The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940

Another outstanding contribution to 20th Century military history by the Univ. of Kansas Press. God bless them, they publish some great monographs. Proessors Corum and Muller of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Mawell A.F.B. know more about the Luftwaffe than any people in the world, except maybe Horst Boog in Germany. And since all you can get by Boog is the incredibly expensive volume he worked on in the WWII history they are writing in Germany, I am very happy with Profs. Corum & Muller. I wonder if they are happy at Maxwell A.F.B. or would rather be at some Big 10 school writing their stuff? Anyway, Corum's book is an excellent look at how the German operational air war was created. Quite readable, it has flat out some of the best general discussion on the Spanish Civil War I have ever read, going beyond just air operations. Corum understands that air operations necessarily include strategic, tactical, and naval operations, and goes into German naval air operations even while the Kriegsmarine itself put so little effort into a fleet air arm. Good discussions of all of the key characters, and this is another book that makes it clear that someone has to get around to writing a book on Manfred von Richtofen. This book is not for the casual WWII reader, and coming to it with some knowledge of German air types is helpful. All in all I enjoyed the book, and would recommend it to students of the Luftwaffe or WWII air operations in general.

James S. Corum has written a scholarly study of German air power ideas and operational doctrine in a well-researched history of the German air power from 1918-1940. In addition, the text provides an understanding of the human dimension in the development of the Luftwaffe beyond the usual stories of Herman Goring and the Nazis. The author notes, "In the years immediately following World War I, it looked to the world as if Germany had been completely disarmed as an air power. On the surface, this was so. Yet, in the long-term view, the Allied powers failed miserably in their effort to disarm Germany." While their air power was disarmed, the Germans could not be stopped from thinking and studying. The text narrates how "General Hans von Seeckt and his small group of airmen succeeded in keeping air power as a central aspect of warfare." After WWI, a select group of German officers made a detailed analyzed of WWI army and air power experience. Foreign air power developments and doctrine were also studied with foreign articles and manuscripts on air power translated into German. Corum notes "Although Germany was denied an air force, it was not denied civil aviation or aviation technology by the Versailles Treaty. This gave the Germans an inherent advantage in the air, for Germany in the interwar period was a world leader in aircraft design and technology." By 1925 German air power operational doctrine was well advanced so that aircrew training and aircraft developed was needed. Most interesting was the text's description of the formation of the "Shadow Luftwaffe." In 1925, under a 1922 treaty with Russia, a German air base was built at Lipetsk, Russia. From 1929-1933, several hundred officers, NCOs, and civilian employees were there as students, instructors, ground staff and test pilots. Airmen at Lipetsk would test tactics and doctrine by dropping live bombs on simulated targets. Fifty modern fighter aircraft were smuggled in from the Fokker factory in Holland. The text notes that an advantage of the Shadow Luftwaffe was the close and effective cooperation between those who developed doctrine for the aerial war, those who developed and built weapons and prototypes and finally the actual producers of the weaponry. When the Nazi party came to power on 30 January 1933 and rearmament openly began, the text notes, "a new group of air leaders came to the fore" and inheriting "a sound foundation and built on it." The author states, "the years 1933-1936 were of foundation-building. Several major personalities dominated the Luftwaffe organization and played vital roles in creating new concepts of air power..." The text narrates the discussions of air power philosophy and doctrine. By 1934 an effective operational doctrine for a small to medium-sized German air force was developed. Contrary to Post-WWII Allied historians, the Luftwaffe was not limited to being "merely a tactical air force geared to army support operations." On page-139, the author states "R

The focus of this book is on the interwar development of German air operational doctrine. Corum demonstrates that the Luftwaffe was not just a ground support air force but capable of strategic operations, including air transport (Franco's troops in 1936) and airborne assaults. In fact, he points out that Anglo-American obsession with strategic bombardment hindered their operational doctrines until 1942-3. Corum points out the biggest German deficiencies as lack of a true naval air arm that could have been decisive in fighting Britain, Udet's obsession with dive-bombers that delayed the deployment of the He-177 and the Ju-88 and strategic misdirection from Goering/Hitler. There are two interesting chapters on lessons from the First World War and the Spanish Civil War. Also interesting is discussion of how the Germans were able to develop not only doctrine, but new fighter and bomber designs under the noses of the Allied occupation forces. The one area in which the Allies succeeded in inhibiting the Luftwaffe was in limiting the German civil aviation industry's engine development programs; when the Luftwaffe went public there were very few engines to choose from and these were less-advanced than Allied models. Weak engines plagued a number of German aircraft designs. There are no maps.

In a severely overcrowded field of books on WW2, this book is a shining jewel. Revolutionary, concise, and clear, this book explodes the commonly accepted myths about the Luftwaffe, while revealing the truly innovative minds at work in the Reich Luftministerium and the General staff in the interwar years. Thought provoking and generally excellent scholarship abounds in this single volume about the critically important doctrinal development of air-power theory, not only in Germany, but in all major combatant nations before world war two. One way to understand this books's value is that by reading this one book anyone can clearly understand the basics of air-power doctrine and the way it evolved in the Luftwaffe. I eagerly anticipate reading the necessary follow-up volume from J. Corum which will complete the groundbreaking work begun in this book.

Few historians are consistently good. Corum is! This book is as scholarly, informative, insightful and interesting as his first book, THE ROOTS OF BLITZKRIEG. Together with his new book co-authored by Richard Muller, these works justifiably earn Corum the reputation as America's leading authority on inter-war German military doctrine.Corum's analysis of the personalities, ambitions and professional viewpoints of the leading German airmen, and their impact on the development of airpower doctrine and aircraft types, is the best available.I'm proud to own this book. You will be too.