investment in this new book clearly offsets any duplication.

This remarkable book takes a completely fresh look at the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, using the Archives of the Soviet Ministry of Defence, the Soviet Army and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The authors are Brian Fugate, a distinguished American military historian, and Lev Dvoretsky, a retired Russian colonel and military historian.They present their findings in their opening words: ?It is an enduring myth of the twentieth century that the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 caught Stalin and the Red Army totally by surprise.? Their work demolishes this myth, sponsored by Khrushchev and repeated by virtually every historian since. For example, they found the logbook of Stalin?s appointments: he had meetings with thirteen political and military leaders on 21 June, and with nineteen on 22 June, which disproves Khrushchev?s claim that panic immobilised Stalin after the invasion.The book shows that the invasion did not catch Stalin and the Soviet High Command off guard: they had developed a skilful, innovative and highly secret plan to oppose it. This plan ensured that the Soviet Union would not only survive the biggest and most violent invasion in history, but would also defeat it. They developed the key elements of the strategy during three war games held in January and February 1941, probably the most important war games ever played.The Red Army considered war games the ultimate form of strategic planning, the best way to test alternative strategies. General Pavlov, Commander of the Western Front, advocated a forward strategy of defending Bialystok, which jutted 150 miles into the Nazi-controlled part of Poland, following with a counterattack into Germany. This strategy meant placing the Red Army?s main forces near the border. Marshal Timoshenko, commissar for defence, and General Zhukov, head of the Kiev Special Military District, proposed placing their main forces deep in Soviet territory for an active strategic defence. This would create the conditions for a counterattack by the strategic reserve that would sweep the invader out of the Soviet Union and destroy the core of his army. The general staff put the current military situation on the map board, then launched the Nazi attack and played out the moves, testing the two strategies. The first game tested Pavlov?s strategy. Zhukov led the German forces and broke through Pavlov?s defences, surrounding and annihilating them. The second game tested the Zhukov-Timoshenko strategy. Zhukov led the Red Army against Pavlov?s ?German? forces which had advanced deep into the Soviet Union. Zhukov counterattacked, outflanked and defeated Pavlov?s forces. The day after the Politburo received the reports of these games, it appointed Zhukov chief of the general staff. The authors discovered details of the third game in Timoshenko?s and Zhukov?s private papers. It tested a more developed version of the in-depth strategy, with a defence zoned in three eche

The authors have reconstructed, from circumstantial evidence, a revisionist interpretation of Red Army prewar planning and early war strategy. This is an excellent attempt to look at "the other side of the hill" (95% of what's out there being narrated from the German point of view. The authors know their material well, but the specifics of their case (a Soviet master plan based on February 1941 wargames kept secret from all but a handful of generals) hinges on only a few collateral documents. They can document a general similarity of Soviet operations with what they believe was the outcome of the wargame, but cannot conclusively link the two, except by arguing that Zhukov and Timoshenko were at the wargame and conducted grand strategy--ergo they must have employed the strategy from the game. This is dangerous ground upon which to rest your entire thesis. Nonetheless, this book is valuable for approaching the first weeks and months of the war from a Soviet perspective, and makes the point quite strongly that the Red Army had already thrown German operations off their timetable within the first month of the war.

This book has caused me to re-evaluate my views of the 1941 part of the Great Patriotic War and my approach to creating a simulation of this campaign. The defense of the upper Dnepr has been documented in other books, but, that this defense was pre-conceived and not just spur-of-the-moment or last-ditch scrambling has never been made clear before now. I'm not sold on everything the author(s) contend. (E.g., rather than believe Pavlov was set up for failure, I'm more inclined to believe that Stalin allowed Zhukov and Timoshenko to start preparing a defense in depth in case Pavlov was wrong, which possibility showed up from the wargames, and/or in case the Germans struck while the Red Army was still being re-organized.) I perceive there were a number of reasons why the blitzkrieg failed in the Soviet Union. It is evident from the information in this book, that Soviet strategy for a defense in depth was a contributor. Overall I'm very pleased with the presentation of information in this book. The fresh perspective is both interesting and rewarding.