Strategy: Second Revised Edition

"Business", "Theatre", or "Politics"; that B.H. Liddell Hart was a soldier and a military theorist/historian rather than businessman, a playwright or a politician is the only reason this work is not otherwise so named, and thus focused. His own limited martial experience, later enlightened and informed by exhaustive professional study, enabled his use of the history of warfare for a verdant field of analogy, metaphor and example. An alternate approach to the study of waging war is expressly not his chief intent, however. Advocacy for the "indirect approach" is his ultimate purpose. Unlike many military writers, ancient and modern, who reduce their theories to slim maxims out of "superficial obfuscation" more often than "genuine profundity" Liddell Hart's readers are treated to illustrations from the Hoplites of classical Greece, to the hydrogen bomb and the early Cold War. That the "consequences of failure in war are greater than in any other human enterprise", Liddell Hart's use of military examples is especially useful in communicating his main; though not necessarily exclusively military, premise. The author does not offer a cursory introduction and overview to military history and strategy, but he carefully selects and examines contests of will, some of them bloodless, which convincingly support his central theme: the superiority of "expending brains instead of blood", of "fighting with the legs instead of the fists". Moving always along the "line of least expectation" and striking with the greatest surprise. A commander's grasp of the "indirect approach"; while quantifiable in material and geographic victories, is best understood through its impact psychologically - the havoc and confusion it achieves in the mind of the opponent. The aim of "grand strategy" then is the engineering of conditions, circumstances and perceptions which make ultimate defeat of an enemy on the battlefield an historic inevitability or a mere useful finality for a specific contest. Though every vignette is culled from military history, minimum imagination and extrapolation will yield the obvious applicability of the "indirect approach" to business, romance, entertainment or politics - any field of human endeavor where one will contends for supremacy or influence over another

Although I teach corporate strategy, I read this classic work on military strategy to broaden my understanding of the nature of strategy. In particular, this book emphasized the utility of the indirect versus direct attack, and drew examples from the Civil War, WWI, and WWII. Unlike Clauswitz approach of massing strength and marching up the middle as expected by the enemy, Hart's indirect attack epitomizes the expression, "Choose your battles". This means forcing the enemy to engage when and where you prefer, in a battle that works to your advantage and their disadvantage. The indirect attack is the unexpected route; it opens up a new front where the foe is unprepared to fight, much like the action taken by Norman Schwartzkopf in Desert Storm with his now famous "left hook" maneuver. The logic of the indirect attack is that it changes the point of engagement at an inopportune moment for the enemy, and in doing so, captures the initiative, creates a dilemma for the opposition, gains the psychological upper hand by catching the opponent off-guard and confusing their response. The indirect strategy applies equally well to the military as it does to business, not to mention football, chess, politics, debate, the list goes on. I see parallels in this, for example, with Hewlett-Packard's indirect attack on the computer industry, which avoided its rivals superior strength in PCs, and instead attacked at the periphery in the printer market where the rivals were weak and caught by surprise. Overall a very interesting book.

This book was used by the Air Force for training 10 years ago; I don't know whether it still is (it certainly should be). The book is divided into two sections, a survey of military strategy from ancient history through the end of WWII, and then a summation and analysis of the lessons learned (with some discussion of the pros and cons of Clausewitz's On War). While a bit dense, the survey is important as it gives you a much better understanding of Liddell Hart's brilliant indirect approach.Liddell Hart does not follow the Clausewitz-ian theory that "blood is the price of victory". Rather he views strategy as a way to minimize the need for armed conflict through moral and physical dislocation of ones enemy. He also keeps an eye on grand strategy and the quality of the peace that is to be achieved after a conflict (something that Clausewitz loses track of).

Here Liddell Hart sums up his principles of strategy, illustrating his ideas with examples throughout history. Critics have claimed, with some justice, that he got too wrapped up in his major idea, the "indirect approach," and oversimplified the campaigns he reviewed here to bolster his point. What a reader must realize, however, is that by the time this book was written, much of Liddell Hart's approach had been battle-tested, with spectacular results: among those who credited him were Guderian, Rommel, and Montgomery. If his "indirect approach" is not universally effective, especially against opponents who have also read the book, it is still brilliant and valuable.Liddell Hart seems to have fallen into disfavor in U.S. military circles, to a degree that cannot be explained simply by his disagreement with Clausewitz about the necessity of destroying the main force of the enemy. While not crediting him, the U.S. applied an indirect approach, emphasizing rapid maneuver, with great success in the Gulf War. Perhaps the explanation lies in a careful reading of the last chapter, added in the 1967 edition, in which he suggests that counter-guerilla warfare must aim to disrupt the guerillas' sources of supply and liaison with allied regular forces nearby -- in short, to win, the U.S. needed to isolate the battlefield. Maybe the U.S. thinkers didn't want to hear this -- and it hasn't helped that, once again, he was absolutely right.So, by all means, read this book carefully. But then also readhis critics. Nobody, even Liddell Hart (or Clausewitz, or Sun Tzu) had all the answers, and the art of applying past principles to future conflicts keeps changing.

Liddell Hart's thesis on indirect strategy has always been grounded on two things: the use of surprise and the importance of manoeuvre. This indirect strategy is predicated on his firm belief that wars/battles should be won quickly, decisively, and with the least amount of casaulties. In this book, he continuously demonstrates to the reader that, ironically in almost every century, the uses of surprise and manoeuvres have largely been ignored by most military leaders except the competent ones. This book then is therefore not only a commentary on strategy but it is a voice intended to remind the reader the necessity and usefulness of a strategy that could minimize deaths and has proven itself to be most effective way of winning a war. Hart strongly believes that we should learn from history to avoid repeating the same mistakes over and over again. As always with Liddell Hart's work, this book is written in a lucid manner and full of life. Highly recommend.