The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918

The book is a very good general overview of the Great War in Europe from July 1914 until the end in November 1918; this book is special from most other books regarding the subject, in the fact it is written from the viewpoints of the German and Austro-Hungarian empires instead of the Western allies of Britain and France. in addition with its good overview on the course of the war it is full of interesting tidbits regarding the start of the war (while, partly understandably, not giving the serbian instigation of the conflict due attention, understandable solely because the book is from Vienna and Berlin, not an overall, viewpoint). This book is a must-read for anyone interested in the German and KuK (Austro-Hungarian) side of the conflict, and what defeat spelled for both nations.

Holger Herwig, a professor of history at the University of Calgary has put together an important and innovate book on the "other guys" in World War I. Americans are, of course, more interested in World War II than the war that proceeded, but when they do direct their attention to the 1910s, they tend to look at it through a British lens. The western front gets more attention than any other theater, and the focus tends to be on the actions of the English-speaking armies, even if they aren't American. As a result, this book is particularly valuable to those of us that do not read German. It offers a solid account of what the enemy was doing and why. First, this is book is about the two German-speaking Empires that fought the Entente Powers. Except for specialized accounts that focus on the Dual Monarchy itself, the Austro-Hungarian Empire is largely absent from accounts about the fighting of this conflict. Herwig's book is also important because he offers a new view on the origins of the conflict. He shows that both empires feel they need the other. Germany went to war not out of a sense that they were destined to rule the planet, but out of a realization that a war was inevitable and that they needed to strike while strike while the Hapsburg Empire was able and willing to contribute to the effort. The Austro-Hungarian Empire made a game effort. Herwig's coverage of the eastern front is rare and exceptionally valuable. After the first twelve months of the conflict, the Dual monarch had shattered itself and became a liability, needing German assistance just to keep going, but refusing to accept that they were no longer a major power. Herwig is offering his readers a military history, but it is broad in focus. He looks at war time mobilization of these two empires and argues that neither managed their resources well. At the end of the war, their armies were far less technologically advanced than those of their enemies. Herwig choose to focus his account on the political, diplomatic, and strategic levels of this conflict. We find that the Central Powers were quite bad at strategy and blundered time and time again. Herwig never really goes into tactical level issues, which is understandable, given his focus. Nor does he spend much time on naval operations, which is surprising given his previous work in this field. Air power is another topic that gets little attention. A greater discussion of these two topics probably would only have underscored his arguments more and the relatively little attention he gives two air and sea are not real problems with this work. The prose is engaging and this book is highly recommend for anyone interested in the topic.

The focus of Holger Herwig's book is from the perspective of Germany and its principle ally, Austria-Hungary. Herwig implicitly argues Germany/Austria-Hungary lost the war because of incompetent generalship, and mismanagement of inadequate resources needed to wage war on a massive scale. Specifically, Herwig blames the failure on the Dual-Monarchy, its unwillingness to subordinate and cooperate in conjunction with its more powerful ally, Germany. Herwig downplays the myth of German military might and attempts to demonstrate that not even Germany, who had showed such greatness as a military power in the latter half of the 19th Century was ready for 20th Century style warfare. Herwig utilizes a chronological method and highly readable narrative style throughout. Generally, Herwig incorporates the standard top-down military/ diplomatic history approach describing causes of the war, mobilization, battles and leaders, major campaigns and results of the war. To a lesser degree, Herwig takes a look at the affects of war on society with such themes as hunger, disease, labor on the home front and gender issues. Overall, Herwig builds his argument by consulting archival sources previously waved over by the "Anglo-centric preoccupations of English language historians" (Strachan, quoted in Herwig, p. xiii). The author admits that a substantial amount of evidence dealing with the Great War was destroyed during bombing raids in WWII. He points out, however, that the reunification of Germany in 1989 has made available documents never before considered by western historians. Herwig relys heavily upon official histories of the war, mainly, Reichsarchiv's Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918, state papers focusing on other German states besides Prussia, and the official history of the Austrian-Hungarian Army. This source material is gleaned from many world famous archival institutions such as: Bundesarchiv (Koblenz), Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (Freiburg), and Vienna's Haus-, Hof- und Staataarchiv, Politisches Archiv and Österreichisches Staatsarchiv. The author also utilizes diaries and memoirs; dissertations and scholarly articles; and secondary sources assembled in perhaps one of the most impressive bibliographies in recent military literature. Although highly readable, the author tends to be too general at times. For example, the Germans advanced through Belgium in a few sentences without any mention of the Belgium resistance or the Germany atrocities committed there in reprisal. One may notice that not once did he mention the scholarship of the historian Barbara Tuchman. In describing campaigns and battles, In contrast to John Keegan's _First World War_, Herwig focuses too much on the top echelons and rarely gets below corps level when recounting troop movements and engagements. Intermittently, Herwig fails to cite sources, particularly when quoting statistics, casualty figures, and troop strength (there are examples where he does quote statistical evidence though). Unlike

Holger Herwig's First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary takes a unique perspective when analyzing the war. Instead of traditional theories that still attempt to place war-guilt and blame onto Germany, Herwig's position is that war needs to be viewed from Germany's position.In describing the German point of view, Herwig illustrates how the war might have been the brief encounter people expected in 1914, but became a drawn out conflict largely due to Austria-Hungary and the ineptness of Austrian leaders. Once this occurred, it was only a matter of time before Germany could no longer sustain its war effort. Food shortages on the German homefront greatly hindered German military capabilities. Germany kept tapping its reserve of manpower usually to bolster Austrian blunders. Frequently Germany saved the day and kept Austria in the war (Germany had little choice but to assist her feeble ally if there was to be any hope of winning the war).But Herwig is also critical of German high command,Falkenhayn, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff for its handling of the western front, notably the Somme, Verdun, and Passchendaele. The German high command was no more or less capable or inept as the allied high command; Germany as a nation was as much caught up in the war as Britain, France, or Russia. Herwig's main point is that after seventy years, the war guilt blame still falls upon Germany because Germany lost the war and Britain and France dictated the peace.This book is essential for any student of the Great War. Herwig's thesis may seem radical to those who prefer the war-guilt pro Anglo-French analysis, but Herwig's understanding of the war and his presentation of facts cannot be easily discredited. His outright blame of Austria-Hungary as Germany's real nemesis may sound like sour grapes, but this is an outstanding historical effort.

This book provides a very usefull look into the lesser known aspects of WWI. If you're a student of history and truly wish to learn more about the way that Germany and Austria-Hungary lost. This is the best way to find out more. Most of us only heard tid-bits of info on the "other fronts" this will open many doors. One of the lesser known aspects of the war is given great attention here...STARVATION. The author proves that the real losers in war are people, not just the troops but, real people.

The First World War destroyed the old imperial system that had governed Europe. Prior to the war central Europe was dominated by the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Imperial Russia. As a result of the war these countries were torn apart by social revolution with Communism taking control in Russia and Fascism in Germany. Herwig in his stunning book explains why. The stunning incompetence of all of the participants in this conflict were breathtaking. The military incompetence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was such that they had lost close to one million men in the first year of the war. However conventional histories fail to look at the way countries managed their economies. Neither Germany nor Austro-Hungary were able to feed their populations during the war or even turned their mind to it. The war years were a time when the normal people in those counties slowly starved to death, suffering from a range of diseases brought on by poor nutrition to witness their husbands and children taken away to die in huge numbers at the front.The book is a stunning inditement of all of the great powers of the time. The First World War is the first cause of a lot which has gone wrong with this century.