The Pity of War: Explaining World War I (Revised)

With charm and ease, author Niall Ferguson challenges the accepted wisdom about the causes and effects of WW1. Ferguson establishes intimacy at once with a reference to a family member who fought in the Great War. He goes on to lay out his thesis with elegance and precision. And then, chapter by chapter, he questions established beliefs and offers factual, fascinating answers. The book is distinguished by an alert, fresh, almost rhetorical style of writing which sets apart Ferguson from other authors. Ferguson is the Martin Daunton of history. This is a book about War for those who loathe war, a book about economics for those who shun the dismal science and a book about human failure for those who still hope humans can learn to live in peace.

Niall Ferguson's book on WWI is excellent. I have read books on WWI before, but they were often about the `guts-and-glory' side of the event. This is a must read, although I agree it is not an easy one. I think it is great that Ferguson takes another angle at the subject. Even though he is controversial he hits the mark on many of the questions he sets out to answer. WWI was not inevitable, indeed. The cold war prior to the event could have continued for some time, if not indefinitely. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by itself was not terribly important, yet provided the triggering event for Germany to decide that now was the best time to fight out of a `perceived' weak position. Britain, as Ferguson quite rightly points out, decided to enter the war against Germany because a German win and the creation of a Central European Customs Union, which could have been used quite effectively against the British, could not possibly have been in her interest. In that context, I find the comparison between the European Customs Union and today's EU not absurd at all. Just witness the German heavy-handedness of the EEC/EC/EU right up to 2004. That should give us a good taste on what the Central European Customs Union would have been like. The chilling bit about Ferguson's book to me is that the détente (France, Britain, Russia) had far more resources at its disposal but used them rather poorly. Whereas, the German Empire by itself (not counting the rather ineffective Austrians) were in a minority position resources-wise, yet managed to inflict far greater casualties on the détente than should have been expected. The other chilling lesson I took home from the book is that the German Empire could have won the conflict. The German blunders of 1918, thank God, put an end to any such hopes. It is not a surprise that this notion is not terribly popular in Germany; the `Dolchstoss-Legend' is a more convenient concept to believe in. Not having ever been involved in war or even close to it, I found the chapter on casualties and the `issue of surrender' a most fascinating read. I have never read it in such detail in any other book on WWI. If you expected the usual `guts-and-glory' book then this is the wrong book for you. Being an economic historian allows Ferguson to innocently tell the WWI story from a different angle. He perhaps takes a clinical view of the factors leading up to WWI and the issues arising during its execution. But this is as it should be.

From the same author I had already red "The Cash Nexus" and had been very favourably impressed both for the readability and the argument (usually a mix of history and economics, not just economic history). Well, about the content, this is not the usual history of First World War.It is an attempt to look behind the stage of historical events, to try to evaluate the actual outcome of the events on the light of the choices available to the "actors". Looking at what might have happened (and did not happen) can help to cast new light on the meaning of actual events.The question "what... if" from which the inquiry starts, is a great stimulus for the reader not just to enjoy the book but also to evaluate the conclusions of the author. I greatly enjoyed this book even if I do not agree with some of Ferguson theses. In particular the critic to the common idea that a culture favourable to the world arise in the last decades of XIX century is a bit excessive (on the light of the thought and following of thinkers like Wagner, Nietzsche, Darwinism with the survival of the fittest,... not to speak about Futurism and the like). I was also a bit unsettled by the allegations about the role of Keynes as a fifth German column in the discussions of war reparations: it may well be, but I believe the arguments used are a bit too personal (the alleged "possible" love affair with dr. Melchior) or overstated (this influence on British public opinion and government in the aftermath of the war).Then, as a "continental" European I've been really upset by the argument that, after all, it would have been better if the Germans won the blitzkrieg and formed a kind of proto-common European Market... Right, it would have cost less in terms of lives. Right, the Greater Reich wouldn't be in competition with the British Empire... and right... we would probably have avoided II WW, but in what kind of world we would live today?

I've been interested in the subject of the First World War since my undergraduate days back in the 1970's. At that time the Fritz Fischer thesis, that Germany's decision on war was a grab for world power, had considerable appeal. I've always had problems with that view since it didn't address the question of why war in 1914, but not in 1905? Had Germany really wanted to make short work of Russia and France she could have done it then with the Russian Army in a shambles after their defeat by Japan. War did not come however. Instead it came nine years later with Germany in a much weaker strategic situation. What I think is most difficult for the reader to do today is to see Europe from the eyes of the elites who made the decisions in 1914. The German Army was viewed by many experts has having considerable flaws, not as the precision mechanism we preceive today. Also the European opinion of the Germans was different. Not too many years before many believed that Germany was unsuited for industry, that her people lacked the talent to master science and technology, that they were primarily a simple pastorial people. For many British to have thought, as Ferguson shows, that they could win the war with money alone stems from this. Also we Americans especially today lack any feeling for the sense of inferiority and weakness that the Germans felt towards the French especially. Germany had been before 1870 a collection of petty princedoms which had been played off against one another by the French, British, Swedes and Russians. Napoleon, still a impressive image at the beginning of this century, had fought most of his battles in Germany, moving about the country at will defeating the best armies put up against him. Our view today is dominated by what happened after 1914, not by the history which preceeded it. This book attempts, in part, to rectify this. For balance I recommend G.F. Kennan's The Faithful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War and David G. Herrmann's The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War. As far as the attrocity argument goes, Germany's main crime in my opinion was that they used those methods, which had up to that point been used only against aboriginal peoples, against Europeans. One must remember that the original lopping off hands and feet stories were based on actual Belgian attrocities in the Congo. As to over 5,000 Belgian civilians killed during the invasion, Admiral Dewey dispatched that many Filipinos during the first days of our own Philippine-American War in 1899, a war that we instigated and fought with blatant cruelty. This brings up the trully controversial point (from a US perspective) that Ferguson brings up on page 55. As he states, "Compared with the US, Germany was a pacific power." Stange that none of the reviews have mentioned this. A comparison of even our more recent history (Operation Just Cause, the invasio

Ferguson's courageous history of the first world war explains how sadistic, relentless killing quickly became an end in itself. And WWI led directly to worse barbarity and terror, so that in 1999 the world faces virtually the same problem in the Balkans which existed in 1914. In explaing how the first great war came about Ferguson stands head and shoulders above the "victor's historians" who fill the textbooks and befuddle political leaders. He finds much to blame conservative British leadership for. And nothing kind to say about America's role. Unfortunately - and this is not Ferguson's fault - he cannot explain how the pointless savagery could have been avoided or cut short. Senseless murder may simply be an instinct; if so, it's time for all of us to face up to that. Forget heroics; war, like all murder, is failure. There are no "good wars." The value of Ferguson's effort cannot be overstated, but it is only a beginning.