The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians: Why It Has Always Failed and Why It Will Fail Again

Mr. Carr has written a concise history of warfare against Civilians. I would recommend this as an excellent primer on the subject. In my belief this should be regarded as a political history as well as a military history. Saying that, I will add some of his conclusions about reforms are overly simplistic.

Mr. Carr has written a concise(small enough to fit in a hip pocket) history of warfare against Civilians. I would recommend this as an excellent primer on the subject. In my belief this should be regarded as a political history as well as a military history. Saying that, I will add some of his conclusions about reforms are overly simplistic.

This is a timely book that is well written in the main. It is somewhat marred by the author's absolutism in arguing his main thesis that warfare against civilians (terrorism) is always a losing strategy for the perpetrators. His secondary thesis is that surgical, preemptive strikes have been consistently the most effective way of eliminating terrorist threats (all the more interesting since Carr wrote this book before the Iraq War).Caleb Carr looks at history from Roman times to the current Arab-Israeli conflict to argue that terrorism always loses. Terrorism, or attacks on civilians, differs from guerilla warfare in that guerillas use their irregular forces and tactics to target opposing/occupying military personnel and targets. Terrorists just kill and maim wantonly, under the mistaken belief that carnage and death will force change or lead the terrorists to their goals. The historic evidence is otherwise. Terrorism almost always hardens the hearts and steels the minds of both targets and local populations against the perpetrators and frequently begets terrorism as a response.Carr's examples are many. The Romans struck not the military might of the German tribes across the Rhine, but the villages and peoples thereof. German tribes became ferocious opponents and were the ones who ended up sacking Rome. Michael Collins was on his way to winning independence for all of Ireland. His turn to terrorism stiffened British resolve (leading one British prime minister to state he would not conclude a deal with the IRA because he "would not shake hands with murder.") and undercut his local support. Palestinian terrorism has not shaken the resolve of Israel; it has produced hard line Israeli governments less likely to negotiate Palestinian autonomy or statehood. These are a few of the historic examples Carr cites in support of his argument.While I think he is generally right, he mars his well argued position by stating that warring against civilians and non-military targets always loses. Certainly the American Indian experience shows that wars of annihilation can sometimes (obviously) reduce an opponent to absolute subjugation for the long-term. And while Rome was sacked by the descendants of tribesman who sufferings were legion along the Rhine, several hundred years elapsed from then until Rome's fall. Also, General Sherman's romp through Georgia is referred to several times, but America healed fairly well and fairly quickly after the Civil War.Nevertheless, the author's failed attempt to prove his observation correct in every case does not mar this book's demonstration that his thesis stands up well in most cases. On the contrary, the evidence marshaled by Carr is persuasive and the conclusion convincing. Carr also shows what has worked historically in dealing with perpetrators of terrorism. Preemptive war, surgical strikes, leadership strikes have all proven the most consistently successful means to deal with history's bad actors. The r

Is the object of war victory or destruction? If victory is the object, the gratuitous violence necessary to totally destroy your adversary will needlessly prolong and increase the cost of conflict. Mr. Carr makes the case that terrorism is a form of war. And the irrational use of gratuitous violence to instill terror for the purpose of destroying the will of a population to resist, will in fact achieve the opposite result. His case is compelling. Carr reviews historical conflicts beginning with the Romans and continuing through 9/11 and current events, marshalling facts, political theory and history to make his case. Mr. Carr takes a fresh look at a series of past and current conflicts; pointing out similar patterns in the history of conflicts involving Rome and Carthage, England and Ireland, Western Europe, Africa, the American Civil War and Arab and Jew in Palistine. He doesn't fall into a predictable political pattern, preferring to allow the facts to speak for themselves. His book will probably offend partisans of political correctness, but the fresh insights and unwillingness to be bound by conventional wisdom enhances the value of Mr. Carr's analysis. This is a book worth reading for anyone who wants a better understanding of what the world is currently experiencing. I found it very helpful and reccomend it without hesitation.

This book begins by defining "international terrorism" (also called "destructive war" or "punitive war") as "warfare deliberately waged against civilians with the purpose of destroying their will to support either leaders or policies that the agents of such violence find objectionable." This book only makes sense if one temporarily accepts that definition. Although such a definition of the word "terrorism" at first seems quite removed from the events of 9/11, the author shows how that event fits into his definition. The book's principal thesis is that such violence is always spectacularly counter productive in the long run. An important corollary is that terrorists should be treated as war opponents not as criminals, and their actions should be treated as acts of war not crimes. Rather than treating them on a par with smugglers drug traffickers or political mafiosi, we should treat them as (organized highly trained hugely destructive) paramilitaries. In describing the development of and changes to war against civilians, the book romps through more than two millenia of military history. The necessarily rather sketchy stories in this brief book provide a fascinating and accessible broad brush introduction to military history. My chief complaint with the book --especially the first part-- is that it it doesn't provide sufficient detailed arguments to support its thesis, perhaps because it so quickly covers so much ground. A reader with a good background in military history might receive the messages differently; what I found to be simply good stories might be a sort of shorthand that would bring forth the memory of many more details from the knowledgeable and provide much more support for the thesis. The thing I liked most about the book is the very wide variety of blunt iconoclastic opinions that the author expresses: Karl von Clausewitz' book "On War" principally shows his admiration for the methods of Napoleon. Islam is notable for the ongoing internal contradiction between its pacifistic compassionate thread and its warlike aggressive thread. The behavior of the colonists during the American revolution was horrific, and was seen as such both by outsiders and by some residents. The African slave trade could not have happened without the locals' high level of intertribal warfare and their common custom of capturing and selling defeated civilians. And many many more. The ideas in this books don't fit neatly into an existing category. It surprised me to find these two themes joined: treat terrorism militarily, and limit war's destructiveness by not using dirty methods even against a dirty enemy. While I don't necessarily agree with the ideas in this book, I found their presentation lively and provocative, and the prima facie case for them reasonable. Although this book is out of the mainstream of current thought, it's not on the lunatic fringe. It's not just controversial, it's a "mind stretcher."