The Charge: Why the Light Brigade Was Lost

In addition to the other aspects of Adkins' treatment covered in the preceding reviews, Adkins also covers the British troopers' equipment and weapons of the time, and, hardly less important, some telling highlights of the protagonists' experiences and shenanigans prior to their service, one is tempted to say regrettable service, in the Crimea. What becomes clear is... well, you'll just have to enjoy the book for yourself.

This is the kind of book that shows how military history should be written. Although the maps and battle sketches are crude they are very effective in making Adkin's case. This is a careful military analysis of the Light Brigade's charge in October 1854, during the Crimean War, with the emphasis on untangling the hows and whys surrounding the mangled orders process that resulted in the charge. The usual culprit, the Cavalry Division commander Lord Lucan, is partly exonerated and receives only mild criticism. The primary culprits in Adkin's view are Lord Raglan and his ADC Captain Nolan. Adkin believes Nolan may have deliberately indicated the incorrect objective. Also interesting is the dissection of the actual charge, such as how many rounds were fired at the brigade and how the casualties were not as spectacular as is often claimed. It is interesting to note how incompetent the British chain of command appears next to the "amateur" generalship displayed seven years later in the American Civil War; even a Mclellan appears preferable to an (...) like Cardigan, the Light Brigade commander. The only omissions in this otherwise fine book: what kind of casualties did the Russian artillery battery suffer? What happened to the Light Brigade survivors in the brutal winter that followed?

I don't think that I could really add much to the previous excellent reviews on this interesting account of the Charge of the Light Brigade. The author, Mark Adkin, has produced an excellent account of the Charge of the Light Brigade, which occurred on the 25th of October 1854 during the siege of Sebastopol. Utilising his in-depth research to provide answers to how, why and who, the narrative takes you along with the cavalrymen on their charge into the Russian gun positions. The book has a number of detailed drawings, maps, and photographs to assist you on this reckless advance into the mouth of the guns. The book is very readable and I think that the author attempts to answer the question `who' was to blame quite fairly and without malice. Overall a very good read for the student of military history or for anyone who just enjoys a good story. A tip for readers of this book, a new release might be of interest: `CRIMEA: The Great Crimean War 1854-1856' by Trevor Royle.

Mark Adkin examines the contributions made by each of the "Four Horsemen of Calamity" - Raglan, Lucan, Cardigan and Nolan - to the fatal Charge. Adkin's book contains much that will be familiar to anyone who has read Cecil Woodham Smith's "The Reason Why". However, Adkin deals with the Charge in greater detail and uses line drawings and maps to explain the confusing troop movements that preceded the Charge. My only criticism, having visited the battleground, is that the drawings fail to convey the scale and make Raglan's task seem far simpler than it actually was. Contrary to common belief, the number of fatalities was relatively small. Adkin's use of diagrams showing the arcs of fire from the Russian guns shows why this was so. The return journey should have been far more perilous. Had it not been for the action of the French cavalry (Chasseurs) who attacked the Russians on one flank the fatalities would have been far greater. Perhaps the most contentious issue in the book concerns the part played by Nolan who conveyed the fatal 4th Order from Raglan to Lucan. Adkin challenges the popular view that Nolan made a terrible mistake which he sought to correct by redirecting the Charge, and was only prevented from doing so because he was, ironically, the first casualty. Adkin suggests that Nolan, the cavalry fanatic, believed that cavalry could successfully attack artillery head on. He had after all sketched out such a plan years before. Nolan, according to Adkin, may have known exactly what he was doing and deliberately duped Lucan into ordering the Charge on the wrong guns. His attempt to redirect the cavalry was actually the result of his loss of control over his mount after he had been hit by shell fragments. It is a fascinating hypothesis butleft me unconvinced. I suggest you read the book and make your own mind up.

This book,draws to a noticeable extent on Cecil Woodham Smiths exellent account of the Crimean War and the charge itself " The Reason Why".Ms. Woodham Smiths description of the social climate and mores which created and fostered the fashionable incompetence in British army leadership of the time remains unmatched.This author, a British cavalryman of this century, provides a detailed miltary analysis based on contempory accounts and records of the battle of Balaclava and of The Charge conducted on the still essentially unchanged battlefield.This objective, exiting and pursuasive analysis, identifies, those who blundered and in what proportion. It concludes by convincingly identifying the individual [not one of the usual suspects] who must bear the lions share of the blame for this disaster and suggests a plausible course of action which might well have snatched real victory from the jaws of what history often views as a glorious defeat.