The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace

At the end of World War I, the UK and France divided up the Ottoman Empire between them with out much regard for the peoples who actually lived in the Empire. Iraq was born of this ill-informed and arbitrary division as a British protectorate. From its birth to the present, Iraq was never a viable nation state such as Iran or Egypt. It was and is more an assemblage of tribes and religious factions who happen to live in a geo-political region called `Iraq'. In this excellent book, Ali A. Allawi, an Iraqi Shia, provides first of all a clear and concise summary of religious-political factions among the Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish populations living in Iraq. He also discusses the equally important issue of tribal affiliation among these populations. As might be imagined, Iraq is a very complicated place and this book is complicated as well. Allawi provides the reader with three very useful readers' guides that greatly help following his multiple stories as they unfold: a list of the names of the key players; a list of acronyms; and a glossary of transliterated Arabic terms used in this book. The core of the book is the story of the failure of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its head, Ambassador Paul Bremer, to rebuild Iraq as a viable nation with a free market economy, established democratic institutions, and the rule of law. Part of the problem facing the CPA was that the reconstruction strategy developed by the Pentagon was based on virtually no understanding of the geographical entity called Iraq but was informed by ludicrously optimistic beliefs that the various Iraqi peoples would view the U.S. as liberators, were anxious to embrace U.S. style democracy, and were ready to leap into the Global economy. Allawi wisely lets the comments of the principal architects of this strategy speak for themselves. He makes clear however that Ambassador Bremer and his CPA staff bought into that strategy in its entirety. In the end the CPA proved completely inept at executing this strategy and managing the various Iraqi reconstruction programs they did attempt to implement. Worse for its entire existence, the CPA proved incapable of understanding the complexities that formed the reality of Iraq and evidenced no interest in learning anything about the `real' Iraq. In what could be the summary of the Pentagon strategy failure in Iraq, Allawi notes that "'nuanced' thinking" was a "term of opprobrium" among senior U.S. policy makers. This inability to conceptualize a complex and often contradictory reality precipitated the invasion of Iraq and produced the failed reconstruction policies that followed.

Before one enters into any conversation, debate, or discussion as to what went wrong in Iraq, read this book. There is plenty of blame to go around on all sides of the issue, and Ali Allawi has done an excellent job of detailing the various blunders and missteps in the process, from inside the system, and with a view of all the facets. He does not discriminate or place loyalties to any given side, just states the facts as they are and backs them up with documentation.

Allawi, grad of MIT with Harvard MBA, gives chapter and verse on the Iraq war fiasco. As both Minister of Defense and Finance in post-war Iraq he knows where all the bodies are buried. His main theme is that Iraq is primarily a tribal society, groups seething with revenge, and with little interest in western democracy or a unified nation. After the quick coalition victory, Iraq included once proud Sunni ripe for revenge, Kurds tasting independence, and various Shia groups anxious for power. The clueless, planless conquerors didn't understand any of this. They lifted the lid on this boiling cauldron and are getting scalded. Corruption is rampant. As Allawi puts it on page 460, "The corroded and corrupt state of Saddam was replaced by the corroded, inefficient, incompetent and corrupt state of the new order. Bush may well go down in history as presiding over one of America's great strategic blunders." The book also contains some excellent background on the diverse population and geography of Iraq.

This is the most thorough and fair account to date of the struggles in post war Iraq between 2003 and present. It documents the personalities, failures and political parties that have developed in the last few years. Large on the list are the major American mistakes following the liberation of Baghdad in 2003. This included the firing of the Iraqi army which caused 200,000 Sunnis with military training to have no jobs and thus boosted the insurgency. Another foul up was the lack of planning for the disintegration of the country into religious and ethnic factions and the lack fo planning for the way in which to deal with the large state monopolies. A brilliant book, this exposes the ethnic tension and the rise of al-Sadr and Al-Queida. It has an insiders perspective and a true understanding of much of what is wrong with Iraq and the prospects for peace in the country. An immensely important and thorough and fair book. Seth J. Frantzman

This book will be read by scholars of the Bush administration's Iraq disaster as the definite history of the Iraq tragedy. The pages of this book will make every American regardless of political affiliation angry and at the same time sad & disgusted that the whole Iraq tragedy from pre-invasion intelligence to post war occupation could have been handled so amateurishly by the greatest military and economic power in the world. This book is a testament to what happens when politicians pursuing a political agenda push aside the military men and try and take control of a war. Although the Bush administration must bear the blame for their own blunders, Iraqi's too must bear their share of the blame. The Bush administration handed them a priceless gift in 2003. Saddam Hussein was demonic dictator; a revolution to remove him could have killed many more than have died in the current war, Iraqi's could have made Saddam's removal at the hands of the coalition forces and with the ensuing high oil prices, their gain and Iraq could be thriving today. Arabs love to talk of Arab unity in the face of Israeli agression & in the name of Islamic brotherhood but Instead power hungry Shia clerics led Al-Sadr and his ilk & thirsty for revenge X members of Saddam's secret police have turned Iraq into a battlefield & made a mockery of so called Islamic unity leaving ordinary Iraqi's of all faiths stuck in the middle, most of whom are tired and exhausted and simply wish to live in peace. The author seems to have a good blueprint for peace but at the root of the problem are the radical Shiites and the x Baathists.