The Case for Peace: How the Arab-Israeli Conflict Can Be Resolved

Alan Dershowitz's "The Case for Peace: How the Arab-Israeli Conflict Can be Resolved" proffers hope for a settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, and carries on the fierce war of words over the conflict. Harvard Law professor Dershowitz, author of The Case For Israel, feels that, with Arafat's death and a new Palestinian leadership, prospects for peace have brightened. He endorses the "obvious" two-state solution suggested by Ehud Barak's ill-fated 2000 proposals and the recent non-governmental Geneva accords, involving Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and most of the West Bank (except for some large Jewish settlements), divided sovereignty over Jerusalem and some "recognition" of Palestinian refugees by Israel without an absolute "right of return." Dershowitz continues to back such controversial Israeli actions as the targeted assassination of suspected terrorists and the construction of the West Bank security wall, but acknowledges a common interest in peace which must be protected from extremists on both sides. He is less conciliatory toward outside supporters of the Palestinians, whom he accuses of opposing peace and seeking "the destruction of the Jewish State," citing everything from anti-Semitic ravings in the Arab press to Western academics who violate his 28-point guidelines for separating legitimate criticism of Israel from anti-Semitism. He particularly targets the "real and acknowledged" conspiracy of "anti-Israel, anti-peace, anti-truth zealots" Noam Chomsky, Alexander Cockburn and Norman Finkelstein and offers a detailed rebuttal of Finkelstein's recent anti-Dershowitz broadside Beyond Chutzpah. In keeping with the vitriolic conventions of the debate-over-the-debate-over the Middle East, he bombards opponents with inflammatory charges based on sometimes tendentious readings of skimpily contextualized remarks; readers trying to substantiate them must often follow long trails of footnotes to other sources. Dershowitz presents his usual vigorous case, but not the judicious treatment these issues cry out for.

For a previous book , "The Case for Israel" Alan Dershowitz has been attacked and libeled by the radical left, who accuse of him being a warmongering chauvinist . In this book he presents a clearly argued refutation of this personal charge against him by outlining a peace plan for the Israeli- Palestinian conflict which in his words is both pro- Israeli and pro- Palestinian. Essentially he adopts the two- state position of what in Israel has long been called the ` peace- camp'. It is pretty much the Peres- Beilin plan in which Israel cedes most of the West Bank ( Judaea and Samaria) and Gaza, and in return receives an end to Palestinian terror and violence, and complete international recognition of its legitimacy. In the first part of the book, ` Overcoming the Geopolitical Barriers to Peace' Dershowitz presents the heart of his plan, and answers questions as to possible difficulties with it. The final goal is two states with secure and recognized borders, an end to violence, and end to all claims each side has on the other. In the course of this he indicates that claims which have long been neglected by the world, such as that of Jews expelled from Arab lands must also be taken into account. He indicates that one of the great sticking points, the question of Palestinian Arab refugee return must be solved within the framework of the Palestinian Arab state. He also answers objections to the critics who claim such a state would not be viable. He too criticizes what he calls `extremists' of both sides who would reject all compromise. But he makes it clear that there is a great assymetry here in that the Jewish extremists are on the margin of Israeli society, while Palestinian extremism and rejectionism is the present commanding position within the society. In this regard Dershowitz has no illusion as to what has been the major reason peace has not been made to now. Palestinianian rejectionism of the Peel Commission report in 1937 which would have given them eighty percent of the land West of the Jordan, their rejection of the UN partition plan of 1947 , their rejection of post -1967 peace plan, their rejection most recently in 2000 of the Israeli ( Barak) and US (Clinton) plan which would have given them ninety- seven percent of the West Bank, the control over the Temple Mount, and control over East Jerusalem has prevented peace from coming earlier. The basic Palestinian Arab rejection of any Jewish sovereignty in the Holy Land is what has made the conflict persist. One source of hope for Dershowitz is the belief that with Arafat's passing a new and more realistic Palestinian leadership will emerge which will opt for the realistic benefit of its people, and not a demagogic vain hope of destroying Israel. Dershowitz seems optimistic that the Palestinians can take a new tack. And while this book was published before the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza he probably believes this an encouraging sign( However one- sided) for peace. In the second secti

I read The Case for Peace by Alan Dershowitz with great interest. Although I am basically an optimist, I have been lately quite pessimistic about the opportunities for peace in the Arab Israel conflict. There are so many obstacles to peace and so many players that the possibility of peace seemed to be remote, at best. But Dershowitz, in a methodical analytic way approaches each of the pitfalls that I had considered and presents the consistent message that peace is possible. This is not a pie in the sky book of dreams. It is rather a hard hitting, at times argumentative, but always convincing case for peace. The aspect of the book that I found most convincing was its avoidance of calling on the various parties to exercise "good will". The time for good will has long passed and now is the time when only hard nosed negotiation can bring about lasting peace. Dershowitz rightfully points out that this final war for peace will be slow and painful for both sides. He predicts that terrorist attacks will continue after the peace is declared and that the parties must avoid, at all costs, the resumption of the "cycle of violence" that has been the hallmark of the intifada. The second part of the book, entitled "Overcoming the Hatred Barriers to Peace" makes this book necessary reading for the opponents of peace throughout the world on both sides of the issue. Sadly, because Dershowitz has been such a vocal advocate for Israel and for a lasting and just peace between Israel and its neighbors, he has become the target of too many personal attacks. These attacks and his necessary defense reach a climax in his passionate call to the reader to "Marginalize and confront those who persist in their hate speech even while Israel and the Palestinians move toward peace."

