The Atomic Bazaar: Dispatches from the Underground World of Nuclear Trafficking

What if ...Iran covertly buys Enriched Uranium from North Korea?...then claims it produced it ..this is the very reason Israel has made contingency plans for a strike on the Known Nuclear sites...its really hard to believe that the World is not taking the Iranian threat seriously,during WW2 we had "Plausible" deniability that a Whole race of people were being savagely eradicated because nothing of that Magnitude had ever happened before at least not to that extent ..but here we have group of fanatical religous Mullahs controlling Iran ..Babbling Daily about wiping Israel off the Map and the World seems to be so de-sensitized about the plight of the Jews that is goes on without condemnation..if any other country was threatened this way ,there would be World wide outrage.

The Atomic Bazaar provides a great overview of the current state of nuclear proliferation. The book has two primary strengths: (1) It's short- 179 pages, so a busy professional can read it on the subway or in a day, (2) and Langewiesche personally gathered most of the facts for his book by walking the streets and talking with principal players -- as opposed to collecting them in a library. The book is weak on nuclear design, what it would take to assemble a nuclear weapon, but correctly focuses on the longest pole in the tent, the necessary fissile materiel: Plutonium or U235. From there the author methodically looks at the most likely avenues a terrorist or rogue state could obtain the materiel. It is written for the generalist, the terms and the science never get too deep, and the author moves quickly. You'll learn the real deal behind A.Q. Khan and how his "house arrest" is really somewhat of a sham to appease Pakistan's ally, the U.S. Particularly interesting reading is how the U.S. government's efforts to assist Central Asian countries improve their border security are largely ineffectual. Not a "tour de force," but the book is current, never bogs down, and should be of interest to anyone concerned with the issue of nuclear proliferation.

In the post 9-11 world there has been much debate about the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack; either dirty or conventional. Given the discussions, and the accusations about other nations' capabilities, I think it is incumbent upon us all to learn as much as we can about the realities of the situation and how nuclear material is dealt with. This book begins with a look at how a nuclear bomb could (and almost would have to be) made and how it could be detonated. It discusses, in detail, the similarities and differences between plutonium and highly enriched uranium. It further details what the extent of damage would be, as well as likely repercussions. The author then moves into the area of security of possible fuels, and gives a detailed look at how difficult it would be for a terrorist group to obtain the needed material. Finally, the book finished with a detailed look at A.Q. Khan, and the role Pakistan has had in disseminating information to other third world nations. It also discusses the politics of the nuclear underground and how this might affect the world. The book is well written, contains much valuable information, and paints a brighter picture than I would have imagined possible. It is, however, frightening to think of who has these weapons and how they might be used.

"The Atomic Bazaar" is sometimes fascinating, and sometimes frustrating (eg. when we learn how ineffectual much of the U.S. effort to safeguard Soviet fissionable materials has been). One learns that the Hiroshima bomb was 9,700 lbs., containing two half-spheres of highly-enriched uranium weighing about 62.5 lbs. each, that were slammed into each other by a projectile charge. The reaction lasted for just a millisecond and used less than two lbs. of uranium (about 3 tablespoons) to create a 15 kiloton TNT-equivalent explosion that killed 150,000. We also learn that most of the radioactive products quickly decay - seven hours after ignition, emissions are about one-tenth those at the level one-hour after detonation, and after two days the level has dropped to a one-percent level. Langewiesche then goes on to assert that use of nuclear weapons are now more likely by terrorists than a nation-state, due to relatively lesser concern over retaliation. Terrorists are not likely to obtain a finished bomb through theft - they are well guarded and incorporate sophisticated electronic interlocks. Building one from scratch is also not a likely alternative because of the difficulty enriching natural uranium. Thus, Langewiesche believes that the greatest threat comes from terrorist theft of already highly enriched uranium (HEU), particularly from the former Soviet Union. About 100 lbs. of 90% U-235 woud be required. (Plutonium, available from a number of nuclear-generating plants, is not a likely source because it is HIGHLY radioactive, and very poisonous if inhaled, ingested, or in contact with an open wound; further, it requires a much more complex means of detonation.) Langewiesche does not believe obtaining HEU would be easy - especially since the areas are remote and the populations rather close-knit; however, it is not impossible either. He relates how some Soviet storage facilities are guarded by relatively unreliable units, that radiation detectors are often turned off (they are set off by most anything), and how border-crossing check-points are easily by-passed. "The Atomic Bazaar" then goes on to tell of Abdul Khan, the famous Pakistani engineer who brought his nation into the nuclear-arms community. He began as a metallurgical engineer within a consulting firm specializing in building ultra-centrafuges to concentrate gassified uranium from 0.7% U-235 to 3% - sufficient for generating power. (Increasing to 90% weapons-grade concentration becomes simply a matter of continuing the process.) While working there he scavenged discarded parts, stole documents and photographs, and recruited others. Libya, Iraq, North Korea, and Iran are all believed to have used his expertise in their own programs. Ultimately, Langewiesche is not certain what the future will bring, though he does believe that simply having a nuclear weapon (and its associated political threat) will be enough for some. Regardless, this is an important book that should be rea

The nuclear doomsday thriller was in vogue during the 1980's (see "Warday" -- 1984 and "The Fifth Horseman" -- 1980). Now in a post 9-11 world, nuclear destruction has made a comeback in TV (see "24") and in literature with "The Atomic Bazaar." Written in a documentary fashion, Mr. Langewiesche focuses upon how easy it would be for a terrorist to obtain the materials for a nuclear bomb (starting in Russia). Then the book tells the true story of A. Q. Khan who offered "nukes to go" to the rogue nations of the world. Easily read in one evening, it will leave you paranoid for our future.