The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration

DR. AXLEROD IS A PIONEER IN EMERGING FIELD OF EVOLUTIONARY THINKING. HIS MODELS STUDY THE EFFICACY OF COOPERATION BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENTS, USING THE KISS METHOD--KEEP IT SIMPLE, STUPID. HIS STUDIES SHOW HOW WE REACH DECISIONS AND MAKE CHOICES IN THE REAL WORLD TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL ITS COMPLEXITIES, AS OPPOSED TO THE ARTIFICIAL WORLD OF RATIONAL CHOICE ASSUMPTIONS USED BY TRADITIONAL SOCIAL SCIENTISTS.

Axlerod's first book elucidated the "prisoner's dilemma" and why cooperation might be in our best interest. This book, an excellent follow on, does two things exceptionally well. First, it outlines a theory by which one can frame and think about the considerations agents take into account when cooperating and collaborating. From this point, it instantiates those theories with well thought examples of the theory. The second aspect that is remarkably useful for many, is the breadth of the examples. For example, Axlerod describes models that simulate emerging alliances among nations in World War II, as well as patterns in the dissemination of culture and norms. Axlerod's writing style is easy to follow and, in a field where complexity is typically described with long equations in set theory and logic, he avoids the proof through advanced math and provides access to these issues especially approriate for the novice. If one searches the internet you can find Axlerod's website, where the actual code and brief documentation is available for download, for both teaching and personal learning. Of course there are also two major weaknesses in the book. Because of this diversity of topics there is no developmental thread running through the book and the resource appendix is abysmal, but overall you can't do better for this topic.

A sequel to his prior book, "the evolution of cooperation".Iterated prisoner's dilemma is the center of this book,with a particular focus on the collaboration in the interests of competiion. No mathmatical background required and usefull referenced included.

This books covers what Robert Axelrod been up to since "The Evolution of Cooperation." Extensions to the original "Prisoner's Dilemma" have required new agent behaviors for stable solutions. "Coping with Noise" deals with agents that make mistakes in their defections and cooperation. "Promoting Norms" covers the fact that pure self-interest isn't a stable strategy and to promote stability requires norms - common behaviors among agents. The most interesting result from his work is NOT that agents should punish defectors - that is intuitive - but agents who DON'T punish defectors (of norms) must be "persuaded" to punish defectors to keep the norm stable. I guess we all need both the carrot and stick!"Choosing Sides" covers landscape theory - the creation of population aggregates because similar agents tend to clump together.There are other interesting sections and I like this book. I would normally give a five to this book; however, this is also a thin book. If there were more coverage of the material and a more in depth discussion of other peoples work, I would have given it a five.