The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq

Ricks argues the shift in U. S. military strategy in Iraq from 2006-2008 was as a gamble. The risk was the unusual surge of more U. S. troops into smaller outposts among the Iraqi people, rather than the popular decision to turn over security to Iraqi forces and decrease U. S. troop levels. With the focus on General Petraeus as the catalyst behind this risk, a more fitting title would have been, The Gambler. Ricks could have evoked lessons from Kenny Rogers lyrics: "You got to know when to hold 'em, know when to fold 'em. Know when to walk away, know when to run." Takeaways from the The Gamble: 1) Know when to surge `em: Future warfighting must continue to emphasize focusing "our combat power at the right place and right time." MCDP 1 Warfighting. Challenge: Realistic assessments of where and when to focus in counterinsurgencies have been historically ignored if politically unpopular (e.g., Admiral Fallon, Centcom commander, lecturing "we have too many troops there"). 2) Know when to fold `em: To win in future wars, we must not promote those who are not winning. Challenge: "The current promotion system does not take into account actual effectiveness in counterinsurgency." Eliot Cohen. "A private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war." LtCol Yingling. 3) Know when to walk away (from the enemy): "Planners must understand the environment and develop plans from an environmental perspective vice an enemy situation perspective." General Odierno. Challenge: "We seek to locate [the enemy's] critical vulnerabilities, where our actions will have the most destructive effects." MCDP 1 Warfighting. Summary: Employing effective leaders focused on protecting the local population, instead of a kill and capture approach, is the "secret to surviving" future counterinsurgencies. Challenge: "We must understand what our riflemen do in Afghanistan every day. The answer is they conduct combat patrols. That underlies all their other activities. They go out with rifles to engage and kill the enemy. That is how they protect the population... Those scholars who emphasized the concepts of non-kinetic counterinsurgency need also to design concepts that bring more lethality to the ground battlefield." Bing West from Tactics or Strategy?

Ricks delivers a penetrating look at all aspects of our Iraqi campaign. To the extent that it can be done, he makes this disaster an entertaining read.

Overall, "The Gamble (SC)" was a good read and provides a good US-centric narrative on the strategy and politics behind surge. However, I wish he had examined the contribution of the rest of the Multi-National Forces - Iraq (MNF-I) a bit more, as well as get some of the more basic facts correct (e.g. The Republic of Korea was the 2nd largest non-US troop contributor with approx. 3,600 troops vice Georgia's 2,000 as stated on page 268). Additionally, the command organization, structures and relationships of MNF-I, MNSTC-I, Multi-National Corps - Iraq (MNC-I) and all the other subdivisions could have been made more clear for the reader. Understanding that the UK based out of Basra controlled most of the southeast with some very interesting challenges at the seaports and borders , with some overlaps with MNF-I facilities. Ditto for the Korea-controlled areas up by Irbil. Overall, a decent read with the obvious mistakes a reminder not to believe everything you read.

Thomas E. Ricks is a Pulitzer Prize winner and it shows in this book. Ricks has written an impressively even handed account that examines the war in Iraq during the time of "the surge." Ricks shows that the military, the U.S. Army in particular, learned from its mistakes, which he documented fully in his previous book, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005. In particular, Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, one of the generals that emerged in Fiasco as being most responsible for things going wrong in Iraq, is one of the key figures in salvaging the situation. It is a testimony to the professionalism of Ricks as a reporter that he is willing to offer such a different portrait of the man. Despite what most think, "the surge" was about more than just an increase in troop numbers. It was a time when the military (the Army and the U.S. Marine Corps) adopted a new approach to the conflict. New measures like aggressive patrolling, small unit deployment among the Iraqis, and the development of intelligence networks designed to neutralize rather than kill the insurgent took the place of big units hunkered down on well-fortified and distant bases that responded to incidents with intense and indiscriminate firepower. General David Petraeus played a key role in developing this change when, as the commandant of the Command & General Staff College, he pushed through the development of a new field manual for counter-insurgency warfare. This subject was close to his heart, since he had written a Ph.D. dissertation at Princeton on the lessons of Vietnam. Petraeus, however, was smart enough to realize he needed other smart people to help once he took over in Iraq. Ricks offers portraits of an interesting cast of characters, which if nothing else shows that Petraeus really was willing to think outside of the box. In fact, he goes as far as to say that Odierno was more responsible than Petraeus for developing the new strategy and doctrine the accompanied "the surge." Ricks spent twenty-five years as a defense correspondent for _The Wall Street Journal_ and _The Washington Post_, and he uses that background to good advantage. The book is well-written and an exceptionally easy read. He examines every level of war, ranging from grunts in firefights at the tactical level, to high-level discussions at the Pentagon. He shows an appreciative understanding for the Sergeants and First Lieutenants that are on the front lines. He also shows a better understanding for events than many of his colleagues. In particular, he puts the famous walk Petraeus took through the Baghdad markets with Senator John McCain into its proper context. While many reporters saw the heavy security apparatus protecting the two men and dismissed it as a publicity stunt, Ricks notes that what was most significant was that the market was in business because it was well-protected, which had not been the case earlier. The only shortcoming in this account is

Thomas Ricks' "The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008" is an excellent, well-researched, and well-told account of how the now-vaunted surge turned around the Iraq War. Ricks had access to General Petraeus, General Odierno, many of their key staff, and used their insights - along with media and journal articles and unclassified after action reports - to tell his story. Ricks' story is that the surge (adding significant additional combat forces to Iraq) concept wasn't the consensus plan of the military but was instead championed by a small group of officers and some academics in the defense establishment. It took the intervention of a retired Army four-star general to bypass Secretary Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to sell the surge to the White House. This contradicts some of the claims in Bob Woodward's "The War Within" that the idea of the surge was originally hatched in the White House. But Ricks goes on to explain how the true genius of the surge wasn't the addition of additional combat troops, it was a change in tactics and outlook. The soldiers got out of their vehicles, patrolled dismounted, and lived among the Iraqis - they no longer "commuted" to the fight and then returned to their bases at night. (As an aside, I observed in 2004 on the ground in Iraq that the emphasis on force protection and unwillingness to take risks among the Iraqi people was damaging to the mission.) And once the soldiers cleared and occupied an area, they were to hold it. This change in tactics was partly the result of the new counterinsurgency manual produced by General Petraeus in late 2006, and it was enabled by the surge in combat troops. At the higher levels, the military engaged the Iraqi tribes and Sunni militias and co-opted them, often with payments and sometimes behind the back of the Iraqi and US governments, in an effort to eliminate, but not necessarily through firepower, enemies to the peace and security in Iraq. And while Ricks lauds the success of the surge, he is quick to point out its weaknesses and risks: although it brought relative peace and security to Iraq (after an initial increase in fighting), it did not move the political process forward. The surge also, by appealing to the tribes and militias, made it more likely that they'll remain powerful extra-political forces in Iraq even as the political process moves forward. Because this book was written so soon after the incidents, and is based heavily on media accounts, it will serve as a good first draft of history. It is also not the definitive history of the surge because it gives the view from the top in Iraq, then tiny slices of the war on the ground, and never gives a full accounting of the brigades and divisions involved or their areas of operation. But my biggest criticism is that many of the Ricks's conclusions are already out of date: he claims that we are at the mid-point of the Iraq War and expects tens of t