The Presidency in a Separated System

Jones (1994) moves away from the responsible parties model of government which sees a strong president, coupled with a strong party working together to develop and implement programs while an opposition develops alternatives for the next election. Jones (1994) contends that such a system is unlike in the US due to the many competing interests - competition between the branches of government, etc. Jones (1994) calls this system of competing interests one of "diffused responsibility," one in which "responsibility is not focused, it is diffused. Representation is not pure and unidirectional; it is mixed, diluted, and multidirectional...credit will be take and blame will be avoided by both institutions and parties" (17). In such a system, presidential power can vary over time, under changing political circumstances, policy environments, and various institutional settings. The president is subject to a number of variables that may affect his influence; "the election itself and how it was interpreted, the number of House and Senate seats held by the president's party, public and media support, and the nature of the agenda" (15). When the president has more of these resources, he will likely be more powerful. When he lacks these resources, it is likely power will lie with Congress. Depending on such variations in power, we are likely to see government dominated by the president, dominated by Congress, or more balanced. Jones (1994) contends that the way a president comes to power - nominated and elected, elected as heir apparent, elected vice president, etc. - coupled with the president's background - political, professional, and party experience - affect the variation in advantages and disadvantages of a president, and the particular governing strategies a president may adopt. The president may maintain a significant amount of advantages to pursue aggressive, assertive strategies, or if lacking advantages, they may need to adopt a more compensatory strategies, i.e. "with significant disadvantages and particularly lacking and electoral edge, the president devises ways supplementary means for authenticating his leadership" (49). Ultimately, what Jones (1994) is arguing is that "the political and policy strategies of presidents in dealing with Congress depend on the advantages they have available to them at any given time" (19). Jones (1994) contends that presidential advantages and disadvantages are also shaped by the organization of the executive branch, the public standing of the president, and agenda setting. The executive branch - executive office of the President - serves as the contacts with Congress, the bureaucracy, parties, the public etc. Because of the potential power in this institution, it is imperative that the president maintain control. The organizational model of this institution can vary. It can fluctuate from a continuous and stable organization to one requiring major restructuring and many new appointments. Such chang

Jones does a marvelous job in brining into to the harsh light the problems in using the rational party, strong president analysis to examine the relationship between Congress and the President. A must read for those with an interest in either the process of lawmaking or the interaction between the President and Congress.