The Clash: U.S.-Japanese Relations Throughout History

As one whose work requires knowledge of contemporary East Asian affairs, I can highly recommend "Clash" for the light that it sheds on past and present U.S. interests and actions in the region. Published in 1997, the book is a bit dated, but Clash does facilitate prediction of future diplomatic, military, and economic relations based upon past crises. LaFeber, who appears to have a slight bias in favor of the Japanese, especially during the American imperialistic era, structures his work by examining U.S.-Japanese relations in three themes, which he continually revisits in his description of the relationship between the two nations since 1850. The first theme is that, despite the apparent cooperation between the U.S. and Japan during the past century and a half, the relationship has been (and presumably will be) punctuated by a series of crises that severely stress association between the two. Next, LaFeber contends that the economic systems of the U.S. (capitalistic, free-market economy) and Japan (non-capitalistic, government and large corporation controlled economy) are incompatible, and have led to clashes on respective trade and economic policies. Finally, the focal point of all clashes and economic strife between the two revolve around the question of China, regarding both policies of its political disposition and the potential opening of its markets. While addressing these three themes, LaFeber does not ignore the effects on U.S.-Japanese relations of Western imperialism and racism, nuclear proliferation, exploitation of Asia through the use of international law, and power of U.S. business interests in Asia (and how those interests drove diplomacy). Despite the excellent research and structure of this work, it left some room for improvement. Some examples of possible improvements include: (1) LaFeber chose to shift between Pinyin and Wade-Giles for his romanization of Mandarin. This use of two different systems was confusing in a work already overloaded with names of actors from many different nationalities. (2) LaFeber's relation of WWII in the Pacific was fairly amateur. I understand that hundreds of books have been written solely describing that war, and that he was likely attempting to limit overall length, but he could have had a much better description of the war in the space that he used. LaFeber's style is not pretentious and is very readable, somewhat unusual for such a scholarly work. It is also relevant and contributes to an elevated understanding of East Asian affairs. I recommend this work as an entry point for anyone who desires to view Japan or greater East Asia from the standpoint of national security or economics.

In THE CLASH by Walter LaFeber, U.S. Japanese relations collide over different visions of Asia. For Americans, Japan represented an opportunity to enter China and satisfy a western global reach built on the extension of Manifest Destiny. Asia stood as a far western American frontier. American commerce and power promised an enlightened deliverance of manufactured goods and a benign pacific paternalism, grounded within the western concepts of unrestricted capitalism and individual rights. For the Japanese, Asia never represented an idea, but a reality. Japan viewed China and other Asian countries through a historical lens encompassing thousands of years. Wishing to protect a harmonious culture and placing itself as a leading actor within Asian affairs, Japan clashed with the United States over a period of 150 years. LaFeber views economics and geo political factors as being the most important factors which shaped U.S. Japanese relations. Beginning with Commodore Perry and the Five Ports treaty, America and Japan each resolved to satisfy their Asian objectives. America solved the the dilemna of overproduction, while Japan built a military and industrial complex that would place it on equal footing with Western imperial powers. After 1873, American and Japanese interests coalesced around the objectives of an Open China, a British alliance, a prevention of Russian and German colonialism, and acquiescence to American control over the Phillipines and Hawaii. In addition, america recognized Japanese control of Korea through the Taft-Katsura agreement. However, the relationship changed. With the beginning of the 20th century, a U.S. Japanese clash emerged as Japan took control of Manchuria, asserted itself militarily through the Russo-Japanese War, and lost a British alliance through american post World War I credit. In addition, a world wide depression forced the United States and Japan to advocate total mobilization and a reevaluation of foreign policy objectives. Wishing to achieve a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Japanese realized that U.S. Asiatic interests prevented Japanese control over Pacific resources. Therefore, Japan opted for a quick military strike against U.S. military forces. For Franklin Roosevelt, a world war provided domestic economic relief and the opportunity to integrate Asia within a US created global capitalist system. The dropping of two atomic bombs achieved American objectives. Following a devastating defeat, Japan rebounded economically through American economic aid, Prime minister Kishi's move toward a more bureaucratic and central government, and american military conflicts within Korea and Vietnam, which provided substantial trading opportunities for Japanese industry. A reinvigorated and economically prosperous Japan produced another clash due to rising American trade deficits and the failure of Japan to stay politically in step with U.S. policy towards Asia and the Middle East. After reading THE

In this very readable book LaFeber recounts the relations between the United States and Japan since Commodore Perry arrived in Tokyo Bay . LaFeber shows that both Japan and America were very interested in the resources and the potential market of China. This rivalry was more serious for Japan, since Japan had almost no resources of her own. As America and Japan became stronger they jockeyed for access to the markets of China and the resources of Manchuria while Russia and China declined. This eventually led to the attack on Pearl Harbor and the war in the Pacific. After the war America tried and failed to change Japans views of capitalism and democracy or persuade Japan to ignore the China markets and develop her military strength against the now rising Russia and China.LaFeber describes the different political and economy backgrounds of America and Japan to explain the actions, and different views of capitalism and democracy of Japan and America. LaFeber also points out the racism of America and Japan that damaged the relations between them.This book has an excellent bibliography and footnotes so the reader can go beyond the excellent research of LaFeber. There are also a series of maps that make the text easier to understand.

If you were puzzled by Japan's economic miracles in the past as well as the sobering today, you need to read this book to find some explanations beyond economical theories-that's not where I started from but I ended up. Lafeber is a mainstream writer on the us-japan relationship, which means that you can use it as a benchmark for comparation on different schools of thoughts. The book is more a historical review than a political/IR debate. History repeats itself-but not necessarily in the same format as war and blood, but may be equally profound. Great book to keep and refer to.

This book was required reading for my seminar on the US-Japan Alliance precisely because it gave such a good overview of the two nations' history together. Starting essentially with Perry's opening of the Japanese ports to American trade, LaFeber does a good job of chronicling the details of US-Japan relations up to the early 90s. Generally, this is a story of the transformation of Japan first into an authoritarian but developed state and then into a pacifist and American-dominated ally. For the most part, his arguments are factual and unbiased, but the book often seems determined to blame the US (for WWII, for example), when there is no compelling reason to do so and even in cases where there is little reason to place any blame. He reserves his greatest scorn, however, for those like John Hay who thought to tame the Japanese machine with trade (echoing Cobden). It sometimes seems as though he's grinding axes in the present rather than arguing about the past. It also should be noted how badly he miscalled the recession of the 90s, which he thought was a chance for the bureaucrats to "refocus" the economy, which would soon come rumbling back. All in all, however, once the author's biases are detected, a rather good - and very readable - scholarly overview of US-Japan relations