The Second Oldest Profession

THE SECOND OLDEST PROFESSION was one of the very few books that James J. Martin favorably reviewed late in life. This is instructive even though historical events covered in this book may seem passe, the book is instructive on how spies, moles, bureaucrats, etc. perpeturate illegal spying and false alarms. Knightly begins his book with events in the early 20th century. He undermines the lurid stories of Mata Hari and others. One should note that Mati Hari was innocent of any spying and was a convenient scapegoat for the misfortunes of the French during World WarI. Of course, there is little notice of U.S. executives trying to do business with the National Socialist regime during the 1930s including the Duponts. Knightly also clearly documents the exaggerated claims of the German air force and ground forces. The intelligence lads claimed that the Germans had an air force that was less than one-third of the official estimates. All the facinating yearns of British intelligence during World War II are gross exaggerations. If the British were so alert to German military operations, one must ask why it took six years for the British and their "allies" to defeat the Germans who were outnumbered by about six to one, outgunned, and out resourced. One should note that the exaggerated claims of German might is well documented in Burton Klein's book titled GERMANY'S ECONOMIC PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. Knightly's exposure of the British and U.S. blunders during the Cold War is amusing and interesting. For example, both U.S. and British "experts" completely missed Kim Philby's spying for the Soviets, and no one was aware until Mr. Philby appeared in the Soviet Union. The CIA's assessment of the Korean War and their denial that the Chinese Communists getting involved is interesting. Knightly's study of the Soviet's nuclear bomb research is most interesting. Post World War II assessments from U.S. intelligence communities reported that the Soviets were 20 years from developing nuclear weapons. Yet, as Knightyly carefully presents, the Soviets shocked U.S. "experts" on August 29, 1949 when they detonated a nuclear weapon. Knighlly poses interesting questions of why the Soviets completed one of the most important weapons of the 20th century, and no one in the West had any idea. The political grandstanding of professional anti-Communists and then Congressman Richard Nixon's complaint of the Communists in the government missed the point. Knightly reveals that the Soviets started developing nuclear weapons in 1940 but could not complete this development due to the carnage inflicted by the Germans during World War II. Mr. Knightly also reveals the blunders of the CIA and others re the Vietnam War. This should not be too surprising because members of the U.S. House and Senate could even find the place on a map and knew absolutly nothing about the history of the area. Neither did the "experts" in the CIA. Knightly's concern is over the power and secr

Phillip Knightley's book is a frontal attack against the intelligence business. He poses the rhetoric question: 'Is there a justification for expensive, virtually incontrollable intelligence agencies in peace time?' 'The secrecy which surrounds them, corrodes a democratic society, contracts our civil liberties ... They spend more time protecting their budgets and their establishments and invent new justifications for their existence.' For the author, 'open, published information and that obtained through traditional contacts have proved more useful.' He illustrates his thesis profusely with examples where nobody trusts and believes nobody. Even specialized authors can only give hypotheses about what really went on: the Hollis affair, the Penkovsky - Nosenko - Golitsyn defections, the Sorge spy ring (Stalin didn't believe Sorge when he cabled the exact date of the Barbarossa invasion), the Lucy spy ring, the Kim Philby affair (discovered only after nearly 30 years). Intelligence agencies have become wellsprings of power in our society, secret clubs for the privileged. Their cost is prohibitive, but the powerful are ready to protect their privileges at any cost ... for the entire population. If democratic regimes constitute a threat for their holdings (mostly oil) or their credo (no distributive taxation), intelligence services will intervene. Some of these interventions were highly effective indeed (the PM Wilson affair in Great-Britain, Indonesia, Guatemala, the Philippines, Colombia, the Shah's Iran), at least in the short run. In the long run, they turn whole populations against the US. That 'any global group of this size must be intensely concerned with its survival', can be illustrated by the fate of President Kennedy, who wanted to 'splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds.' The culprits behind the assassination are clearly exposed in Gregory Douglas's book 'Regicide', based on the memoirs of CIA chief Angleton, one of the main characters in this book. Although written before the fall of the Berlin Wall, this is still a very topical book about 'freedom and democracy' in the world. It reads like a thriller. It contains also certain corrections on the author's former book 'The Philby Conspiracy'.

