Nature of Sympathy

Max Scheler is a now almost forgotten early phenomenologist. He made very objective studies of values, sympathy, sociology of knowledge and sociology of culture. This is one of his masterpieces in which he tries to phenomenological differentiate and explain the meaning of 'sympathy'. The book differentiates the concept of sympathy from related concepts like fellow-feeling, commiserisation etc. He argues how sympathy is not the same as these concepts and why sympathy is not a form of enlightened self-interest either. Particularly interesting are his arguments against Adam Smith's theory of moral sentiments in which fear motivates sypathy and Freud's concept of guilt as source of such feelings. He also shows how Buddha's concept of universal misery blocks compassion by accepting misery matter-of-factly and expecting everyone to accept and live their misery. The book concludes that sympathy is made possible by empathy but is an irreducible feeling.