The Rehnquist Choice: The Untold Story of the Nixon Appointment That Redefined the Supreme Court

This is either a fascinating or frightening account, depending on your viewpoint, of how in 1971 William Rehnquist was chosen to be nominated by Richard Nixon to the Supreme Court as an Associate Justice. The author was, of course, counsel to the President at the time and intimately involved in the process. Dean has drawn on his own recollections and notes, as well as having made excellent use of those infamous Nixon tapes which captured many of the key conversations involved in the mechanics of selection. Nixon was determined to re-shape the Court, but had been frustrated with his prior nominations of Haynesworth and Carswell. Dean argues that Nixon (with the aid of Rehnquist who was an Assistant Attorney General at the time) tried to create openings by encouraging a Douglas impeachment and the resignation of Fortas. When it became evident that Justices Black and Harlan, due to illness, would soon be leaving the Court, the "process" (if you want to call it that) began. Approximately 38 individuals were under consideration at some point, including Agnew, Bickel, Senator Byrd, Arlen Specter, Howard Baker, and Caspar Weinberger to name just a few. Dean devotes most attention to Representative Richard Poff, Judge Mildred L. Lillie, Herschel Friday, and Senator Byrd and how they were considered. Throughout the process, Rehnquist's name is mentioned by various folks, but he is never really in the running. The process swerves on erratically, names drop off, new names are added, and Nixon's frustration with leaks and the American Bar Association explodes. In the end, Nixon backtracks and offers one slot to Lewis Powell, who had been cut earlier due to his age, and is close to offering the second to Howard Baker. But Baker, as Dean terms it, "dithers" and wants more time and suddenly in a key almost off-hand discussion between Nixon and Richard Moore, his Special Counsel, Rehnquist's name pops up again, and Nixon learns for the first time that he had been second in his class at Stanford and had clerked for Justice Jackson. Suddenly the sun peeks thorough the clouds and Nixon decides Rehnquist (who he has never really known) is his man. The nomination goes forward, but Rehnquist had idea what was up when "the call" came out of the blue, only having his first private chat with Nixon months after the nomination. Dean adds some intersting discussion of both of Rehnquist's hearings (including his later one for Chief Justice), and reviews the issue of whether there were smoking guns in his background as to which he misled the Senate. The book contains a chronology, helpful notes, and a nice bibliography. An essential book for anyone interested in Rehnquist and that most inexplicable of all Presidents.

With meticulous attention to detail, John Dean gives the reader an unparalleled insider's view of one of the most momentous decisions in American history, Richard Nixon's appointment of William H. Rehnquist, Jr. to the U.S. Supreme Court. Using transcripts of the tapes Nixon left behind when he fled the White House in disgrace, plus additional source material from the National Archives and his own excellent memory (remember, this is the man whose sworn recollections of conversations about Watergate BEFORE the tapes were produced were never questioned after the tapes came out), Dean lets us see how bumbling, how innocent and how political a process this important decision actually was. Dean starts the book with the background of the plot to derail Abe Fortas's nomination as Chief Justice before Nixon is even elected, and exposes it for its political and unfair nature. He then provides additional background on the nomination of Warren Burger as Chief Justice, the unsuccessful nominations of Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell, and the ultimate confirmation of Harry Blackmun to Fortas's seat. With no internet, no Fox News, no right wing think tanks, no computers, the process of finding and then vetting Supreme Court justices was primitive. Nixon spent all his time on individuals never nominated, and worked hard to vet them, only to have them all be unnominatable. Not having learned by having two nominees turned down, Nixon's decision to appoint Rehnquist was made on the spur of the moment. Yet, in important ways, it was the most longlasting part of his legacy, reaching directly to just a year ago and through the legacy of Rehnquist's jurisprudence, perhaps forever. The Nixon we see here is bare naked to the reader. He hates Jews, demeans women, has few goals other than the political. He is a man paranoid of leaks and very much in charge of his White House and his own decisionmaking. He has no patience for civil rights, busing or the rights of the accused; he would be willing to appoint a Robert Byrd to the court just to spite a Democratic Senate that would be unable to turn down one of its own. He seeks to embarrass the American Bar Association (even while ending up appointing its former President, Lewis Powell, at the same time as Rehnquist). Dean clearly dislikes Rehnquist, and of course by this time hates Nixon and all his coterie, but the book nonetheless, by its very use of Nixon's own words, presents the man in all his complexity and his kind of genius.

