That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution

Do not be intimidated by the number of pages in That Infernal Little Cuban Republic. Lars Schoultz's study of US-Cuban relations is a remarkably enjoyable book to read, whether you open it as a reference for details about a particular episode or digest it from end to end. Based on primary documents, a large number of interviews, and excellent secondary sources from a variety of perspectives, the book should be considered the standard reference work on US-Cuban relations since 1959. Undoubtedly due to space considerations, Schoultz covers the relationship prior to 1959 relatively briefly. Still those chapters provide a clear introduction to the book's theme, which is well developed, that the primary source of tension between the United States and Cuba is the asymmetry between the two. To US policy makers, Cuba is a small country whose responsibility is to do the bidding of the United States, and when it doesn't, they view Cuba as an infernal little republic. In contrast, Cuban officials view the United States as a hovering giant who has the capability of crushing Cuban independence, and has repeatedly tried to do so since 1959. That Infernal Little Republic is a superb book for classroom use, and will reward anyone with even a passing interest in US-Cuban and US-Latin American relations.

The author barely touches the pre-Eisenhower days, so it's not really a review of the full history of US-Cuban relations. Still, for anyone interested in why the US has MFN status with China and Russia, trades with many dictatorships much worse than Cubas, and yet has embargoed Cuba for so long, the book clearly shows how that has happened. Chapters are organized by Presidential Administration and show the continuity through administrations and across party lines, of current policy. The policy seems to be a confluence of the government picking on whom it can, regardless of balance or threat, the perceived political power of a minority in southern Florida and,well..., hmmm, that about covers it. That trade would have had a much larger impact upon Cuba, a small country just off our border, than it has had with much larger countries much further away, seems to not be a clear enough message for politicos to comprehend. The one area the author could have drawn out better is the link between the first large group of refugees, the ones most vocal about overthrowing Castro, and the Batista regime. Most weren't the least interested in Democracy when their Fascist leader was in power and they were getting all the perks that came from that. They lost their power by refusing to embrace democracy, helping push the regular Cubans to Castro, and then used the word "democracy" to try to punish the Cuban people even more for getting tired of them. It's one reason why their descendants, as shown in polls pointed out by the author, are much less anti-Castro and pro-embargo. They don't have the link to Batista and can look more honestly at the situation. However, that's a minor point. The book covers more than fifty years of relationship in detail, following the words and actions of many people. It's a must read for anyone trying to comprehend the issue.

Professor Schoultz (Political Science, University of North Carolina) has given us the best up-to-date study on US-Cuban policy, which he considers a failure. In //The Infernal Little Cuban Republic//, an excellent book, Professor Schoultz feels that relationships between the US and Cuba have not been normal because the United States must uplift the Cuban people. Most Cubans who want change believe they must seek it on their own, and this scholarly author feels that the United States will not get over its obsession toward Cuba anytime soon. In this study, one is given the most comprehensive chronicle of US policy toward the Cuban Revolution today. As President Theodore Roosevelt told a friend in 1906, "I am so angry with that //Infernal Little Cuban Republic// that I would like to wipe its people off the face of the earth." Since 1959, a group of rebels led by Fidel Castro has caused more trouble toward Cuba than anyone could possibly have imagined. Utilizing a vast number of documents and firsthand interviews with US and Cuban officials, Professor Schoultz gives the readers the most comprehensive analysis of the attempts and failure of ten US administrations to end the Cuban Revolution. One is guided in this volume to all the events from the 1960s plot to assassinate Castro to the message most recently seen on billboards in Havana, "Communism doesn't work because people like to own stuff" - a statement attributed to late rocker Frank Zappa. This book argues that the Cubans' historical insistence on their right to self-determination has irritated American administrations and influenced both US domestic politics and foreign policy alike. Hence, diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba have been extremely lengthy. This volume, in the opinion of this reviewer, points to the highly unproductive foreign policy between the US and Cuba and charts new prospects as a new century of US relations toward Cuba begins. This is an outstanding book, most timely in view of the Obama Administration's new interest in shaping Cuban-American relations. It will become the major reference work on US policy toward Cuba. Reviewed by Claude M. Ury

Schoultz offers a different yet realistic perspective of twentieth century political events that led the USA to earn the "ugly American" image in Latin America. Mr. Schoultz's analysis of US foreign policy toward its Spanish speaking neighbors exposes the arrogance that has gotten us involved into armed conflicts all over the world. On the other hand, the author misses a very important point regarding the Cuban embargo. The main reason the embargo continues is not because of US unreasonable demands towards Cuba, or the failure of American presidents to understand the issues at hand. The only reason the restriction continues is because the last thing the Castro brothers want is to open the eyes of an enslaved people to the outside world, especially to the fruits of capitalism and the American free enterprise system. As a footnote, I suggest the author reads a 2007 Forbes magazine article in which old Fidel comes out as one of the wealthiest heads of state second to Queen Elizabeth II with a billion dollars in foreign investments. For your information, Mr.Schoultz, Cuba is more of an elongated island-farm managed and owned by the Castro brothers than a communist country per se. Andrew J. Rodriguez Award-winning author: "Adios, Havana. A Memoir"

Before I read this book, I knew that Southern leaders had already cast eyes on Cuba in the 1850s, as the Ostend Manifesto showed. But, I did NOT know that way back in the early 1820s, under the administration of President Monroe and Sec'y of State John Quincy Adams, we landed troops on Cuba for the first time. Is it any wonder that Cuba has leery concerns about our proclaimed best intentions? As for the "snarky" part, Schoultz is a history prof at North Carolina, and the book gets blurbs from folks like former Colin Powell assistant Larry Wilkerson. So, we're not talking alt-weekly newspaper snarky. But, for an academic-level history, we are. Here's a sample, from page 209: "Although he could barely find Brazil on a map, (Dick) Goodwin..." On the serious side, after a few chapters of buildup, Schoultz gets us to Batista, then Castro. He doesn't turn a blind eye to Castro's nationalization, or other early issues but does present a symmpathetic view of his rise to power. He also shows the obsessiveness, first of the Kennedy brothers (and Dick Goodwin's Camelot torch-carrying for them), then of LBJ in full macho bully pose. Since this is about US-Cuban relations and written from a US point of view, the history is framed from that way. After the introductory and background chapters, we get 1959 and Castro's success, 1960 and Eisenhower's attempt to grasp the situation, 1961 and the Bay of Pigs, 1962 and the missile crisis, and "state sponsored terrorism" (which is a totally true description) to wrap up the Kennedy years. After that, we get one chapter devoted to each US Presidential Administration, an easy way to focus this narrative. An excellent epilogue sums up how American political leadership still "doesn't get it" about Cuba in many ways. In essence, long before George W. Bush's ideology-driven invasion of Iraq, when we haven't marginalized Castro's Cuba, assistance we have offered has tended to have strings of Wilsonian idealism attached to it that we've never applied to even Russia/USSR or China.