The Bomber War: The Allied Air Offensive Against Nazi Germany

Prof. Neillands does an excellent job setting the props, introducing the actors and explaining the plot of that incredibly tragic drama which was Allied strategic bombing in World War II. If there are compliments to be rendered or blame to be assessed he doesn't shirk at the task. Rich in data yet compelling in pace, Prof. Neillands kept my interest at a level I seldom reach with nonfiction. There are those who will still castigate him for his defense of Air Marshal Harris. Having been in the military myself, I understand the limitations of command. As far as bombing Dresden is concerned, there is very little doublt but that Harris and Spaatz were following orders. Therefore, the blame must rest higher. All in all, I would place this in the top ten of all WWII nonfiction I have ever read. If you have a choice of books on the Strategic Bombing Offensive, please consider the late Robin Neilland's book first.

This is an excellent book. Whether or not you agree with the author's view, the work is well-researched and well-written. Bombing planes were used in World War Two by the Germans, British, and Americans to destroy factories and other targets in an effort to reduce the enemy's ability to wage war. Neillands covers the history of such strategic bombing from its earliest use in World War One to the 2000-plane raids of 1945. He comes to some interesting conclusions. The first is that bombing is messy. I flew over Germany in a four-engine, B-17 heavy bomber in the winter and spring of 1944. During training, we were told that our precision bombing would only hit factories, sparing civilian areas. But I quickly saw that our load of bombs scattered all over a city, despite our best efforts to be accurate. Women and children were certainly killed. Neillands' also concludes that the American boast that its B-17 bombers could fight their way alone to a target was false. He was so right. German fighters destroyed our bombers by the hundreds and killed huge numbers of American flyers. Five members of my crew were killed and two, including me, were wounded. It was only when hundreds of P-51 fighter planes became available to escort the bombers that the slaughter of aircrews lessened. Probably Neillands' most controversial argument is that German cities, including Dresden, were bombed to destroy factories and other strategic targets, not to destroy centuries-old buildings. Aircrews have been villified by people who should know better for bombing cities. The aircrews were not the bad guys. Whether they were German, British, or American, they had no choice. It was fly or face execution. The bad guys in war are not the soldiers, sailors, or airmen. The bad guy is the one who started the war, whether it was World War Two, Korea, Vietnam, or Iraq. General Sherman said, "War is hell," and he was so right. Neillands' careful research shows how bad it was for the civilians on the ground and the flyers in the air. For a picture of what the decision to wage war brings, this book is well-worth reading.

As the son of a flier who flew two tours in Halifax bombers during the offensive against Germany, I must say that a book taking this position is long overdue. War is a terrible, but necessary undertaking to protect civilized society from barbarians, whether it is the Nazis or the fanatical Islamic terrorists we are experiencing today. Any book which sets the record straight to counter all the left wing propaganda which attempts to paint allied fliers as murders is welcome. May garbage like the C.B.C.'s "Valor and the Horror" eventually be forgotten. These men deserve to be remembered with honor and respect. Thanks for writing this book.

This is a balanced account of Allied bomber war. Both RAF and USAAF contribution is considered. It rightly concentrates on Germany, because the pre-war doctrines of strategic bombing were put to practise above Germany. This concentration lets him to condense the war to manageable 400 pages, while including many reminisences by those involved: both commanders, pilots, navigators and gunners, and he also lets German fighter pilots and flak gunners as well as bombed civilians to speak. Neillands tries to understand the bombing effectiveness, unlike Harris, who preffered to bomb cities because they were large enough targets to hit with lousy navigation aids. Neillands spends a lot of time discussing morality of area bombings, but very little on alternative ways of fighting the war: heavy bombers are accepted as the main fighting vehicle of bomber war and no alternatives are considered or cost-benefit analyses tried. Yet USAAF 10% losses per mission (which translates to 12% chances of surving 20 mission tour of duty) and even the 4% RAF losses (with 30% chance of finishing 30 missions) should have made somebody think about alternatives (like Mosquito "light" bomber which could carry the same bomb load as the B-17 "heavy" bomber, but with 0.2% loss rate). Neillands has the tendency to repeat selected topics so many times as to drive the reader furious. His favourites: 88 mm flak gun was an excellent anti-tank weapon; bombing accuracy in cloud-covered Europe under enemy fire is worse than in training bombing in sunny Texas; losses are prohibitive in daylight bombing without fighter escort. These comments and many others appear 5-10 times in the book. 50 pages could have easily been culled by removing repetition. On page 387 Neillands commits a statistical fraud when discussing losses: assumably he tries to soften the allied losses by quoting side by side the Luftwaffe fighter command losses. These two, however, have very little to do with each other: Bomber command and the 8th USAAF were minor contributors to German fighter losses, compared with the Eastern front. Early in the bomber offensive Germans lost one fighter for two heavy bombers, which in economic terms was a bargain: two shot down fighter pilots who could often parachute to safety of fatherland, vs. 20 airmen who either died (only 20% survived, based on Neillands's scattered statistics on the topic), or were captured and imprisoned. 8 aircraft engines destroyed against two. Towards the end of the war the situation developed into parity: one fighter for one bomber. Neillands spends a lot of time speculating whether bombers could have won the war without ground forces, and he believes that Harris and Arnold could have done it. But then, on page 396, he refutes his own argument: "Germany was still fighting in 1945, and fighting hard." which means that the infantry had to invade Germany to end the war, and the "bomber dream" of winning the war from the air was just a dream. Despite these d

Hello,Excellent book, Niellands put you really back into the mindset of times we never hope to encounter it again.Furthermore it offers an excellent analysis of the "we were victims" version of WW2 which is gaining popularity in Germany.Niellands also doesn't spare Bomber Command and the USAAF regarding tactics and results.Niellands ask the obvious questions, "historians" out on anti Harris mission fail to ask. A must read for someone who seriously wants to learn about WW2 events, or someone who just wants to read an original analysis of these horrible times.