Battle/Huertgen Fores

Unlike many authors who write about combat MacDonald was there. When you read his stories, you are seeing it through his eyes. Even when he is writing about events where he wasn't present, he still gives the reader a feeling of being there. When he is describing a fiasco like the actions to take the Huertgen Forest he makes you "feel" for the common soldier and doubt the competence of the senior commanders. If you see a book written by Charles MacDonald, buy it!

Excellent book. Kept your interst while describing the tactics and intricacies of war.

MacDonald's text is the original non-scholarly texts written on this battle, he does however reference many Allied and German war records and unit histories as well as personal accounts of troops who were present. His credentials as a military historian are also well established adding significant value to this work.This text is very well written and is the origin for many of the theories that are often repeated with regards to this battle - specifically that it was a useless use of manpower and that it never had the proper goals or objectives (the Roer River Dams specifically). Indeed, MacDonald quotes German commanders puzzlement about why the Americans were making such strong attacks into the forest.Hindsight makes us wonder why the attack into the forest was pressed Division by Division with the loss of armored, artillery and air support and indeed the forest and the Germans extracted a heavy toll. Indeed one wonders why an airborne attack at the Roer River Dams coupled with a an armored push north (the Aachen Gap) and South (to the Roer) was not used to isolate the forest defenders, especially when one considers what was accomplished in the Falaise and Roer Pockets by the Allies or in the numerous encirclements achieved by the Wehrmacht on the Ostfront. Instead it appears that Eisenhower's broad front strategy condemned many soldiers to slugging it out yard by yard in the forest.Regardless of the opinions or analysis aided by nearly 60 years of time - this is an excellent text and well worth reading as an insight into some of the hardest combat the allies saw in the ETO.

Charles MacDonald covers a lot of the same ground in "Siegfried Line" and "Three Battles", and those books have nicer maps. This book has the advantage of focusing on the Forest only (up to the Battle of the Bulge), and is fair and readable in the typical MacDonald style. For what the book is meant to be (i.e. popular history), it's superb. Other sources will have more detailed descriptions of certain battles and better maps.

The late Charles B MacDonald served as an officer of infantry in World War II and later became a civilian historian in the U.S. Army's historical division. His memoir, _Company Commander_ has enjoyed classic status. He also contributed three volumes to the Official History of the U.S. Army in World War II, commonly known as the "Green Books." This work, first published in 1963, still holds a valued place in World War II historiography.Although such recent authors as Gerald Astor (The Bloody Forest, 2000), Edward G. Miller (A Dark and Bloody Ground, 1995) and Robert Sterling Rush (Hell in Hurtgen Forest, 2001) have contributed new studies that take advantage of the latest sources, they all owe a debt of gratitude to MacDonald. MacDonald was the first to argue that the American planners failed to appreciate the importance of the Roer River dams as a primary objective of the Huertgen Forest campaign. He was also the first to state the Huertgen Forest was a wasteful squander of American lives and should have been avoided. Again, he was the first to criticize the American leadership for not fully comprehending the detrimental affects of the rugged terrain, the staunch German defence, and the harsh weather conditions that was indicative of the slaughter in the Huertgen Forest. These three basic themes would provide a basis for Astor, Miller, Rush, and others attempting to provide any future analysis of the campaign. MacDonald places the initial probes into the forest in September, 1944; the failure of the 9th Division in October; the decimation of the 28th Division in early November; and the final breakout in late November in overall perspective. MacDonald also provides a summation of Eisenhower's "broad-front strategy", a wide sweeping advance into the enemy's heartland, coupled with a strategy of annihilation, that of destroying the enemy and his ability to wage war. With this overall strategy in mind, what then was to be done with the Huertgen Forest? How were the Roer River dams to be captured when the heavily fortified town of Schmidt, and the better roads it provided for German armor and infantry, was continually denied to one American division after another? MacDonald does not tell us, nor, for that matter, does Astor, Miller, or Rush. The mistakes of generals are oftentimes evident; alternative solutions come harder.Yet, as a comprehensive narrative of the Huertgen Forest campaign, MacDonalds book was, and still is a solid foundation from which to build insight into what is perhaps the most difficult and bloody campaign in American Military history. A must for anyone interested in this terrible fight.