The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency

THE SECRET SENTRY is a master-work of a real historian - Matthew Aid has very carefully collated and correlated recently de-classified documents to provide a clear path through major events. His analysis is thoughtful, and doesn't appear to over-reach or invent. Other reviewers have stated that THE SECRET SENTRY is not a "casual" book. I disagree: it is eminently readable, particularly for a historical overview. The reader is not bombarded with minutiae, but a careful, well-measured collection of major historical episodes. Where appropriate, the time of day is included to inform the reader and clearly display how the course of events relates to and influences the actions of decision makers. This presentation also shows how politicians have repeatedly (privately) mis-interpreted and (publicly) mis-represented information to the public. Chapters are broken into short segments, highlighting the relevance of a given event to the larger chapter topic while avoiding the "droning" typical of many histories. (For those interested in minutiae, the references section is impressive.) I whole-heartedly recommend this book. It clearly shows the impact - positive and negative - of the intelligence community on U.S. national and world events.

The National Security Agency (NSA) wears one of the thicker cloaks of secrecy among the agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). For this reason any book that purports to be "The Untold History of" the NSA ought to be viewed with suspicion. In this case however Matthew Aid has actually produced an accurate and compelling history of NSA. Perhaps equally important his book does not compromise any of NSA's sensitive sources and methods. This book can serve to provide the context for better understanding James Bamford's series of books on NSA and indeed to understand NSA itself. That being said this book by necessity is very much a surface treatment of a very complex institution. For example it is focused entirely on the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID) to the exclusion of NSA's equally important Information Assurance Directorate (IAD). Also Aid is much too kind in his discussion of NSA management over the years. For example although he mentions the NSA unplanned three day outage, but fails to mention that NSA management had been repeatedly warned that this was exactly going to happen by folks both within the agency and by outside consultants for at least two years before the event (which was a lot more the "main processing computer"). As for General Hayden's fabled "100 Days of Change", it did not hit NSA "like a tidal wave", but more like another round of meaningless rhetoric. The only tangible result was the implementation of the disastrous `Trailblazer' initiative which succeeded in squandering millions of dollars and whatever goodwill NSA had left with the congress. So a good book within limitations that provides probably the most solid unclassified history of NSA that has yet been written.

Not a book for the casual reader but an excellent overview of the NSA. The story begins during World War II and it is revealed that many countries, enemies and allies, were targeted by those working in Signals Intelligence. Cracking Russian codes began in January 1943 on the orders of Brigadier General Carter Clarke. The FBI's Special Intelligence Service knew about Russian spies in the United States (see The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence by Raymond J. Batvinis), but could do little about it. This book reveals why. Even though a large number of Soviet spies were identified in the late 1940s and the 1950s, there were not many criminal indictments or convictions. From this book: "But most of the agents who spied for Russia were never indicted because it might (?) have revealed U.S. success in breaking Russian codes." I mention Joseph McCarthy because of a new book titled Blacklisted by History by M. Stanton Evans. It is now obvious that he could not be allowed to succeed against a very real Soviet menace in the United States. In light of this, I think it is necessary to correlate this information and rewrite Cold War history, especially regarding the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union beginning in World War II. The Signals community could not publicly tell what it knew at the time. That said, I am in general agreement with the other reviewers regarding NSA history from the Korean War to the present. I think any errors would only be apparent to those with specialized knowledge. In any case, it is disquieting to see that such intelligence was sometimes used selectively or disregarded, apparently on the hunch of those in charge in the military. The only "flaw" in the book is that the roles played by other intelligence agencies who were also gathering Signals Intelligence, especially the CIA, are not made quite clear. However, that would have likely expanded the page count considerably.

