The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost

This book is a general encylcopedic type that cover alot of topics.A person could use this book to write and expand on alot of the topics covered in this book.For instance there were numerous references to illegal substance abuse by Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan,very similar to US soldiers during the Vietnam era.This includes some officers as well. The Soviet war machine was geared toward a "civilized" European war and was completely unprepared for the insurgency style guerilla war that occurred in Afghanistan,also very similar to the US experience in Vietnam.Apparently the Soviet supply system wasn't able to adapt well to the vast distances that this war encompassed and the Soviet equipment broke down badly,leaving frontline troops to improvise on "scissors and paste".There are excellent summations by Soviet military writers at the beginning and end of each chapter so if you miss what is being said in the read,you can still "get it" from the summations.Indeed the chapter summations would give one a good general outline of the war in itself. There is also a chapter devoted to ideology.Apparently the Soviets self image of,"the good guys who are devoted to workers of the world",meant little to nothing to the general Afghan population.Militant type Islam has a bigger influence on the Afghanis and the Mujahadeen have no scruples about using terrorism on local Afghanis.In addition the Mujadin are being funded and trained by Russia's superpower enemies,constructing a Mujahadeen terrorist"Frankenstein" type monster that will come back to permanently haunt the west.The authors of this book have done a great job,books like these while not a "soldiers story" can save lives in a next conflict by the abundance of interpretive info.

Let me first start off that this is not a quick easy read. It goes into VERY small detail about practically everything in the Soviet-Afghan War. However, some of the small things that the author goes over gets very boring very quick. When you read this book, it almost feels like a battle manual for the Soviet-Afghan War. However, when you get done reading the book, its probably the closest one person can come to understanding the war without actually being there. The drawings in the book are also very useful to help spell out what the author is saying. All in all, the book does not give an action/adventure story of the war, but when you comprehend it, you will have a firm understanding of what the war was like from an operational point of view

On many occasions during my reading of this book, I was filled with questions. Eventually, each and every question was answered in full. It covers everything from footwear of the Airborne forces to the pay of senior officers. It's filled with hard won knowledge of a largely misunderstood (by both Russia and the west) war. I was constantly struck by some comparisons with U.S. Army, Vietnam experience. We see an army, known for it's operational and technical excellence, finding its strengths of little or no use in a hostile and underdeveloped country. Although the 40th Army made some adaptations to their environment, they suffered from, "an ideological blind spot in the Marxist-Leninist tenets." Let's hope that the U.S. Mandarins who are running the present war in Afghanistan read this book. It would be great tragedy to see ideological blind spots cause a repeat of the Soviet experience. The organization of this book is worth noting. Each chapter covers a given subject, written by a different Russian officer who we can assume is a subject matter expert. As I alluded to earlier, I would be filled with questions at the end of some of these chapters. The editors always came to my rescue by adding their own comments in the end of each chapter and subject that neatly answered all questions. This is one of those books that should be read by every serving officer and enlisted man in the armed forces. It not only gives a clear and understandable view of how combat maneuver units work, but also logistics, combat support and all the other services that make war possible and impossible, or were used and misused. While I'm on the subject of who should read this book, it might be even more important for politicians and Foreign Service officers to study it thoroughly. This book showcases the disconnect between policy that's easily created and the effort it takes to enact that policy.

Les Grau had already firmly established himself as an expert on Soviet and Russian tactical operations in Afghanistan before the release of this latest work. Here he partners with Michael Gress to provide a timely translation of the Russian General Staff's perspectives on the Soviet military's war in that nation. The result is a fine work that offers members of the United States and other armed forces a number of valuable lessons. It is apparent as we watch current events that many of these were known and taken into account. The use of special operations forces and focus on those nodes of greatest criticality have served allied interests well. Yet it is unfortunate that this book was unavailable a few months earlier, for other lessons proffered by Grau and Gress have been learned at unfortunate cost. That competing interest groups in Afghan society seek to use U.S. firepower against potential foes other than the common enemy has become all too obvious. The authors let their readers know that such internal struggles were also characteristic of the Soviet's conflict. The Soviet-Afghan War may have been a different military against a different enemy a decade ago, but its study is still of pertinence today. Les Grau and Michael Gress should be thanked for making its lessons available. That they have done so with so readable a translation and such insightful supplementary analysis makes their feat all the more notable.

The Russian/Soviet General Staff is well known and highly esteemed for its comprehensive studies of past Wars and Campaigns. Following the Afghan War, a small group of Senior Officers gathered together to publish a history of the Soviet War experience in Afghanistan. They hoped to pass on the hard won lessons of their war onto a new generation of Russian officers who are currently engaged in guerilla wars in the Caucusus and Central Asia. Unfortunately, there has been little interest in publishing their book in Russia. In an effort to get their book published they turned to Lt. Col Grau, an American soldier/scholar of the Russian Army. "The Soviet Afghan War" is an attempt to distill lessons from a bitter experience. The Soviet Army that rolled into Afghanistan in 1979 was a formidable force trained to do battle with NATO in Western Europe. They were unprepared for a guerilla war waged in the high mountains and deserts of Afghanistan. However, as the war progressed, the Soviets learned and adpopted new tactics. The Army that left Afghanistan was radically transformed. This learning process is at the core of the book.This is the third book in Lt. Col Grau's trilogy on the Soviet Afghan War. "The Bear Went Over the Mountain" is about combat as seen through the eyes of Platoon and Company Leaders. "The Other Side of the Mountain" is war and all its tactical permutations as seen by the Muhajadeen. "The Soviet Afghan War" is the big picture as seen by colonels and generals. Of the three books, "The Soviet Afghan War" is the most intellectually satisfying.