The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II

With the majority of World War II books retelling the same history everyone has read, it is refreshing to hear an author come to interesting and unique conclusions. Any historian can retell facts, but it takes another level of writing and research to introduce new hypothesizes and to defend them. This book picks apart the two primary military doctrines which inspired the Axis and Allied powers into developing armadas of bombers and tanks. Though I did not agree with all of Mosier's statements, they all forced me to look at World War II through a different focus and it is simply arrogant to discredit his ideas and call it garbage(aka the review below this one). Mosier spent decades researching the War throughout Europe and is more than a credible source. I found most fascinating his defense of the Maginot Line and the French army, showing that the swift defeat of the allies in 1940 was much more about politics than logistics. The other interesting point is the thought of "what if" Hitler had not launched his last assault through the Ardennes sector(Battle of the Bulge), but against the Soviets on the Eastern Front and how it would have altered the Cold War after the war. This is an insightful book which forces the reader to rethink everything they have learned about World War II

I recommend you read this book and decide for yourself. I can and many others here are full of ideas based on past experience and unique biases' that can be good or bad. For sure, if you were to read this book it would not kill you or your ideas. Though, if you are a commander of troops, understanding this book just might actually help you save the lives of those you lead and ensure that they win the battle too. If you belief that the Blitzkrieg really is the operational break through then this book will re-enforce your ideas. If you are looking to understand alternative strategies and well researched arguments supporting such that they challenge your existing ideas and beliefs regarding the operational art of warfare, then this book will help you to understand military strategy and the operational art, with a "sharpened" view of strategy and a keener eye towards the demands of battlefield realities. If you are commander of troops you must read this. Your troops and the children they might have demand no less. If you are a historian and you are satisfied with the status quo then keep reading the same type of books you have always enjoyed reading. But, pick this book up and read it. Challenge yourself to disprove the ideas presented in this book. I am certain it will improve your understanding of the blitzkrieg. For those that read the book, please keep the following points constantly in mind when you muse over the ideas presented in the book: The author states that the German leadership could respond to battlefield necessities better than the Allied commanders (to an extent) and they did this by better training. That I do not dispute. But, the author would better support that premise by showing HOW they had better training and HOW that training lead to battlefield success. Field expedients Secondly, what the author is trying to say about the Germans having better training (but does not say it directly in the book) I suggest the idea that the Germans were exceptional at forming ad-hoc type "battle groups", called Kampfgruppe in German. Some strategic realities to keep in mind when reading the book: The book does not discuss the pure strategic power of the "Ultra Secret" as it pertains to the Blitzkrieg strategy. Such a discussion would clearly show how the Allied High Command knew the intimate details of German battle plains before the battle ever started. The Allied commanders had the "Ultra Secret" yet the Germans were kicking Allied commanders all over the place. Further, the Germans were doing that kicking even when the Allied forces had numerically superiority and technological superiority over the Germans. The author does not discuss casualty and capture data that may either support the research to support the idea that the blitzkrieg was a myth. Objectives and distance achieved should be discussed in great detail too. Finally, ask yourself this question: Are we so sure of our methods and our me

Despite criticisms of Mosier's thesis in these reviews, I believe Mosier has presented a solid and persuasive case that blitzkrieg tactics during WWII were essentially ineffective. And in defense of Mosier's account, I would add that the battles on the eastern front, which many reviewers complain Mosier neglects, were in fact not Blitzkrieg-style battles at all. The German invasion battles into Russia were series of encirclements at first until a general war of attrition set in. I believe that is why the eastern front battles are neglected in the book. In fact, few operations in WWII ultimately fit the blitzkrieg or "breakthrough" mold as they were initally carried out. And for the most part, as Mosier explains, they did not succeed even where the "breakthrough" method was initially employed. Where Mosier strays is in his more general conclusions about particular generals or wartime strategy as a whole. To claim that Montgomery was a military genius is a major stretch. Mosier's account of the African campaign is not at all convincing. In fact, Rommel was brilliant with the smaller forces he had. Montgomery deserves no great praise simply because he was finally able to stop Rommel by building up three times as many tanks. Without adequate support from Hitler, Rommel couldn't go on forever. He kept attacking vastly superior forces, and he usually won. Eventually this had to end, and it did. Finally, Mosier doesn't give enough credit to genuine instances of brilliant tactical strategy that occurred in WWII or other wars in history. To say, as he does, that the German army was better trained or that the allies simply overwhelmed Germany at the end is not enough. Individual generals or leaders had plenty of sound or brilliant advice that was ignored (to their sides' detriment) or was actually used. After 1941, Germany could have won the war or continued on much longer than it did had Hitler not made any number of serious errors. And however well he refutes the notion that a classic blizkrieg operation defeated France in 1940, he might have considered that German commanders knew the psychology of the French and British political and military commands well enough to know that they would probably blink in the face of attacking German forces as they marched into France. Being able to read your enemy correctly is an important facet of war. In summary, I think Mosier's basic thesis is valid but that some of his other generalizations or observations about the war are more dubious.