First, there are few things this book isn't. For example, don't let the title fool you. While "peace" is the general topic, reading The Case for Peace won't make you feel as if you're sitting around a campfire singing Kumbaya to acoustic guitar accompaniment. This book is vintage Dershowitz - fast, argumentative, and thought provoking. (It also happens to be a lot of fun to read, though I'm sure that more politically extreme readers will feel less comfortable.) Also, this book isn't another peace proposal; there's no "Dershowitz Peace Plan." In fact, Dershowitz starts from the end, noting that all reasonable people recognize the basic outlines of an ultimate peace agreement between Israeli and Palestinians. From there, Dershowitz moves backwards. He identifies the obstacles to such a peace plan, and then he points out either why they aren't really obstacles, or how best to overcome them. In Part I, Dershowitz goes over what he calls the "Geopolitical Barriers to Peace." He's talking about the actual issues that peace negotiators must consider before reaching an agreement: borders, Jerusalem, the security fence, counterterrorism measures, refugees, etc. Most importantly, Dershowitz puts the lie to those who argue that (1) a one-state binational solution is preferable to the two-state solution (Chapter 2), and (2) a future Palestinian state would not be viable because Israel will only allow for several non-contiguous Bantustans (Chapter 3). Dershowitz proves that these are disingenuous and false arguments advanced by people whose interest is not in precipitating peace, but in undermining Israel's legitimacy. One of the themes running through Part I is similar to what Dershowitz wrote in Why Terrorism Works. While Palestinians are entitled to self-determination, they should not receive the same or more than they would have gotten at Camp David in 2000, prior to launching their terrorist war against Israel. It only makes sense. If Israel is serious about deterring terrorism, it can't reward the Palestinians for refusing to negotiate. A second theme is that compromise isn't perfect. It sounds obvious, but I have the feeling too many people don't get it. Dershowitz takes special care to point out, on several occasions, that whatever agreement the Israelis and Palestinians reach, no side will get everything it wants, and no one will consider the agreement entirely just. Some advocates on both sides believe that the other side has no right to statehood. But to Dershowitz -- who no doubt believes that Israel, at least, "deserves" to exist -- statehood isn't only about what a community "deserves." He views self-determination more pragmatic than old disputes about history, morality, and law. Call it Peace by Exhaustion, maybe. Occasionally Dershowitz is a little esoteric. For example, in Chapter 4, instead of writing directly about the Palestinian and Jewish Rights of Return, Dershowitz discusses refugee issue in the cont

This book is well written, honest and sincere. I liked it, even though I often disagreed with it. It argues for a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. But this book makes a better case against the enemies of peace than it does in favor of any specific solution. And indeed, if the people in the region want peace, they'll achieve it and it will benefit them. But that will entail, in my opinion, a big change in Arab attitudes. Late in the book, Dershowitz makes an excellent point. Namely, that, perhaps in response to his own book called "The Case for Israel," Michael Neumann has written a book called "The Case Against Israel." Um, why not "The Case for the Arabs?" I think this shows part of the problem: many of those who are against Israel are not really for anyone. Dershowitz realizes that many Arabs want to be rewarded, not punished, for their campaign of terrorism. And he knows that some actions he recommends may be seen as impractical appeasement of terrorism. He's willing to state some of the objections to what he says. And he then makes his points clearly and fairly. The author notes that some people, including some Jews, say that the existence of Israel is bad for the Jews. Well, they might want to ask some of the Jews from Russia, Ethiopia, Argentina, and elsewhere who have found Israel to be a very useful haven! There is a discussion of the failure of the Camp David talks. Dershowitz explains that although some people claim that the Arabs were offered only a disjointed and non-contiguous area in the West Bank, the truth is that they were offered a completely contiguous region there, and he shows maps to illustrate this. And he disposes of claims that peace would somehow infringe upon the rights of individuals or groups in the region. The author says that Jerusalem can be shared in order to achieve peace. I disagree. It may indeed be shared, but I think this idea is too clever by half. I suspect it is likely to be a waste of time to spend so much effort to split up Jerusalem, inch by inch, when such agreements may last only hours before being replaced by something which changes the border by miles. If the people on both sides really want to split Jerusalem in this weird and awkward manner, they'll choose it. If not, I think it may be a bad idea anyway. Dershowitz notes that suicide bombers, along with the hate speech and other incitement that helps produce them, are serious threats to peace. And that a new Levantine Arab state that launched terrorist attacks on Israel would also threaten peace. He also explains why the touted "Geneva Accords" won't work. Well, what about having an international court help out? Dershowitz replies that the International Court of Justice is much like Mississippi courts in the 1930s. Just as these Mississippi courts, which excluded Blacks, could not judge fairly when issues involved disputes between Blacks and Whites, the International Court of Justice can't judge