The Great Evolution Mystery

Mr. Taylor has developed a good argument for the need for a broader view of evolution. Maugre another viewpoint here, he has assaulted yet another religion-from-science (Darwinism brooking no opposition) with science. Easily read, logically built, clearly apprehensible.

Giving the author his just due, this is about as fine a critique of Darwinism as one is likely to ever find: It is scientific, un-polemic, well-argued, offers counter-hypotheses, and when it does finally fail to connect the theoretical dots, it does not then ignominiously revert to metaphysical defenses or hide behind "divine plans" such as "intelligent designs," etc. as the "Creationist" do. This is of course all very admirable and all to the good. The problem with this critique, I fear however, is that it is more a critique of the inductive method than of Darwinism per se. Allow me to try and explain. At its base -- and "once removed" from the impressive experimental details -- the critique appears to be circular and tautological. In its broad outlines, it argues essentially that since Darwinism is open-ended logically (that is to say it proceeds inductively), it is therefore not logically closed? Duh? Karl Popper himself (one of the authorities Mr. Taylor calls upon to support his critique) argues convincingly that ALL theories are tentative; none are finally settled. That is to say they are never finally proven, and thus are always open to scientific suspicions and further testing, and thus in some sense remain forever open-ended -- even when not logically so. With this being true of all inductive theories, it should come as no surprise that on the surface at least, there would "appear" to be biological phenomena that the "inductive theory" of evolution do not explain: For instance in the most often and arguably the best example, the complexity of the eye. However, asserting the existence of an "otherwise unexplainable" counter-example, no matter how improbable, and no matter how many authorities may back it up, is not quite the same thing as providing proof of a defect in a theory, whether inductive or otherwise. Shouldn't the criteria for overthrowing a theory (i.e. of proof) at least in principle be as strong as the charges leveled against the theory? Certainly clever assertions of "possible" counter examples cannot be the end of matter, and of the investigation? Here, the author (and the illustrative authorities he appeals to) argue that since there are very improbable things that "appear" to be unexplained by Darwin's theory, then the theory itself must be wrong? This is more a suspicion, based at most on statistical improbability than a proof; and thus is more a detail than a solidly based logical argument. Seems to me a place for further and more intense testing, not one for declaring Darwin wrong. A more serious standard for critique would be one that PROVES that a particular biological development under question "could not have come about simply by mutation or natural selection." Since this cannot be done, these examples must, in the end all amount to carefully catalogued suspicions that demand further testing and not a solidly based proof. But the author's points were well-argued and it was a fun ride anyway. Five Stars