German Generals Talk

`The German Generals Talk' is an awesome book by the late British military historian B.H. Liddell-Hart. It was published a few years after WW2, so it is obviously a bit dated, but I would still consider it a must-read for anyone interested in WW2 or the Third Reich. Shortly after the war, Liddell-Hart managed to get access to several of the surviving Wehrmacht Generals that were being held in POW camps at the time. The interviews provide us with some fascinating insights into the war from the German perspective, and Liddell-Hart's own analysis is equally compelling. One of the most interesting aspects of the book was reading the Generals' views on Hitler and their conflicting outlooks that ended up being such a decisive factor in the war. Hitler was indeed a talented strategist-to an extent-but his early successes (i.e. the Generals didn't think a quick defeat of France would be possible) went to his head and made it that much more difficult to reason with him later in the war. Virtually all of the Generals interviewed felt they could have won the war if Hitler had allowed them a more flexible and independent strategy. Even after Stalingrad, they felt they could have gradually worn down the Red Army with a mobile, defensive strategy that allowed them to withdraw from tough positions and regroup on their own terms. As it was, Hitler vehemently forbade any type of withdrawal on principle, forcing the troops to stand and fight exactly where they were. This irrational policy assured the absolute destruction of much of the Wehrmacht. On the other hand, the Generals tended to be very stubborn in their own right, and were hesitant to consider creative new strategies that went against their orthodox training. They were mostly of the old Prussian stock and thus clashed with Hitler and his revolutionary outlook. One of the other topics that most interested me was the discussion of why Hitler didn't invade England. It seems that Hitler had an affinity for the English and truly preferred a peaceful arrangement with them. This also seems to be the most likely reason for why the British were allowed to escape at Dunkirk; Hitler let them, as a sort of goodwill gesture. Talk about ungrateful, those Brits! Also discussed are the General's opinion on the opposing armies, the July 20th plot, and an array of other issues. My only complaint is that some of the descriptions of military operations are a bit tedious, but since this is essentially a military history, I can't rightly take anything off the rating for this. Also, as previous reviewers have pointed out, some of the General's claims should be taken with a grain of salt, but this cannot be held against Liddell-Hart either. Overall, this was a fantastic read that belongs in every WW2 history student's library.

B.H. Liddell Hart was one of most renowned military historians of the 20th century. Before John Keegan there was Liddell Hart. Liddell Hart was also a respected military strategist and was known to many of the German generals and seems to have developed a comfortable rapport with at least some of them. Liddell Hart writes with a clarity and a crispness that is just a pleasure to read. The book's opening chapter of 'The German Generals Talk' is especially well done. This remarkable material in the hands of a gifted writer like Liddell Hart gives the reader an opportunity for fascinating behind-the-scenes insights. Originally published in 1948 the book uses Liddell Hart's interviews with Rundstedt, Kliest, Blumentritt, and others to review WWII in Europe from the German professional military perspective. Liddell Hart particulalry develops a view contrary to the stereotype of Hitler as an incompetent meddler in military affairs. Early in the war and even before the war, Hitler had been proven correct in his strategic assessment, so that it later became ever more difficult for the generals to dispute him when he made a series of blunders. (I hasten to add that I am speaking here only of Hitler in regard to his military role and not his sick and hateful ideology). A book that belongs in your WWII history library. Highly recommended.

I found German Generals Talks to be extremely interesting and candid collective sets of interviews which was done immediately after World War II. The interviews are useful because they were done so close to the war, before politics, biased memories and self-justification really kicks in by these surviving German commanders who would write their own memoirs years later. The author uses these interviews to help justified his positions and theories of "indirect approach" concept which he have been harping on for a long time. Personally speaking, I see nothing really wrong with that since I enjoyed Liddell Hart's writing and see merits in them. The Germans who talked with Liddell Hart also seem to expressed that they too enjoyed his writing which may explained some of the openness they displayed. Overall, a pretty interesting reading material, probably considered as a mandatory reading for anyone interested in World War II.

This is a must have book for any body who is interested in WWII. The interviews are with the German Generals during captivity, and for the most part is one of the most direct way of seeing their views/opinions - granted with a bit of hindsight. Very informative and well done. I do agree with one of the reviewers who mentioned that it is written in a manner that further inflates the author's ego, but one can put up with that to read the interviews. Also it is presented in a clear easy to read manner not overburdening the reader with too much details, but rather just the events in the generals own opinions/words {memoirs and such are better places for too much details}.This also serves as a nice preliminary before continuing on to reading some of the memoirs from "the other side".

Liddell Hart's interviews with German generals immediately after WW II ended provides the reader with a essential perspective from inside the defeated military command. The author candidly calls Hitler "too brilliant" a strategist when criticizing the traditional Allied view that all Germany's mistakes were Hitler's and all her success were due to the German generals. Hart points out the political ineptitude of the German generals when assessing their military prowess. Politics are not divorced from military affairs in this study. The superb blend of Eisenhower's political skills and solid military judgement is contrasted with the utter failure of the German military to address political issues in the Reich. Hart lets the vanquished foes tell their own stories in an easy to read narrative form. He allows the German perspective to point out strengths and weaknesses in the British, American, and Russian militarys. An example is the German disregard of any threat of allied invasion along the French Bay of Biscay coastline because they correctly judged the Allied invasion of the European continent would never be carried out outside of the range of air cover. After Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio the Germans were able to use allied predictability against them. Hart uses this example to champion his "strategy of the indirect approach" that has become his hallmark, and surmise about what might have been if bolder leadership had prevailed in England in 1944. An easy read with some of the great minds that opposed the allies in World War II. Never pretentious or overloaded with unit designations or historical snobbery. A straight forward view from the "other side of the hill" that is presented to help the allied military and the lay reader learn from history.