The Theory of Moral Sentiments

There is no doubt Adam Smith is one of the greatest minds in history and this book embodies his insights on human nature. He did a theoretical review of ancient perspectives on moral theories, followed by his comments on each of the different schools of thoughts. It is always enjoyable to see how he explains and refutes on the fallacies of those thinkings, and in the process offers refined versions to the original. Though several examples of his brilliance have been mentioned by other comments, two uncited instances/traits of this book are probably worth mentioning: 1.) His insights on the system of sympathy. His analysis on sympathy is about as clear and concise as one could get, and is definitely enlightening to those not well learnt in moral philosophy. Symphathy, accordingly, is the basis for much of human emotions, and he argued forcefully on how the system of sympathy works in shaping our bahaviors and emotions, and how sympathy works differently when perceived situations changed. However, his usage of the word `sympathy' seems to cover the domain of both `compassion' and `sympathy' in normal man's vocabulary, indirectly suggesting that both are actually the same sentiment but differed because of different standpoints. Though so, one of his greatest contributions to moral philosophy is in the construction of this descriptive system of sympathy. 2.) His ability to strip twisted logics into manageable pieces and reconstruct them into good logic. For example, he explained that the doctrine of Bernard Mandeville, who "by means of this sophistry that he establishes his favorite conclusion, that private vice is public benefits." It is obvious from Adam Smith's point of view that private vice is not equal to public benefit, but because of the sophistication of the logical deduction involved, the less skillful or diligent minded people will fall prey to it. A quote from Part VI Section VII "These, described and exaggerated by the lively and humorous, though coarse and rustic eloquence of Dr Mandeville, have thrown upon his doctrines an air of truth and probability which is very apt to impose upon the unskillful." Anyway, there's lots of wisdom in this book, so read it slowly and only when you could focus your attention on it. There are some who find this book too long, but frankly it is not. Every sentence makes a point. Lastly, a favorite quote for your enjoyment: "Though none but the weakest and most worthless of mankind are much delighted with false glory, yet, by a strange inconsistency, false ignominy is often capable of mortifying those who appear the most resolute and determined."

The language is quaintly old but somehow that eases in. A voice from the past is telling you how our whole social fabric has come to be. It isn't driven by dogma. It is driven by pure reason and an uncanny perception. Strongly grounded in reality, and not just air headed philosophical blather, this is a great source for those who need to assign values to concepts - but not just based on faith or some dogma taken as truth without question. Adam Smith then turns that perceptual engine of his on speech, itself. It is an extra that, by itself, is worth the price of the book.

The book under review was published by LibertyClassics. Smith's "Theory of Moral Sentiments" (TMS) is both an excellent work of psychology and an eloquent exposition of philosophy. It was written about the same time as David Hume's and Francis Hutchinson's theories of moral sentiments (theory of benevolence) in the 18th century, departing from the ancient ethical paradigms of a priori ethics and reaching instead toward an empirical, a posteriori ethics for modernity. Rather than deducing first principles from the philosopher's armchair, Smith's account begins with experience, habit, and custom based on nature's disposition of mankind's moral constitution. Therefore, it is a wholly modern theory, and in many ways anticipates Darwinism and evolutionary biology (EB). Smith's ethical account is grounded entirely in observation. Nature, custom, habit, and experience teach us its principles, which comports with both our internal judgments and our external evaluations. By our imagination, we place ourselves as if we are the other person, conceiving ourselves as if we were that person. Our emotions well up with an "analogous emotion" of the other, vicariously experiencing the other's pleasures and pain, his gratitude and resentment, becoming sympathetic to the other's plight as though it were our own. Love and gratitude are agreeable sensations, while hatred and resentment are disagreeable passions. Our sympathy for the other is measured like that of "an impartial spectator" who we become by viewing another's motives and actions by our own in accordance with our own sense of propriety, moral sense (duty), and benevolence, by "bringing the case home to ourselves." "Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of the like faculty in another. I judge of your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reason by my reason, of your resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love" (I.i.3.10). "We approve of another mans judgment, not as something useful, but as right, as accurate, as agreeable to truth and reality" (I,i.4.4). Conscious of another person's situation generates sympathy in ourselves, and the correspondence with one another, is "sufficient for the harmony of society" (I.i.4.6). "To feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature . . . .as to love our neighbor as we love ourselves is the great law of Christianity . . . . as our neighbor is capable of loving us" (I.i.5.5). Based upon these primary motives of gratitude and resentment (foreshadowing Trivers' and Hamilton's reciprocal altruism in EB) leads to an analysis of grief and joy, anger and love, suffering and enjoyments, distress and relief, envy and magnanimity, and all the other binary emotional relations. To each emotion we attach a "proportionable recompense" for merit and demerit, reward and punishment. A sympathetic imagination or indignation nat

