The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow

Although much of Burr's analysis leaves a lot to be desired, this book is a must have for a first hand look at Kissinger's diplomatic legacy. There is still much information that has not been declassified and therefore _The Kissinger Transcripts_ presents only a partial picture at best, but Burr's compilation is well worth the effort to see Kissinger's many different diplomatic faces show themselves as he deals with different characters such as Mao, Brezhnev, Zhou Enlai, Gromyko, Deng Xiaoping and others. It is truly fascinating to examine the different rhetorical tactics employeed by Kissinger to suit his particular audience. Incidentally, this bit of genius appears to be lost upon Burr, and others too, who view these many Kissinger faces with a seeming lack of understanding and even think of it as somewhat contradictory. The guiding theme when examined as a whole, however, is that Kissinger worked toward the improvement of the position of the United States in the world power structure. There is no doubt that the opening of China, coupled with Kissinger's deft Middle East diplomacy, did just that. These transcripts shed some much needed light on the operations of perhaps the United States' greatest executor of foreign policy.

The lengths to which Kissinger went to recruit the Chinese on the American side in the Cold War are instructive to those who believe that America played its cards well on the international arena in the Cold War. Much of the story that William Burr has pieced together--quite admirably in my opinion--is sad reading from the American point of view. Less so, of course, from the Chinese perspective. At points, it is easy to forget which of the parties was the superpower, and which the third world nation rising from internal turmoil, economic collapse and a severely hostile international situation. It is particularly instructive to read this book in context of the question of dealing with China, a problem which America has grappled with fitfully over the past two decades. The roots of Chinese suspicion of "peaceful evolution" and "engagement" lie in their recollection of the avid wooing of China in the 1970s. On a local note, for the Asian reader, Kissinger's views on dealing with the Indian subcontinent are also instructive, including his open willingness to pressurise India in the Bangladesh crisis. In general terms, the Nixon administration's bias was perceived in India, and has been one of the reasons for the difficult relationship between India and USA in the 1970s and early 1980s. This book only provides proof of that less-than-subtle 'tilt'.This book is invaluable reference material to all students of international relations, even if it is used as a "how-not-to" manual. The only gripe is the shoddy proof reading, with typos and inconsistent romanisation of Chinese names. But that is a small price to pay for this excellent piece of research. Buy this book, you won't regret it.

Individuals indeed can change the world, as evidenced by some of the transcripts in this excellent collection of original documents. William Burr has delivered an important record of the actions of the principle actors during the United States' shift from Kennan-inspired containment policy to balance-of-power politics.Reaping the benefits of the Freedom of Information Act and declassification projects at the federal agencies responsible for U.S. foreign policy, Burr and his colleagues at the National Security Archive project at George Washington University have brought us the raw, unadulterated truths surrounding the diplomacy behind Nixon's detente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China. Gems such as the momentous first meeting of Nixon and Mao with Zhou Enlai and Kissinger in attendance cannot be missed.Excellent primary source material with copious notes from Burr. A must-have for anyone interested in Kissinger and his relationships with Nixon, Mao and Brezhnev.

These top secrets talks between Washington, directed by Kissinger at all, China and Rusia are like those ( not at all) that took place in the 19th century Europe to build what was known as the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and also created the so called "balance of power" that kept all power nations out of war. Kissinger as Secretary of State in the Nixon-Ford era took in his hands the priority to create that "balance of power" between China, Rusia and USA, that was called "detente" and kept out the fear from a possible nuclear war all over the world. These transcrips show how the negotiations that conducted Kissinger during that time were conducted between China and Rusia, and also show how well he kept the fear out from a confrontation from the foreign policy of the United States.

It's important that this kind of information is published, and not kept secret. Another fact not mentioned in the reviews is how China was given a free hand by Kissinger against India. This enabled China to pass on nuclear secrets and missiles to Pakistan. Now the world is trying to figure out how other Mid Eastern Moslem nations can be denied such technologies.It goes to show how short sighted Nixon/Kissinger's foreign policies were. They allowed two monsters to arise in Asia - china and pakistan.