The Origins of the Second World War

In reading this rather short synopsis of the origins of World War II by Mr. Overy, one realizes that this is but a quick thumbnail sketch overview of the cause of the War. The work is by no means meant to be an all inclusive study of the origins of World War II. In essence what Overy does is to give us an outline which includes the main characters, treaties, political climate economic considerations and basic thoughts and motives of all the key Nations. In fact this book could easily be used as the text for such a course in the origins of the Second World War. It should be only used as a text, other more thorough works would be used to enrich the student in the deeper aspects of this historical narrative. However, Overy does bring new material into the mix, especially in the activities of Russia's military preparedness. The book should be used as a general reference or even as a college text. The meat of the prose utilizes basic facts and conclusions and transitions to other events which serve as a basic outline to these important formative events. This narrative is by no way a definitive work of what happened in the cause and effect actions prior to and during the beginnings of World War II. This book if used as a guide and basic reference will be a 5 Star historical gem welcomed in any library.

In this interesting, provocative, and comprehensive overview of the antecedents leading up to and causing the onset of the Second World War, noted British historian Richard Overy ("Why The Allies Won", "Russia's War") presents a masterful summary of the complex welter of factors influencing the drift into conflict between the Axis powers and the more established powers of Britain and France. Overy carefully articulates the ways in which a multiplicity of factors created a power vacuum as well as an associated change in the balance of power such that the existing world order created at the close of the First World War became increasingly fragile and dysfunctional. It was into this moment of recognized weakness in both the British and French empires that the German, Japanese, and Italian governments sought to create their own empires at the expense of the existing order.This, of course, varies from the conventional belief that World War Two was singularly Hitler's war, one that he alone created and prosecuted against the good will and conventional moral purposes of the powers that be. Yet Overy argues quite convincingly that this is hardly a fair or objective reading of the historical record, since the policies of appeasement pursued by both Britain and France were hardly moral, being rather more organized around preserving their own political, economic, and military advantage than around any kind of democratic values or concern for the common good. While it is true that Hitler aggressively sought to change the existing framework to the benefit of the German state, it is hardly true that the political or economic policies of the other world powers were in any fashion necessarily more selfless or altruistic. Indeed, the acts of appeasement were callously designed to give whatever they could over to Germany without endangering their own admittedly precarious strategic economic and political interests, with little regard for the consequences for the indigenous populations of the areas surrendered in the process. Seen in this way, Hitler was feeding into the existing time-honored mode of empire creation, and one must remember that when general war was declared in the fall of 1939, it was Britain and France that declared war on Germany over the issue of the invasion of Poland. In this fashion, one must examine the reasoning behind the Allies decision to commence hostilities at that point rather than later. Given the fact that Hitler did not seek a wider war at that point, one must question the specific reasons that the Allies chose to prosecute a general war at that juncture. Overy argues that it was due as much to political self-interest more than altruism that they decided for a general mobilization. This becomes even clearer when one recognizes that Hitler wanted to avoid a two-front war, and the main objective of his reach eastward was to gain "lebensraum", or living room, for the rapidly expanding German population. In this sense, he made a fata