To truly understand Adam Smith's economic masterpiece "The Wealth of Nations", one must understand its moral foundation. Without Smith's essential prequel, "The Theory of Moral Sentiments", the more famous "Wealth of Nations" can easily be misunderstood, twisted, or dismissed. Smith rightly lays the premise of his economics in a seedbed of moral philosophy -- the rights and wrongs, the whys and why-nots of human conduct. Smith's capitalism is far from a callous, insensitive, greed-motivated, love-of-profits-at-any-cost approach to the marketplace, when seen in the context of his "Moral Sentiments." [Note: This book is a "page for page reproduction" of a two volume edition published in 1817, which is reflected in my pagination references.]Smith's first section deals with the "Propriety of Action". The very first chapter of the book is entitled "Of Sympathy". This is very telling of Smith's view of life, and his approach to how men should conduct their lives. "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it." (p 1:1). Later Smith asserts that this "sympathy, however, cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a selfish principle." (p 2:178) This propriety of conduct undergirds all social, political and economic activities, private and public. When Smith observes that "hatred and anger are the greatest poisons to the happiness of a good mind" (p 1:44) he is speaking not only of interpersonal relationships but of its moral extensions in the community and world. Smith treats the passions of men with clinical precision, identifying a gamut of passions like selfishness, ambition and the distinction of ranks, vanity, intimidation, drawing examples from history and various schools of philosophy. He extols such quiet virtues as politeness, modesty and plainness, probity and prudence, generosity and frankness -- certainly not the qualities of the sterotypical cartoon of a capitalist robber-baron. Indeed Smith is contemptuous of the double standards employed by cults of celebrity: "The great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers...of wealth and greatness" paying lip-service to wisdom and virtue, yet Smith oserves, "there is scarce any man who does not respect more the rich and the great, than the poor and the humble. With most men the presumption and vanity of the former are much more admired, than the real and solid merit of the latter. It is scarce agreeable to good morals or even good language...that mere wealth and greatness, abstracted from merit and virtue, deserve our respect." (p 1:79) Tragically, the wealthy celebrity foists a dangerous pattern upon the public, "even their vices and follies are fashionable;and the greater part of men are proud to imitate and resemble them in the very qualities which dishonour and degrade them." (pp 1

This book, the first published by Adam Smith, was very favorably received when it was first appeared in 1759. Within a few generations, however, it was largely neglected due to various turns taken in moral philosophy. Smith's approach is to paint the moral aspect of living in vivid colors, so that it literally inspires virtuous conduct. But in doing so, Smith never preaches; instead, he illustrates the beauty of virtue even over the practical advantages of living as though one were an "Ideal Observer" or spectator. This perspective plays a large role in his work, for according to Smith the moral perspective, and indeed conscience itself, is largely a function of adopting the point of view of the "person principally concerned" in morally relevant situations, and subsequently sympathizing with the perspective of the various parties involved. Sympathy for Smith is not soft-heartednes (nor headedness), but is instead identification with the motives and feelings of the parties involved. The volume includes one part devoted to an examination of the history of ethical theory, interpreted through the lense of Smith's own sentimentalist theory. One thing that should be noted about The Theory of Moral Sentiments is that it goes a good way in correcting the impression that Smith was a laissez-faire capitalist, and indeed the sentiments expressed here make it clear that the popular conception of Smith as first and foremost an economist concerned with automatic regulation resulting from an "invisible hand" (a phrase used only twice in all of Smith's writings, as explained by the editors in the excellent introduction to this volume), do not mesh well with the historical facts. He was a professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow University, and is reputed to have declared himself most proud, not of his most (and justly) famous, The Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, but of this book instead. Indeed, his headstone reads, "Here Lies Adam Smith, Author of The Theory Of Moral Sentiments and of The Wealth of Nations." The book's major shortcoming is its ultimately unsatisfying appeals to human nature at junctures where people clearly have disagreements. Smith's defense of retributive justice is an example, for today we might well see ourselves as involved in a struggle to move beyond such a conception of what constitutes appropriate behavior, despite the natural propensity that we may have toward it. Despite its age, this book will inspire and challenge people now struggling with moral dilemmas, and the comparatively confusing moral climate of our own time. It is good to see it in print, and it is good to see moral philosophers and others beginning to discuss its significance once again. I recommend it highly.