The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global

The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global Well written. Very detailed. Some repetition. Very informative. Writer knows his subject. Should be required reading at the State Department.

Though the author seems to belabor the point at times, the end result is a study in the jihadist trends of the past 30+ years. In this book you will be introduced to the key players in this drama along with the historical background of how their thought and teaching developed. It will take some time to digest it all but do not rush the reading and you will be rewarded with a level of analysis lacking in most books and reporting on the subject. It is well written for such a complex and daunting study.

Fawaz Gerges here gives us an enormously useful history of the jihadi movement, one that benefits greatly from his facility with Arabic sources and his access to many jihadis for interviews. Of greatest importance though is the analysis he provides of the terrorist threat. While some hawks have argued that Mr. Gerges has historically had a tendency to minimize that threat, events seem to bear out his argument that: The September 11 attacks were not just a product of the civil war within the House of Islam but a direct result of the civil war within the jihadist movement itself. In this sense, the United States was a secondary, not a primary, target of jihadis' military escalation, and the bulk of jihadis (religious nationalists) remained on the sidelines and did not join the onslaught by their transnationalist counterparts. If my thesis holds, then Al Qaeda represents more of a national security problem to the United States than a strategic threat, as the conventional wisdom in the American foreign policy establishment has it. Therefore, it is critical to highlight the internal turmoil among jihadis because it brought about dramatic shifts in their thinking and action and caused further splits in their ranks. It is certainly the case that the 9-11 attacks have been disastrous for the most anti-Western extremists, provoking the U.S. into actions that have decimated al Qaeda, brought democracy to Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq and Lebanon, liberalization to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc., and hastened settlements between the Israelis and Palestinians and Pakistan and India. The irony for al Qaeda is that in striking a secondary target they inflicted on themselves strategic defeat.

When any book has 60-some pages of citations and notes, you know it's a serious work. These days, it seems everyone is an armchair expert with a "factual" opinion on the global Jihad situation. Because I receive phone calls from US soldiers and civilians serving or working in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Bosnia, I have a bit of insight into this situation. What most people spew as fact is merely rewarmed televised propaganda with little or no basis in reality. Thus, it was refreshing to read Gerges' well-researched book. Gerges is authoritative, not opinionated. This is evident in his extensive use of letters written by various key players in the global jihad psychodrama. One of the points he discussed was how the Muslim mainstream has rejected Osama bin Laden--and why. Through my volunteer work in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), I have been interacting with Muslims for many years--long before September 11. My opinion of these people has nothing to do with their religion. I have found them to be intelligent, hard-working, considerate, and giving. Not at all the characterization we find being put forth by our more "insulated" fellow citizens. Being of Sicilian decent myself, I know a thing or two about being "suspected"--as many innocent Muslims are today. The situation in the Middle East is not one of a monolithic Muslim culture waging war against the so-called "Christian" nations. In France, Muslims outnumber Catholics and Protestants combined. Any time I read a book or article about Jihad, I know the author has stepped into "stupidland" as soon as there's mention of "the Middle East Muslims still fighting the Crusades against Europe." Yes, in the minds of a few zealot Muslims, the Crusade thing is true. But let's not forget we have zealot "Christians" in the USA running around in bed sheets and lighting crosses on people's front lawns. In both cases, religious leaders have declared the zealots as acting in violation of their respective scriptures. Broad generalizations based on special cases may be normal for American mainstream media, but that doesn't make them correct or useful. Gerges doesn't make any generalizations. In fact, I had to stop reading at a few points to wonder what point he was trying to make. When I did that, I realized it wasn't about selling his point to the reader. At those few points where I had to stop to digest the material before moving on, Gerges was going in-depth and making me out together a structure of points. The global Jihad isn't a linear thing, or something you can boil down to a few trite statements. It was great to see someone treat this complex subject with the in-depth examination and evidence it deserves. So, what can you expect to find in this book that I like so much? Gerges starts out with a lengthy introduction that gives perspective on September 11. Then he addresses the Afghan War (U.S.-backed Taliban against the U.S.S.R.) and how that sowed the seeds of transnational J

There is no doubt that Islam as a religion and Islamic-Western relations as a political problem have captured the attention of everyone in the United States who is tuned into current affairs. September 11th, the worst terrorist attack in American history, and the current international war on terrorism have changed the lives of people around the globe. The search for the accused masterminds behind 9/11 and other recent attacks against Western and Western-allied targets, and the pursuit of those who are the direct perpetrators of terrorist activities, is an ongoing and very expensive enterprise. Of particular interest are the whereabouts and capture of Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, leaders of the terrorist group called Al Qaeda. For the most part, Al Qaeda has been characterized as an Islamist front united in armed struggle, or "jihad," against Western civilization and Western interests. But Fawaz A. Gerges, a noted historian and Middle East expert, has a different take on the matter and has offered his own analysis in "The Far Enemy," a book that is extremely detailed and meticulously researched. Gerges certainly possesses the credentials needed to write a book such as this. Educated at Oxford University and the London School of Economics, he has previously been a Research Fellow at Harvard and Princeton universities, and he now holds the Christian A. Johnson Chair in International Affairs and Middle Eastern Studies at Sarah Lawrence College. Gerges has written widely on Arab and Muslim politics, Islamist movements, American foreign policy, and relations between the world of Islam and the West. His has authored several books and his articles have appeared in several of the most respected journals and newspapers in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. He is also a senior analyst and regular commentator for ABC television news on Middle Eastern affairs. The first question that naturally comes to one's mind is: What is meant by the "Far Enemy"? Furthermore, if there is a "far enemy," there should be a "near enemy" and who is that? I have read a great deal about Islam and the Islamic "jihad" during the past few years and never came across these terms before. Now that I am familiar with them, thanks to the author, past and current events regarding Islamic-Western tensions, and some of the events in certain Muslim-dominated nations, are better understood. To put it simply, the "far enemy" refers to the United States and its Western allies; the "near enemy" are the Muslim regimes which have been deemed "unacceptable" either for their secularization of politics and society or because, in the view of some jihadists, the religious authorities and scholars have been "subverted by corrupting Western influences." Up until the late 1990s, according to the author, jihadists had concentrated their attention on fighting the "near enemy," that is, bringing about political and social change within Muslim nations, returning thes