The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy or Division?

This book is structured in a very simple manner, following the history of this country: First, the monarchy from 1920-1958; Second, the revolution from 1958-1968; Third, the Ba'ath Regime from 1968-1988; Fourth, the wreck of Iraq from 1988-2003. These chapters recount the history of Iraq from its beginnings after World War I--when the British created a country where none has existed before--with three parties holding very different views--Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds. Each of these three groups is examined as the basis for speculation as to what is to come in the future. The authors wonder if Iraq might end up splintering into three distinct countries--Sunni, Shia, and Kurd. Questions emerge from this scenario: Is this desirable? Would the needs of all three groups be optimized in this manner? Will this encourage additional "ethnic cleansing"? Even beyond what we have seen? Would such a solution mark success--or failure--of the American intervention? The future? America's role in that future? We cannot say at this point. However, it does appear that the American intervention never really understood the historical and cultural context. We can only hope that the Iraqi incursion turns out well. But it is also clear that Americans sadly misunderstood the context into which they entered. . . .

This book should have been required reading for those eager to enter Iraq, overthrow Saddam Hussein, and install a Western-style democracy. The book has three main points: (a) a history of Iraq from its flawed beginnings after World War I; (b) an analysis of each of the three main groups--Sunnis, Shia, and Kurds; (c) an examination of different scenarios that might illuminate the future of Iraq. Each element is well done and provides context for the reader interested in something more than current events weith respect to Iraq. The end result of reading this book is to wonder at the arrogance of the war planners who apparently did not consider historical and ethnic and religious context as that critical for the outcome of the war. As one of the neocons once mentioned, reality is not so important to the United States; the country can create its own reality. To this point, the reality being created on the ground in Iraq is far different than it might have been had history acted as a guide.

Anderson and Stansfield have written one of the best books on Iraq currently on the market. This book would be a wonderful place to start for those who have taken an increased interest in Iraq as of late. I was skeptical about this book at first because the chapters on Iraqi history are very brief and quickly skip over a lot of details. However, I've read quite a bit about Iraq and am used to more detail. I realized that this is the type of book someone should start out with and then work your way up to someone like Charles Tripp. Even though the authors breeze through a lot of detail, they point out a lot of important information that usually gets left out of other Iraqi history books (particularly when it comes to the role of the U.S. in Iraq). Once you've finished the history section of the book, you'll find three very informative chapters about Iraq's three main ethnic groups. These chapters are quite accurate and provide the reader with a solid foundation of information. The last two chapters are the most helpful and the most informative. The authors discuss the problems facing Iraq and how they should be dealt with. Quite a bit of time is spent on democratization theory and its application to Iraq. The authors use all of this to come to the conclusion that perhaps a managed partition of Iraq is the best course of action. You may not agree with this, but the authors make a very convincing argument. That being said, this is probably one the best books about the future of Iraq and I'm glad I finally got around to reading it. Anderson and Stansfield have produced a very well written history/analytical book that really tries to answer the important questions about Iraq. Anyone interested in Iraq should read this book as soon as possible.

This is an excellent book for those who want to know more about how the ethnically artificial Iraqi state was created by the colonial powers, mainly the British, in the 1920s, and why; and how it "progressed" toward the Ba'athist dictatorship under Saddam Hussein with attendant intrigues and atrocities. The first chapter covers the period from 1920 to1958 under the Hashemite Monarchy; the second from 1958 to 1968; the third from 1968 to1988; the fourth begins with the end of the Iraq-Iran War and ends in 2003. Then there are three chapters devoted to the three main ethnic groups, the Shi'a, the Sunnis, and the Kurds. There is an epilogue and an index. I came away from my reading with the sense that no matter what is done, Iraq is headed for massive bloodshed resulting eventually in a new Sunni dictatorship or a Shi'a theocracy--neither of which is what the Bush Administration had in mind. Clearly the authors--Liam Anderson, a political science professor at Wayne State University, and Gareth Stansfield, an expert on Iraqi and especially Kurdish affairs--do not think it likely that democracy will arise out of the ashes. They give three likely scenarios in terms of options for the United States in Chapter Eight, "The Democracy Dilemma" (which is where the time-strapped reader might begin reading). The first option they call "Democracy Lite" in which there is a "short-term occupation" with an attempt "to establish a functioning democratic system," and then a pullout. (p. 191) The authors argue rather convincingly that this will never work mainly because the various political divisions within Iraq will prevent it, the Sunnis because they fear the Shi'a majority, the Shi'a because they don't really believe in democracy, and the Kurds because they want their own autonomous state. The next option is a long-term occupation (a minimum of ten years). Here the prospects for democracy are better, but such an occupation is likely to unify the dissident elements of Iraq in an insurgency effort against a foreign power, as has happened in the past. Indeed, the attacks against Coalition forces and those Iraqis who support the Coalition have increased substantially since this book was finished a year ago. So the real question then becomes, how long will the American people put up with the cost in dollars and bloodshed before pulling out? The third option is the installation of a puppet regime and the quick withdrawal of US troops. The authors call this the "default option" (p. 209) and condemn it as spelling "disaster for Iraq" and "seriously detrimental to U.S. interests." (p. 211) Instead of these three options, the authors opt for a fourth possibility which they call "The Managed Partition of Iraq." The idea here is to give autonomy to the Kurds in the north, and to give the rest of the country to the Sunnis and the Shi'a, or to have that territory divided between them, with the Shi'a controlling the southern portion in a kind of "state of Basra"

Fantastic. Anderson and Stansfield truly grasp the nature of the problems within and around Iraq, highlighting the difficulties facing the US lead reconstruction in handling the different factions, whether it is Kurd, Arab or Shi'ite. It is refreshing to see academics truly knowing what they are writing about, with the acknowledgment of how artificial Iraq actually is. A copy of this book should be assigned to all dealing with the subject matter, and the Middle East as a whole.