I was very pleasantly surprised to see that someone had finally included former US Supreme Court nominee Richard H. Poff in the annals of recorded national history. Poff was considered a shoo-in for the Supreme Court, despite opposition from many liberals. While some considered him a racist, many African-Americans spoke out openly and stated he was anything but a racist, since he had in reality helped their position. His record, both before and after the nomination, speaks for itself and Poff's brilliance as a jurist. In fact, he was a man who believed strongly in individual rights, and openly stated that no American citizen should ever be detained or imprisoned absent a specific act of Congress permitting it, which by necessity means that he would be opposed to President Bush's actions in the so-called 'War On Terror'. Those who have actually met Richard Poff know him to be a man who cares very deeply about people, who quite correctly followed the dictates of his constituents even if he disagreed, and who was vociferous in dedicating his life to ensuring justice and upholding the Constitution. Bear in mind, this is a man who had been in the House as a representative of the Sixth District of Virginia since 1956, so he served during a turbulent time in civil rights history. He made some ultimately rather unfortunate choices while representing that district, but they were all done because that's what his constituents wanted. Most unfortunate among these choices was signing the infamous Southern Manifesto, which opposed and defied the US Supreme Court on its decision in Brown v Board of Education. If he had not done so, he most certainly would not have been reelected, because his constituents wanted him to sign it. While at first glance it may seem that he sold out for reelection, or that this proves him a racist, think about it. He did exactly what a Representative is supposed to do once elected; namely, act as the voice of their constituents, who otherwise would have no voice on national issues. Yet, once he was nominated for the US Supreme Court, that document came back to haunt him - and most disturbingly his family and especially his young son - in a very big way. A moderate conservative, Poff was well-respected in most circles, and seemed a perfect choice to change the tide of the liberal Warren Supreme Court. After all, he had served for years on the House Judiciary Committee, and was an attorney who had years of practical experience under his belt. Richard Poff was Nixon and Dean's first choice for the US Supreme Court, not Rehnquist. Almost immediately, 30 liberal Senators threatened a filibuster, and Poff was forced to make an unenviable choice: either destroy his family during the confirmation process, or drop out. Fearing that he would have to tell his then-12-year-old son that he was adopted - something he and his wife had never intended to do - he chose to withdraw from consideration strictly for personal reasons

If you love reading about the Supreme Court and the story behind the Justices and how they got there, then this book is perfect. John Dean was in the Nixon White House when Tricky Dick was looking to make two Court appointments at the same time. The first appointment, Lewis Powell, wasn't too hard. He was a distinguished lawyer. But what about the other appointment? Nixon couldn't find anyone suitable for the position. His choices were either not qualified or didn't want the position. As a last resort, he picked an obscure White House lawyer who went on the change the face of constitutional law, William Rehnquist. John Dean explains how Rehnquist was chosen and quotes Nixon saying some very unsavory things about women as well as other intemporate comments. This was the real Nixon -- a foul mouthed political animal who placed ideology over everything else. The book also talks about Rehnquist's unsavory past, including a memo he wrote as a Supreme Court clerk in 1954, when the Court decided Brown v. Board of Education, the seminal ruling outlawing separate but equal schools. The future Supreme Court Justice proposed affirming Plessy v. Ferguson, which affirmed racial distinctions in schooling. John Dean talks about this controversial memo and takes apart Rehnquist's position that it did not reflect his views.

During his first presidential term, Richard Nixon had the unusual opportunity to appoint four justices to the supreme court. This book tells the inside story of how the nominees were selected, focusing almost entirely on the selection of the latter two: Lewis Powell, a prominent Virginia attorney, and William Rehnquist, then the Assistant Attorney General to John Mitchell. Not counting the book's introduction and afterword, its main story covers just 35 days in the fall of 1971.The book begins by telling how Nixon virtually created the first two vacancies. Essentially, Nixon encouraged Senate republicans to fillibuster the elevation of Abe Fortas to the Chief Justice position. Once in office, Nixon's men then staged a PR campaign to discredit Fortas, causing him to announce his retirement. Ironically, the legal precedent for investigating Fortas' business dealings was based on a memo written by Rehnquist. If anyone should be entitled to write this story, it is John Dean. At the time, Dean was Council to the President, and it was he that first brought up Rehnquist's name, mostly as a fanciful suggestion. He recounts his experiences vetting candidates and some of his conversations as reconstructed from notes and memory. Primarily, however, the book is based on Nixon's tape recorded conversations in the oval office. Dean has done a good job editing these transcripts so as to maintain sufficient context without dragging them out too long. What emerges in these conversations is a series of bungled operations and imprudent decisions. Before Lewis and Rehnquist were finally selected in the final two days before their names were announced, the administration actually selected four other candidates. Two were rejected by the Senate, and the other two (including a woman) were deemed unqualified by the ABA (although from the sounds of it, the female candidate, Mildred Lillie, was fairly qualified but discriminated against by the all-male panel). John Mitchell and his assistant Rehnquist did an abysmal job vetting candidates, so much so that Dean and another lawyer were sent by John Ehrlichman to independently interview the candidates in more depth. And Nixon himself seemed to base his choices on hearsay and surface biographical snippets, like the candidates' class rank or the school they graduated from. He paid very little attention to the candidates' actual writings or opinions. One of the incidental but nevertheless shocking revelations in the book is the deep extent of Nixon's sexism. Recent tapes have revealed his racism and anti-semitism, but his low opinion of women is repeated time and again in the transcripts. For example he is quoted as saying "I don't even think women should be educated!" and "I don't think a woman should be in any government job whatever." In the book's afterword, Dean makes a compelling case that Rehnquist lied under oath during his confirmation hearings, both when he was initially confirmed in 1971, and then again in 1986 when R