The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the Twenty-First Century

"The Future of War" is for anyone interested in military matters, or anyone interested in thinking. It's a great book about warfare, but even if you don't have much interest in war, you'll find a treasure-trove of that oft-cited skill, 'critical thinking'. The book begins with the long history of war, providing insight into things I never considered. For example, the author explains how David was able to kill Goliath, who was burdened with very heavy defensive armor at the expense of mobility. The book draws a comparison to present day Goliaths - the huge armored tanks and the aircraft carrier battle groups - and how both strategy and technology is changing the usefulness of those weapons systems. I was surprised when I realized that the immense power of a carrier battle group is primarily focused on protecting the carrier, which in turn only has a few dozen attack aircraft from which it launches offensive weapons. I knew some of the data previously, but the book assembled that data in a way I hadn't considered. The importance of sea lane control, and the analogy to control of certain orbits in space, was fascinating. There's so much more, but you'll have to read the book. It's a keeper, even though it was written several years ago.

The authors begin by noting that there is "a deep chasm between the advent of technology and its full implementation in doctrine and strategy." In their history of failure they note how conventional wisdom always seems to appreciate the systems that won the past wars, and observes that in the U.S. military there is a long history of transferring power from the political and military leadership to the technical and acquisition managers, all of whom have no real understanding of the current and future needs of the men who will actually fight. They address America's vulnerability in both U.S. based logistics and in overseas transport means-"Destroying even a portion of American supply vessels could so disrupt the tempo of a logistical build-up as to delay offensive operations indefinitely." They have a marvelous section on the weaknesses of U.S. data gathering tools, noting for example that satellites provide only a static picture of one very small portion of the battlefield, rather that the wide-area and dynamic "situational awareness" that everyone agrees is necessary. They go on to gore other sacred oxes, including the Navy's giant ships such as the carrier (and implicitly the new LPH for Marines as well as the ill-conceived arsenal ship) and the largest of the aircraft proposed by the Air Force. They ultimately conclude that the future of war demands manned space stations that are able to integrate total views of the world with control of intercontinental precision systems, combined with a complete restructuring of the ground forces (most of which will be employed at the squad level) and a substantial restructuring of our navel force to provide for many small fast platforms able to swarm into coastal areas.

The Friedmans stir up controversy because they don't adhere to any one standard weltanschauung (not even that of MIT). That's OK. Their primary contribution in this book is framing the issue of maritime security with both focus and relevance. They are 100 percent right: in the next half century it will become much harder to defend ships at sea - merchantmen or warships - because of long-range shoot-and-scoot missiles posing a threat from shore, and because of inescapable surveillance from space. This will profoundly alter international security relationships and world trade patterns. This will in turn affect your life directly.America is the only great naval power in history who has never really recognized that she is one. The Friedmans pull out some nuggets, even if much of their information is well known to those in the military and the defense industry.

This book directs one's attention to the discussion the way we have thought about war will no longer be as relevant in the future. The notion of "weapons reaching and obsolete status" points to a central thesis in the book--that America will remain the preponderant military and technical power of the 21st century. This of course may be a comforting piece of information for policy shapers and makers, and business peoples. But is it really ? Such dominance by one nation is bound to lead to the shifting of the balance of power among nations unless the movement toward internationalization proves to be successful. However, aspiring powers and emerging nations that wish to be freed from this American dominance may -- and there seems to be information to support this -- seek weapons of mass destruction to counter US global hegemony. This book made a clearly argued case for American Dominance, but it does not help us to see the political/moral future. But within its parameters, its an "eye-opener."

This is a well thought out book. I picked it up cheap for a few of the included charts and graphs and was very nicely surprised by the content. The Friedmans have done a very nice survey of the evolutiionary ptrocess of weapons and weapons systems. The introduction of the concept of weapon senility vs weapon obselescence is very intersting.This one really makes you think.