The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex Situations

Napoleon said "On s'engage et puis on voit!" Loosely translated that means "One jumps into the fray, then figures out what to do next," a common human approach to planning. This discussion (page 161) takes on the adaptability of thought and cautions decision makers about the risks of overplanning in a dynamic, multivariate system. Using examples from Napoleon as well as more concrete examples such as the quotation about soccer strategy (also on page 161,) Dietrich Dörner, the brilliant German behavioral psychologist (University of Bamberg) has created a masterwork on decision making skills in complex systems; I find it to be highly complimentary to Perrow's work and also highly recommend his equally brilliant "Normal Accidents." A strength of this work is that Dörner takes examples from so many areas including his own computer simulations which show the near-universal applicability of his concepts. One of Dörner's main themes is the failure to think in temporal configurations (page 198): in other words, humans are good at dealing with problems they currently have, but avoid dealing with and tend to ignore problems they don't have (page 189): potential outcomes of decisions are not foreseen, sometimes with tragic consequences. In one computer simulation (page 18) Dörner had a group of hypereducated academics attempt to manage farmland in Africa: they failed miserably. In this experiment Dörner made observations about the decision makers which revealed that they had: "acted without prior analysis of the situation; failed to anticipate side effects and long-term repercussions; assumed the absence of immediately negative effects meant that correct measures had been taken; and let overinvolvement in 'projects' blind them to emerging needs and changes in the situation." (How many governmental bodies the world over does this remind you of?) I am a safety professional, and am especially interested in time-critical decision making skills. Dörner's treatment of the Chernobyl accident is the most insightful summation I have seen. He makes the point that the entire accident was due to human failings, and points out the lack of risk analysis (and managerial pressure) and fundamental lack of appreciation for the reactivity instability at low power levels (and more importantly how operators grossly underestimated the danger that changes in production levels made, page 30.) Dörner's grasp here meshes the psychology and engineering disciplines (engineers like stasis; any change in reactivity increases hazards.) Another vital point Dörner makes is that the Chernobyl operators knowingly violated safety regulations, but that violations are normally positively reinforced (i.e. you normally "get away with it," page 31.) The discussion about operating techniques on pages 33 and 34 is insightful: the operators were operating the Chernobyl Four reactor intuitively and not analytically. While there is room for experiential decision making in complex systems, analysis o

THE LOGIC OF FAILURE: RECOGNIZING AND AVOIDING ERROR IN COMPLEX SITUATIONS by Dietrich Dörner is a great read that has changed my thinking about organizations, decision making and complexity ever since I read it about a month or so ago. I recommend it unequivocally to anyone who makes decisions, and particularly to those in organizations and assessment and management positions. Dörner, a cognitive psychologist at the University of Bamberg, writes about tendencies in decision making, basing many of his conclusions on experiments and simulations he has run with human subjects. For example, he has had subjects manage a mythical area of Africa, Tanaland, to help the nomadic peoples there. The managers can control all areas of life, public works funding, pesticide control, legal issues of grazing, housing matters, etc. In another, Dörner makes his research subjects the mayor of a mythical town, Greenvale. Again, they can address many issues related to life in this community, education, employment, taxes, public services, business development, tourism, social programming, etc. He also does a brief study of Chernobyl to analyze how that disaster happened through logical failure. Dealing with how people make decisions, the real and root processes of decision making in humans, Dörner makes the point early on that decision making is not an isolated process. "But I am not concerned with thinking alone, for thinking is always rooted in the total process of psychic activity. There is no thinking without emotion" (p. 8). He also makes the point that thought is rooted in value systems, and that our decisions are generally made to bring us closer to the goals that are based on these values. Given this basis, Dörner shows throughout the book various tendencies individuals have when faced with ambiguity in decision-making situations and with complexity that overwhelms them. Sometimes people will focus so tightly on an area in which they are comfortable or will allow themselves to be distracted by small items to avoid coping with complexity. Often, we cannot know all we need to know about a topic. Dörner writes about the success rates of participants who utilize planning procedures for a limited time, then go to work, but who revisit their issues and are willing to change, vs. those who just set right in without situational analysis, get confused by unintended consequences and start blaming outside factors or creating "myths" or superstitions about why they are experiencing the problems that they are. Comfortingly, Dörner's research results show that some planning that is moved into action, with frequent analysis of the results of the decisions is effective. He also writes about other effective methodologies, such as thinking by analogy, to generate better understanding of a process. The entire book, by enlightening the reader on the factors involved in decision making -- emotion, values, fears -- helps to create greater perception on what we do in our ow

Wow - a superb analysis of why we fail even when doing things right! The lessons contained herein are invaluable to every professional, and more so for those who are in critical decision making and leadership roles. The fallacy of our thinking is something we dont like to admit or understand, this book reveals the pitfalls of the same. You will need some guts to read and understand this book since it will uncover flaws that you will probably hate to admit. In some places the translation could have been better, however that should not prevent anyone from reading this book. I suggest "Dont just read - but grasp the lessons." It may take more than one reading to get a better understanding, but that investment of time will be well worth the effort. Equally important - reflect on what you read as you try to assimilate the material discussed.

Dietrich Dörner is an authority on cognitive behavior and a psychology professor at the University of Bamberg, Germany. His research shows that our habits as problem solvers are typically counterproductive. Probably our main shortcoming is that we like to oversimplify problems. Dörner offers a long list of self-defeating behaviors, but common to all of them is our reluctance to see any problem is part of a whole system of interacting factors. Any problem is much more complex than we like to believe. And failure doesn't have to come from incompetence. The operators of the Chernobyl reactor, as Dörner points out, were "experts." And as experts, they ignored safety standards because they "knew what they were doing." Dörner identifies four habits of mind and characteristics of thought that account for the frequency of our failures: 1. The slowness of our thinking-We streamline the process of problem solving to save time and energy. 2. Our wish to feel confident and competent in our problem solving abilities-We try to repeat past successes. 3. Our inability to absorb quickly and retain large amounts of information-We prefer unmoving mental models, which cannot capture a dynamic, ever-changing process. 4. Our tendency to focus on immediately pressing problems-We ignore the problems our solutions will create. Successful problem solving is so complex that there are no hard-and-fast rules that work all the time. The best take-away from the book (and this is my favorite quote): "An individual's reality model can be right or wrong, complete or incomplete. As a rule it will be both incomplete and wrong, and one would do well to keep that probability in mind." The book is 199 easy-to-read pages, and Dörner gives lots of interesting examples from lab tests illustrating people's actual behavior in problem-solving situations.It's a thought-provoking book for anyone whose job is to tackle complex problems. In one way or another that includes anyone in just about any profession.

I picked this book up after hearing a book editor I really respect say he re-reads this great book every few years. And, wow, am I glad I did. What this book talks about is decision-making in situations of complexity, uncertainty and intransparence. The author, Dorner, recounts the results of computer simulations that explore how people succeed and fail in decision making and planning. This is one of those "keepers" that I'll read again and again... and get more from the book each time.Tangential comment: I'm also a writer (my best-selling books have been Quicken for Dummies and QuickBooks for Dummies) and so I have to say that this book is really, really well-written and edited. Wonderful craftsmanship!