The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace

In this exhaustive 800-page tome, U.S. Envoy to the Middle East (1988-2000) Dennis Ross gives a painstakingly detailed play-by-play account of the Middle East peace process. From the Madrid Conference of 1991 to the collapse and aftermath of Camp David in 2000, Ross's account well acquaints the reader with all of the major players and the complex maneuvering this process has entailed. THE MISSING PEACE covers both the negotiations aimed at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and those between Israel and Syria. Ross shows how close Israel and Syria came to reaching a deal, particularly in 1993, when Yitzhak Rabin offered to withdraw from the Golan Heights--an offer that came to be known as the "Rabin pocket"--but this never came to fruition, largely because of disagreement over security measures such as early warning stations in the Golan, control over the Sea of Galilee, and the timetable for withdrawal. Many readers will pick up this book with the hope of gaining insight into the failure of Camp David. Ross's even-handed approach prompts him to express criticism of leaders on both sides, but he ultimately blames Arafat for the summit's breakdown. With his sights set on a 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon and a greater sense of respect for Hafez al-Asad than of Yasir Arafat, Ehud Barak viewed Syria as a priority over peace with the Palestinians, which made him reluctant to come to the table. However, according to Ross, once he did so, Barak was willing to offer far more than any Israeli leader before him, including all of the Gaza Strip and 91% of the West Bank with an additional 1% land swap (Israel later accepted the "Clinton Ideas," which would have Israel cede 94-95%, with a 1-3% swap). Though conventional wisdom holds that it was the refugee issue that produced the greatest impasse, Ross indicates that the real source of deadlock was the fate of Jerusalem. Here, too, Barak offered unprecedented concessions: Palestinian autonomy in the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City, Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, and custodianship over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. In the end, however, Arafat could not accept any form of Israeli sovereignty over the city. Ross speculates that, in addition to Arafat's (understandable) fear of assassination, he was wedded to the struggle, unable to let go of his revolutionary identity. Ross identifies a number of other reasons for the absence of a successful peace settlement. On the Israeli-Syrian track, the two sides were simply out of sync. While Asad could not match Rabin's boldness in 1993 (or, later, that of Peres), the situation reversed when Barak's enthusiasm cooled in December-January 1999-2000. With respect to Israeli-Palestinian peace, extremist violence--such as the spate of suicide bombings in 1996--often derailed negotiations. Although Ross only delves into this toward the end, another key problem was that the negotiations were often affronted by t

This is no survey book - Dennis Ross takes the reader into the darkest details of 12 years of peace negotiations between the Israelis and their neighbors. What almost happened with Syria? Why'd it fall apart? Who really cares about 400 yards of borders? What deal fell apart between the Israelis and Arafat? Who does Clinton blame? When were the Israelis at fault? The book covers the broad themes as well as how the participants willingly and unwittingly push each other's buttons, and balance external attempts for peace with internal political tactics. This differs from other books on the Middle East in several ways: It's written by a participant, but not the senior-most politician. As such, you get working level ins and outs of the negotiations, the participants and the low level details. This isn't a book written to advance a political career or push one side or the other - it's about negotiation as a hard detailed process. The book's neither perfect, nor for everyone, but for someone willing to devote time understanding the Middle East, it's a fantastic primary source. For that, it deserves 5 stars in my eyes.

Athough 800 plus pages, it is a gripping book, which unveils the complexity and personnal influence of it's main figures. How chances are missed, and the consequenses that the everyday person in the involved countries has to live with.

Author, Dennis B. Ross is currently Distinguished Fellow and Counselor at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is best known, however, for the leading role he played in shaping US involvement in the Middle East peace process from 1988 to the breakdown of talks in 2001. Ambassador Ross, a highly skilled diplomat and negotiator, worked tirelessly as our country's point man in both George H. W. Bush's and Bill Clinton's administrations, and dealt directly with all parties involved in the negotiations. Ross assisted the Israelis and Palestinians in reaching the 1995 Interim Agreement. He successfully brokered the Hebron Accord in 1997, and facilitated the Israeli-Jordan peace treaty. Bringing Israel and Syria together was also a priority on his agenda. There was a time when Ross strongly believed that Assad would make a deal with Israel. "The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace}" is an extraordinary book which chronicles the intricate dance toward peace over a period of 12 years - with all the missteps and crushed toes in between. The period was filled with extraordinary optimism and terrible frustration, from the highlights of the face-to-face negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis, which led to the signing of the Oslo Accords, made famous by the handshake on the White House lawn between the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, and the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, to the last days of negotiations before President Clinton left office. Prime Minister Rabin was murdered by a Jewish fanatic two years after the Accords were signed. It was hoped that Shimon Peres, Rabin's successor, would win the 1996 elections. Suicide bombings and violence caused Israelis to seriously doubt the Palestinians' intentions to be "Partners in Peace." Peres was defeated by Benjamin Netanyahu, a conservative and a hawk. The situation improved when Ehud Barak won the 1999 Israeli election. Unlike Netanyahu, Barak pledged to do everything in his power to work for peace. In July 2000 President Clinton met with both Barak and Arafat at Camp David to come to a final agreement. Although Barak made surprising offers, detailed in the book, Arafat backed out, not even willing to use Barak's offers as a basis for further negotiations. Ross recalls, the Palestinian leader "said no to everything," and did not present "a single idea or single serious comment in two weeks." Clinton did not give up until he had to turn the White House over to George W. Bush. The author believes that Arafat was never up to "ending the conflict" - for him "violence was always an option." And then the al-Aqsa intifada began. This political memoir is a work of historical significance. Ross, the ultimate insider, shrewdly analyzes the entire process, and really sets the record straight. Ross writes, "Only by telling this story can we debunk the myths that prevent all sides from seeing reality and adjusting to it. Indeed, only by telling the story