The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974-2008

This book is called "The Age of Reagan", which makes it sound like it's mainly about Ronald Reagan, and probably explains all the disappointed reviews here. Actually, a more accurate title would be "The Political History of the U.S. 1974-2008". Wilentz goes through year by year recounting every political argument or kerfuffle there was. Ketchup as a vegetable, Lani Guiner, Biden's xeroxing, etc.: it's all here for political junkies to savor and remember. Wilentz calls the book "The Age of Reagan" because his influence is felt over most of the time - the rise of conservatism and tax revolts in the 70s, his administration in the 80s, and lingering effects afterwards. It's fair, but I think "The Political History of the U.S." would have been better.

The author, an established `liberal', aims at describing how a conservative movement that once was deemed marginal, managed to seize power and hold it. No hagiography is to be expected, of course, but also no vilification, as per his promise. Reagan, for his historical importance, is put in a line with Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Roosevelt I and II. His `age' could have been Nixon's, but for Watergate. The author says that working on this book changed his own opinion on the subject of RR. Hence, I expected it to change my own, to some extent. Actually, that did not happen. The book covers the period from 1974 to 2008, starting with a prologue on Nixon and ending with an epilogue on the W-years. For me, that coincides with my years of wanderings over the globe. I have looked at the world from ever changing perspectives since 74. I had periods of extensive exposure to US matters, mainly during the new century, and also some others with nearly total unawareness, mainly in pre-internet years, while staying in more exotic places. In consequence, the book fills some gaps of my memory, erases some of the white spots in my mental map of contemporary history. The Ford and Carter chapters are mainly used for the description of the problems that these two outsider Presidents had: domestic (mostly civil rights, economics, and energy related) and abroad (the Vietnam and Cambodia disasters after the American withdrawal, for Ford, the Iran calamity for Carter); Near East trouble for both; and for the description of the build up of the new right, the neo conservative movement, with RR as the spearhead. A key issue is `détente': Kissinger's `realism' seems to have bothered right wingers quite a lot. I always thought of HK as a bad guy, thinking of Chile, mainly. Looking at his enemies at the time, I am considering that I might like him in this niche... (But no, out of the question). During these two lackluster presidencies, the momentum of the conservative movement built up, impressively. (If `conservative' means mainly private property and religion, it can just go to the beach, as far as I am concerned. If it means conservation of humanitarian values, I am a conservative.) I have a problem with the détente chapter: we hear about the diplomacy of meetings with Brezhnev and Mao, and we hear about the Helsinki conference with all the disagreements about the value of the Helsinki agreement (some still don't understand that Helsinki was a major coffin nail for the SU!), but there is not a word about Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, which was the true front rider of the collapse of the Evil Empire. The Berlin Wall would never have fallen peacefully without Brandt's kneeling at Auschwitz and all the related actions. The collapse can't be explained by single causes. Main contributing factors were the softening of the domestic situations after Ostpolitik and Détente, the Afghanistan fiasco, and the competitive pressure from the West. There is no denying RR's contribution

Nothing in Sean Wilentz's history of American politics from 1974 to 2008 took me by surprise, except perhaps the author's willingness to give Ronald Reagan the recognition due for his political savvy and charisma. Most Reagan denigrators -- and I admit that I have been one -- have regarded him as a hyped-up Howdy Doody, a useful front for 'conservative' kingmakers. Wilentz actually credits Reagan with being his own man, the master of his own White House, and furthermore with being more flexible and open to pragmatic compromise than either his coterie of advisors or his latter-day disciples. Withholding judgment of his 'ends', Wilentz portrays Reagan as indeed the dominant figure of his Age, far more a man of 'means' than the three presidents who preceded him or the three who followed. Discussing the diplomacy that led to the INF treaty in 1987 as well as other steps toward nuclear disarmament, Wilentz writes: "To complete that triumph of diplomacy and goodwill, Reagan had to withstand the criticism of many who had informed and reinforced his views of the Soviets for decades but who lacked his own understanding with Gorbachev and other reformers now in control of the Kremlin, a great change was at hand. Call it a triumph of character or idealism or perceptiveness or "wishful thinking" (in George Will's term), or some combination of these. But Reagan's ability to dispense with dogma (including his own) and negotiate with Gorbachev helped bring an end to a nuclear arms race that had terrified the world for forty years. ... Reagan deserves posterity's honor for not adhering stubbornly to the ideas and strategies of cold war conservatism and neoconservatism... His success in helping finally to end the cold war is one of the greatest achievements by any president of the United States -- and arguably the greatest single presidential accomplishment since 1945." (p 281) Wilentz goes to town, as it were, in distinguishing between the solid core of ideas and ideals to which Reagan adhered, and the sundry rigid ideologies proclaimed in his name by his fragmented political heirs -- neoconservatives, fundamentalist reactionaries, states' rights bigots, free-market dogmatists, anarcho-capitalists, and fanatical libertarians, all of whom paid obeisance to a different idol. All except the evangelicals could be lumped as neoliberals in economic doctrine, but their unreconcilable ideologies and their willingness to 'fight dirty' to impose their ideas on teverybody fused together in the presidency of George W Bush, whom Wilentz perceives as the eventual hypertrophy (the grotesque and unfunctional exaggeration) of "Reaganism," which led to the debacles both foreign and domestic, and the collapse of the conservative paradigm. The chapters treating Ronald Reagan himself are by far the most interesting of the book. Wilentz has scant praise for any of the other six presidents of the Age, and certainly no bias in favor of either Jimmy Carter or Bill Clinton. Nixon, For

If you are a conservative Republican you are going to hate this book; if you are a liberal Democrat, you are probably going to love it. However, the author competently summarizes American History since 1974 without getting the reader bogged down in details. Moreover, I think a reader should welcome Wilentz's evaluation of the events described, rather than be satisfied with a sterile "objective" recitation of facts. The most interesting part of the book is Wilentz's account of Reagan's decision to treat Gorbachev as a legitimate reformer. This decision was made against the advice of many of Reagan's advisors and was as contrary to Reagan's past history as Nixon's opening to Communist China. One impression I drew from the book is that Reagan's Secretary of State, George Schultz, may be the most underated statesman in our history. He should be considered the equal of George C. Marshall for guiding Reagan on a course that ended the Cold War. Wilentz is a bit too easy on Clinton, particularly in regards to the expansion of NATO into the Russians' backyard. This was an unnecessary affront to a nation that considers itself a great power and is as protective of its spheres of influence as we are of foreign meddling in the Western hemisphere.