The Secret of Stalingrad

In the Preface, the opening paragraph summarizes the book stating "This is about Stalingrad and how it was fought and why at the turning point in the struggle on the eastern front the United States and Great Britain invaded North Africa instead of the coast of France as almost everyone in those days expected." The text notes that during WWII Moscow "was a secretive city in a secretive state waging a secretive war." Even, the front line was unclear in the public's mind and few knew the names of Russian field commanders. Interestingly, an accurate/extensive civilian "grapevine" was developed which kept the public informed.This book reviews the military and diplomatic events preceding the Battle of Stalingrad. The German High Command had misgivings about the eastern front in 1942, but Hitler assured them all was well as he planned to attack the Caucasus for their oil and food. Accurate intelligence was lacking for both combatants with the Germans tending to overrate their own forces while underestimating the enemy. Stalin, however, was better informed and did an excellent job of concealing his large number of reserves units. The text notes that even after the war that the Russians continued to conceal the role of these reserve units for reasons of military security or political necessity.The diplomatic card game played by Stalin was intriguing. Stalin played his cards close to the chest, revealing nothing. Britain and the United States, however, failed to ask the right questions (in many cases asked no questions at all) that would have revealed the true military situation on the eastern front. Answers were needed before a second front could be opened. Stalin simply told his coalition partners nothing making effective coalition warfare impossible as mutual confidence was lacking. Stalin wanted a second front in Europe in 1943 and purposely led Roosevelt and Churchill to believe that Russia was in extremis. However, Churchill convinced Roosevelt to move to North Africa in 1942, and George Marshall thought this 1942 move would make it impossible to invade France in 1943. Thus a common integrated allied strategy was not developed.The author narrates the tactics and moves of the German 6th Army as it thrust to the Volga River and the capture of Stalingrad. An angry Stalin annoyed that there would be no second front in Europe in 1942 and suspicious of his army's will to defend Stalingrad to death, issued on July 28 the terrifying directive to not yield any ground in Stalingrad. The closer the Germans got to Stalingrad, the less room they had to maneuver and the farther they were from their base of supplies so that the Russian Army was able to initiate a counteroffensive to encircle and cutoff the German 6th Army. Stalin issued orders on September 12, 1942 to develop a powerful counteroffensive. The significance of 12 September passed unnoticed in Washington and London. Stalin's deception of his allies continued as the author notes on page 227 "On October