The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945

"The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945" by Peter Mansoor is an extremely solid, thoroughly researched and balanced examination of American infantry combat prowess in WWII. Mansoor's book is based on the thesis that, contrary to what has become almost dogmatic wisdom in WWII historiography, the American citizen soldier defeated the vaunted German soldier (the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS being lumped together here) not by means of superior numbers and overwhelming logistical resources, but rather through ultimately superior combat performance. Few historian authors have so effectively tackled this topic to dispel the commonly and misplaced belief that the Germans were combat superior. What makes Mansoor's arguments especially compelling is the fact that he does not simply 'throw the baby out with the bathwater': Mansoor does not toss aside the obvious tactical prowess and oft baffling resilience of German combat units in the Second World War as so many authors have done previously when trying to demonstrate that the American soldier was an effective tool of war. Rather Mansoor rightly points out these strengths of the German war machine, while at the same time demonstrating, through detailed analysis of combat engagements from the invasion of Fortress Europa to the battles for the Ruhr and Saar, that the American soldier outfought the German soldier in the final analysis. Mansoor presents ample comparative evidence that in most cases the Americans fought the Germans on equal, if not disadvantaged, footing when all appropriate combat modifiers are examined, such as terrain, weather, quality of arms, quality of tactics, effectiveness of casualty replacement, unit resilience, ability to learn lessons from combat experiences, and influence of offensive vs defensive postures. It becomes clear from these analyses that the Germans were typically superior in tactics, ability to act quickly and exhibit amazing resilience, use of terrain (mainly because they were so often fighting in the defensive), and arms quality (which usually offset any superiority the Americans might have in quantity), but that the Americans were superior in use of supporting arms (notably arty and air power), replacement of casualties (despite the deficiencies levied against the American replacement system), and in their ability to 'grow' from experience. Mansoor argues that if German vs American engagements took place in the absence of superiority of numbers (both soldier and weapon), which they usually did, American victories must have come through superior fighting abilities. His arguments are extremely well made and supported. "The GI Offensive in Europe" is a book all students of Second World War history should read. Those who suffer from "Wehrmacht [P****] Envy" (blind love of all things German) should definitely read Mansoor's book since they might actually see through clear glasses and rethink their devotion to the fallacy

For the serious student, this book should be read along with [similuar book]Both deal with the same topic, but there is surprisingly little overlap.I agree with most in the review ...but I think that he and other reviewers exagerate the degree of degeneration of the German army that the US faced in France. The Germans were unsurpassed trainers of soldiers and industry was still turning out sufficient quantities of weapons of all sorts. It was only after D-Day in France that tatical airpower began to make itself felt. Until then the main contribution of strategic air was the "transportation plan" which was designed to knockout the French transporation network in order to limit the ability of the Germans to bring reinforcements to the invasion site. It was quite successful.The soldiers that the U.S. Army faced were as good as any the Germans produced in most cases. (There were some "ground-holding" divisions of overage or semi-invalid men.) Equipment had improved since 1941 and many tactical lessons had been learned.But there was no doubt that the western allies could produce overwhelming force, and if properly applied, victory was certain. The catch is: if properly applied. It was by no means inevitable that force would be properly applied. The British outnumbered Rommel in tanks in the North Afican desert on many occasions but managed to lose. Rommel said to one captured British officer that it did not matter if he was outnumbered 2 to 1 in tanks overall if at the point of attack he outnumbered the British 2 to 1. If we had fought as badly as the British did before Montgomery took over, we would have lost. To win required learning from our mistakes, a willingness to improvise, inititive at all levels down to private and, of course, great courage. Our soldiers had what it took.

Tom Hanks' movie will seem tame after you've digested Colonel Mansoor's detailed illustration of how normal everyday young men advanced across the ETO in the early 1940's against what most thought was a far better trained army under NAZI control. Read this book and dispel many of the myths you've probably grown used to from watching the screen - that German soldiers were unreliable; American GI's had an unlimited supply of material and replacements; and finally, that the Allied general staff were frequently on the same page in their estimation on how the war should be conducted.

If you have read all of the Army Green books on WW2 (and I come close) you will not find all that much new here, but for those of you that haven't... and you know who you are, this is a great book. I consider it a very detailed primer on the US Army in WW2, and it will certainly be one I recommend to those that seriously want to learn more about how this democratic, draftee group of guys beat the all powerful German Army. I found it darn near impossible to find in a bookstore! Which is a shame as more people should read it... LIKE YOU!.

This book is an extremely thoroughly researched study of the legendary American GI in the European Theater of World War II. Lieutenant Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, a Battalion Commander in the US Army and former professor of history at the United States Military Academy, offers a fascinating and a quasi-reformist look at the way in which the army's basic fighting unit was recruited, trained, mobilized, , deployed and commanded throughout the long four years that America fought in Europe. The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945 is not only a beautifully crafted book, but more importantly it is a perpetuating addition to the latest revisionist rave where historians have claimed that the GI in World War II was better trained, equipped, and, most importantly, better led than their foe; Hitler's vaunted and often overly hailed Wermarcht. Mansoor's premise is that the American soldiers proved their capabilities in battle, which he correctly claims is the ultimate test for an army and a nation. "A fashionable argument in the past two decades has been that the Allies won World War II only through the sheer weight of material they threw at the Wermarcht in a relatively unskilled manner." Mansoor refutes this argument in this book first by dissecting the variables encompassed in the "combat effectiveness" formula and then quantifies the human, organizational, and technical capabilities of the opposing forces that fought in Europe. In the end Mansoor concludes that one of the most critical factors attributed to the American GI was his high level of endurance once engaged in combat. Referring to works by the likes of Bonn, Dupuy, van Crevald, and SLAM Marshall, Mansoor accomplishes where most of these great thinkers have marginally succeed; proving that the American GI in World War II was indeed superior to his foe. Mansoor achieves proving this thesis with an analysis that will most likely be used for years to come as THE single source to refer to when searching for a balanced comparison of the Allied GI and Wermarcht soldier. Dense with details and statistics, the book is written in an academic style, but in the same light, highly readable. He brings the reader comprehensively through each stage of the war, from mobilization through pre-combat training, and then to the beaches of Normandy and beyond. He leaves no stone unturned in this complete analysis. This book was no doubt a major undertaking and Mansoor's hard work and focussed approach will undoubtedly " provide fodder for historians of the war for years to come." The GI Offensive in Europe should be shelved alongside the best historians of World War II. Academician's and military leaders must read this book for it proves that the superior training, organization, and execution of doctrine by the American Military units is what accounted for the unprecedented success of the US in 1945 and will continue to do s