The Secret Sentry is an extraordinary book, providing much more information about the activities of the National Security Agency (NSA) then was previously available. Some people will know that the NSA history unit has recently released volumes of material on aspects of the history of the agency. In some measure these releases were due to Matthew Aid, the author of the book. Matthew served in the old Air Force Security Service, one of the service arms of NSA. He has experience inside the system but has done extraordinary research in the records held by the National Archives and Records Administration facility at College Park. The quality of his efforts have been so good that other people, once they became aware of his endeavors, who worked in the NSA world have shared experiences with him. Matthew discovered that the people who were supposed to cull records before they were transfered to College Park missed a lot of documents. He also learned to effectively use the Freedom of Information Act to nudge documents out of NSA and other intelligence organizations. The net result is a work that provides more insight into the operations of the Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) community than has been available before. It is an up and down story with both successes and failures. But the important insight that emerges is that SIGINT often has provided the greatest volume of material used by the services, other intelligence agencies, and the White House. During the Vietnam War much of the intelligence that the military and political structure used to fight the conflict came from SIGINT. Also, there were times when NSA broke into Russian communications, although not often enough. Matthew provides an surprising amount of information on the use and misuse of SIGINT from the Gulf War to the present. His history also makes clear, that as was the case with Pearl Harbor, SIGINT information can be so volumonous that important facts can lost or overlooked until it is too late. He also reminds us that when polititians become their own intelligence officers the result is often dismal, if not to say distorted. For the sake of ethical accountability, I wish to disclose that I know Matthew Aid and have been after him for years to publish his research. I also was a member of the NSA family, having served in the old Army Security Agency, with two tours of Vietnam (his depiction of SIGINT use in Vietnam is the best I have seen). It should also be understood that many of the chapters in the book could individually be expanded into book-length studies. Matthew has much more data than he was able to use in the book. Actually, the publisher, Bloomsbury, is to be acknowledge to allow almost a quarter of the book to be footnotes. It is unusual for a book on intelligence, particularly one from a commercial publisher, to be so heavily documented. A final note: the book is quite accessible and a fast read because of the way it is organized. The book could have used

Were some of the employees asked before the eighties of the previous century whether they worked for the NSA they would probably laugh and reply that NSA stood for:"No Such Agency".However,even the most guarded secrets will eventually come to the surface.This is what happened with the NSA,which was established by President Truman's decree in 1952. Matthew Aid has invested two decades of research on this fascinating aspect of American intelligence and has produced the best and most authoritative history of this mammoth governmental agency, which employs today more than forty thousand men and women. The founding father of the NSA was General Carter Clarke-a much controversial figure, a college dropout who was one of those who chased Pancho Villa un Mexico under the command of John Pershing.This was in the early forties. The book is divided into various chapters focusing each on another dramatic event, such as the role SIGINT played in the Cuban Missile Crisis during 1962- a time when the world was facing Armageddon.But in spite of the many efforts to collect data on the Soviet Union's moves, the NSA had not been able to discern the minds of their adversary.It was the flights of the U-2 which were responsible for the detection of the missiles in Cuba. Other chapters are about the role of the NSA in the Vietnam War.Here the conclusion is that the NSA has produced some significant stuff which was tragically ignored by the policy -makers in Washington. The Six-Day War ,the Soviet downing of the 007 Korean Airline flight,the role of the agency during the Reagan years are discussed as well. A third of the book is about the more recent times, namely:Iraq ,the controversy over the mass destruction weapons there ,SIGINT and the combatting of the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and the current status of the NSA. With only minor exceptions,the history of the NSA is mainly one of failures due to a number of reasons.To make a long story short, the message of the book is: too much information can sometimes be detrimental to the efforts invested in order to produce accurate and valuable analysis about the opponent's intentions. Second,SIGINT wasn't, isn't and will probably never be the factor which will be the most important segment of intelligence,on the contrary:when tens of thousands of computers and other high- tech means of this agency are engaged in an endless battle against low-tech of terrorists in Afghanistan or other third-world countries and seems to be losing the battle daily, the conclusion is that smaller is better and more efficient. Despite the money and resources invested,the short golden days of the NSA are over.It will be HUMINT combined with SIGINT which will be able to assist policy- makers in the best possible way. I recommend this extremely well-researched book (and its 97 detailed endnotes)to anyone interested in the way SIGINT intelligence works.You will enjoy each chapter of it very much.