In "The Second Oldest Profession," Phillip Knightley has penned a compelling account of the ongoing saga of the British Secret Intelligence Service, a once-'non-existent' organization that was gestated appropriately enough in the fantasies of Rudyard Kipling's Great Game and pre-World War I spy novels. These, the author notes, ignited a frenzy of hysteria against various enemies, both actual and imaginary. As SIS became a reality (and other agencies and nations joined in the intelligence rush) the fantasy became compounded--often careening out of control--due to the deception that is, necessarily, embedded in the core of espionage. Mr. Knightley questions whether governments ought to sponsor intelligence agencies, which, he notes, tend to be costly, self-perpetuating many-headed monsters, the growth of which "always seems to be accompanied by a reduction in civil liberties" (p. 366). Thriving on "secrecy which corrodes a democratic society," the intelligence monster "juggles all our destinies in the name of protecting them" (p. 392), a proposition that seems even more cogent today than in 1986 when the book was first published. Phillip Knightley's books are eminently readable, and "The Second Oldest Profession" is no exception. The book, which serves as a reader's guide to British intelligence agencies (e.g., SIS, MI5, SOE) with stopovers at the Abwehr, the KGB, and the CIA, is fascinating, both to the reader approaching the topic for the first time and to the "addict," who cannot get enough of the subject. With considerable wit (e.g., "KGB: Dzerzhinsky's Pride, Stalin's Prejudice"), Mr. Knightley rounds up the usual suspects--a cast of "thousands" whose names have become household words (at least, in some households). In relating the notable triumphs and even more notable disasters of the intelligence world, Phillip Knightley never fails to inform and to whet the interests of his readers.

In "The Second Oldest Profession," Phillip Knightley has penned a compelling account of the ongoing saga of the British Secret Intelligence Service, an organization that began appropriately enough in the fantasies of Rudyard Kipling's Great Game and pre-World War I spy novels. These ignited a frenzy of hysteria against various enemies, both actual and imaginary. As the SIS became a reality (and other nations joined into the rush for intelligence) the fantasy became compounded--often careening out of control-- due to the deception that, necessarily, lies at the core of espionage. Knightley questions whether governments ought to sponsor intelligence agencies, which, he notes, tend to be costly, self-perpetuating many-headed monsters, the growth of which "always seems to be accompanied by a reduction in civil liberties" (p. 366). Similarly, he observes that the intelligence monster "juggles all our destinies in the name of protecting them. And it is able to do all this because of the secrecy with which it surrounds itself, a secrecy which corrodes a democratic society" (p. 392). As long as such secrecy endures, the monster will thrive! Phillip Knightley's books are always eminently readable, and "The Second Oldest Profession" is no exception. Relating both SIS's notable successes and their even more notable disasters, the author never ceases to inform and entertain his readers.

Phillip Knightly's THE SECOND OLDEST PROFESSION is one of the better books on secret intelligence that I've come across. He starts in the early part of the 20th century, and presents a convincing argument that the whole concept of the need for intelligence was based largely on *misinformation*. He also suggests that the Soviet's huge intelligence empire was essentially a reasonable *response* to the massive attempts of the West to overturn the Russian revolution, culminating in the failed assassination attempt on Lenin. (Imagine how history might have been different if the Russians had been initially approached with any kind of cooperation in mind!) With those beginnings, he goes on to show how the whole intelligence enterprise has essentially been a secret "comedy" of terrible errors. The main exception, perhaps, might be World War II, though even that era was no bright and shining star. His study of the Cold War era is both fascinating and well informed. This is one of the basic books for anyone interested in the subject.Now that a bit more time has passed, it's interesting to be able fill in the blanks where this book left off (it was published about 15 years ago). In the light of news from the last several years, we can see now what some of the figures in the book could only guess. One of Kingsley's themes, you see, is that from day one, the Soviet intelligence service was consistently the real Master in this game. After a major spy was uncovered a couple decades ago, James Angleton (of the CIA) always maintained there was another mole yet to be uncovered. Angleton was somewhat ridiculed for his views, and seen as overly paranoid. Now, in 2001, we've discovered that the top counterintelligence directors in both Great Britain *and* the CIA were, in fact, Soviet spies. So, as Kingsley maintains in this book---with rare exceptions, the Soviets knew all along *everything* that they needed to know! Imagine that.Again, highly recommended for those who like this sort of thing.