The need to defend the military strategy of western powers when it failed has been a consistent theme in the twentieth century, and continues today. Moreover, many of those glorious victories were more often than not the result of poor decisions on the part of the vanquished, not the victors, and were certainly not the "brilliantly conceived campaigns" trumpeted by the military and their enthusiastic encomiasts. Thus it is no surprise that John Mosier's book should elicit squeals of protest from the purists.The premise that the "armored breakthrough" is a myth is well supported by Mosier's thesis and examples from World War II, and it is interesting to note that even NATO, during its many studies of potential Russian armored thrusts pouring through the Fulda gap into West Germany during the Cold War nearly always maintained that a vigorous defense would buy enough time for relief from the USA.One can argue that the strategic bombing campaigns of WW2 are possibly not an appropriate subject for the book, since their faulty premises have already been successfully demolished in the literature, and I would have liked to have seen more discussion of action on the eastern front, but Mosier, in my opinion, encapsulates many arguments and aspects of military actions that have been traditionally dismissed as irrelevant. For example, the horrible timings in MARKET GARDEN, are often relegated to a few sentences in many accounts. If the British had managed to break out of their sloth, and coordinate ground/air elements more effectively, who knows what might have happened. Instead, I have read accounts of MARKET GARDEN being accorded a "modest success" instead of the ill-conceived operation it was. One needs only to read personal accounts of American paratroopers involved in the operation to learn of their disgust at the lackadaisical thrust of British armor. (Divide the miles by the hours of the operation; there's speed for you.)My father was captured at the rearguard action in Calais, and as a result incarcerated for the duration of the war with terrible results--he still suffers from post-traumatic stress syndrome 60-odd years later--and I have never seen any accountability from the armchair generals or the politicians for the failure of the BEF to engage the enemy. Instead, we had the "miracle" of Dunkirk. Mosier clearly lays the blame rightly so at the top where it belongs. The BEF soldiers weren't cowards; their superiors and the French government were. However, it's simply not politically expedient to say that in this day and age. As Mosier intimates, this was never Blitzkrieg; merely the wind rushing in to fill a vacuum.

The main point of this book is that the concepts of blitzkreig and strategic bombing never significantly altered the outcome of the Second World War. Mosier believes that the allies won because they outnumbered the Germans and the Germans held out for years because they had an superior officer corps. Mosier blames Churchill and not the French armed forces for the debacle of 1940. Mosier states in his book that Churchill withdrew the British forces prematurely which left the French northern flank vulnerable. Also Mosier makes the controversial claim that the Germans spent most of their money on fortifications and not enough resources were devoted to tank production while the French had a larger and superior tank force than the Germans in 1940. The Germans won, according to Mosier, because they intergrated close air support operations with the army as opposed to the British and French air forces that concentrated their efforts in strategic bombing. In the closing chapters of the Mosier writes that the reason why the Western allies won decisively in France in 1944 was because of Hitler's failed counteroffensives in Mortain and the fuitile German attack in the Ardennes in late 1944 sealed Germany's fate although the war would last a few more bloody months. In the concluding chapters Mosier writes that in the end it was superior allied numbers and not skill that defeated the Germans. The main weakness of the book is that Mosier ignores the Eastern Front and the successful blitzkreig operations of General Konev or the American close air support doctrine that was mentioned in Pattons Air Force by David Spires. Overall I would reccomend this book for anyone interested in a new and shocking history of the Second World War.