33 Day War: Israel's War on Hezbollah in Lebanon and Its Consequences

I take my hat off to Gilbert Achcar and Michel Warschawski for writing "The 33-Day War", a brutally honest account of Israel's ruthless but unsuccessful aggression on Lebanon from 12 July to August 14, 2006. The first two chapters provide detailed background on Lebanon and Hezbollah (In my opinion a single chapter on background would have been sufficient, given that the book is only five chapters long). The first chapter tells us about Lebanon's civil war from 1975 to 1990, the importance of Iran and Syria in the region, and the situation in Lebanon after Syrian troops left. Chapter two concentrates on Hezbollah, from its proclamation in 1985 up until 12 July, 2006 - the day it kidnapped two Israeli soldiers to trade for Lebanese prisoners jailed in Israel. Chapters three and four provide excellent analysis (mostly political) of the war and its aftermath. The authors discuss Israel's military failure, UN Resolution 1701, Hezbollah's handling of the post war situation, Israel's political failure and its role in Washington's "Global War". I was interested to read that "Resolution 1701 says not a single word about the protection of Lebanese territory against the repeated aggression by Israel, an occupying power in Lebanon for eighteen years". Another interesting fact revealed was that "Chief of Staff Dan Halutz sold off all his stock market shares at the beginning of the crisis, knowing that their value would probably fall soon". Warschawski explains that the Israeli military staff, like their chief, were more interested in stock market fluctuations than in the readiness of their troops - one of the causes of Israel's disastrous war campaign. Achcar, in the conclusion titled "The Sinking Ship of U.S. Imperial Designs", explains that although the US has the capacity to "knock down any regular army on earth" it "nevertheless proved one more time in contemporary history that is unable to control rebellious populations in poor countries". He comments that "however the situation in Lebanon evolves, the Israeli rescue boat, instead of helping to raise the sinking ship of the U.S. empire, actually aggravated the shipwreck, and was even dragged down with it". Although the political discussions of the war were brilliant, I would have liked to read at length about the military aspect, in detail. When I came across the book, being someone immensely interested in this topic, I was going to buy it no matter what it centralised on. That said, I was hoping to read about Hezbollah fighters climbing out of their bunkers and surprising the Israeli soldiers and about their logistical and communications systems - how it all remained intact and why it was unbelievably effective. "The 33-Day War" is very anti-Israeli, and rightly so. I congratulate Achcar and Warschawski for their courageous stand against the Zionist regime and for their vision and insightful discussions on the realities of the wider Arab-Israeli/American conflict.

When I picked this book up, I was hoping for a chronological review of the war. This was not forth coming, and unfortunatly (as of 2007), a review of this war is not available anywhere in print, except possibly Wikipedia. This book is a political review of the war. Why it started, the goals, outcomes and conclusions. The authors are blatantly pro-Hezbollah in their writing, and do not attempt to present the Israeli side of the war. I'm fine with that, but others may not find it palatable. Overall, I learned a bit, but I do have to state, that I found some conclusions rather amateurish. I believe this book should be used as a side interlude or manual, in an overall study of the Political History of the MidEast.

Gilbert Achcar and Michel Warschawski's book, is very critical toward Israel and its policy and strategy and it doesn't hesitate to point out some very annoying and interesting facts regarding this country's relationship with the US. A poll of the 'Arab street' conducted after the war found that Hezbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah was the most popular political figure in the region. The most unpopular figure, President Bush, had broadcast his private beliefs by mistake six days into the conflict. The US government was refusing to join the EU and UN in calling for a ceasefire, saying Israel must be allowed to root out the 'A-team of terrorists'. The degree of ignorance in Bush's formulation is made clear in this dry but penetrating book. The self-proclaimed pacifist academics (one from Lebanon, one from Israel) paint a picture of an exceptionally complex and politically fluid Lebanon, the most religiously and ethnically mixed country in the region, racked by a 15-year civil war (the book is mainly a political story of the 2006 war). Hezbollah was born in this period and became the force best equipped to resist Israel's occupation of the country's south, eventually driving them out in 2000. Although Hezbollah is funded by Iran and Syria and receives its armaments via the Syrian border, it is a broadly independent organisation which runs schools, hospitals and social services in south Lebanon and enjoys huge support there, not only among the Shias, Lebanon's largest sect. Hezbollah enjoys far greater autonomy and popular support than characterised in the neocon world view. Looking at Israel, the authors draw the controversial conclusion that its recent military failings (although this is not a military history book and the reader who is looking for details of the tactics and the battles will be rather disappointed) and willingness to kill Lebanese civilians stem from the same source: a 'colonial' inability to respect their adversary. In former Prime Minister Ehud Barak's words, Israel is 'the modern and prosperous villa in the jungle' of the Middle East, and Israel now formulates its fight for survival as a battle of civilisation versus brutality. This concept is used to justify the apparent imbalance in the value of Arab and Israeli life, which, incidentally, cuts both ways. Hence 429 Hezbollah prisoners were exchanged for one kidnapped Israeli businessman in 2004 and in last summer's conflict, the civilian body count was 1,070 Lebanese and 43 Israelis. While Hezbollah leads the reconstruction effort in south Lebanon and digs a new set of fortifications, and Israel tops up on bunker-busters ready for the next round, this book makes it clear that the region's increased stock of fear is keeping no one safe.

This book is about Israel's failure in its military and political objectives in Lebanon. The war strengthened Hezbollah, increased its credibility, and undermined the Lebanese government. The Israeli propaganda machine has even given up on spinning this war as a success. Have you ever heard the term "Blowback", (a classic example).

Finally, a clear explanation of the reasons behind the Lebanon war of Summer 2006, and of how it evolved