Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime

If you want the best ever book to assess the command and leadership of a single FIGHTING leader, buy Joel Hayward's highly praised "For God and Glory: Lord Nelson and His Way of War". Its assessment is original, thorough and relevant to today's leadership studies.But if you want a book that deals with that highest level of leadership, the political employment and direction of fighting forces, then this is your book. As you would expect from author Cohen, you get rigorous and insightful analysis of the difficulties and responsibilities involved in wielding massive force. You get lucid explanation, fluent writing and clear and compelling argument. In short, this book is better even than Martin van Creveld's book on military leadership.

The true genius of leadership is found in the proper management of subordinates. In this excellent book, Eliot Cohen examines the actions of four democratic leaders and how they led their nations through four different kinds of total war. The four leaders are Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion. Each had differing styles and different concerns but each had one thing in particular in common, a determination that the strategic conduct of the war should be managed by civilian, not military leadership. Cohen agrees with the four that such civilian control is absolutely essential not only to the winning of a war but to the preservation of a democracy. In his chapter on Lincoln, Cohen describes how Lincoln formulated a political strategy for winning the Civil War which included complicated and sometimes contradictory goals: To name two of them, Lincoln needed to retain the loyalty of the slave holding border states that stayed in the Union while also refusing to compromise on the issue which led to the secession in the first place, the refusal to allow the expansion of slavery. He also had to ensure that the Confederacy received no diplomatic legitimacy. The political impacted on the military strategy. Much of this was beyond the grasp of the military generals and Lincoln had to lead aggressively. By contrast, Jefferson Davis, graduate of West Point, seemed completely oblivious to the need to formulate a larger political strategy.In discussing Clemenceau's leadership in the waning years of WWI when the French faced catastrophe, Cohen shows how Clemenceau played two military commanders Foch, with his offensive tendency and Petain, promoter of the doctrine of "defense in depth", off against each other. He reconciled the differences in tactics and doctrines and ultimately helped ensure the success of the French army. He educated himself with frequent trips to the front to see the situation first hand. Churchill, was known for his intense micro-management, not of individual battle tactics but of military strategy. Churchill, having seen the debacles of the first world war was determined that no decisions would be made on the basis of faulty assumptions. As such he questioned his officers and generals intensively and constantly. The officers resented this but such a management style enabled Churchill to base decisions on facts not on conjecture. Churchill's supple mind, much like Lincoln's enabled him at all times to reconcile distant and sometimes competing goals, including the political management of a difficult alliance. WWII was an intensely political war and considerations of state pervaded almost every strategic decision taken. Churchill's genius as a war leader was his ability to bring each disparate element together into a cohesive whole.Ben-Gurion had to fight a very different kind of war. As head of a fledgling state with no genuine army, in 1948 he was not only required to formulate military and political strategy, t

Cohen's thesis is that wars cannot be left to generals. Using four case studies involving successful heads of state who took an active role in their nations' wars (Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion), he debunks the "normal theory of civil-military relations." That theory holds that once war is upon us, politicians must step out of the way and let the military take over and, unfettered, win it. This view goes back at least to the American Civil War (for example, read the same admonition in Sheman's memoirs). It became most fashionable in this country after the Vietnam War, when comparing it and Korea to civil-military relations during the two World Wars.I was skeptical. Having fought in Vietnam and still a bit upset at our not having achieved victory (albeit still today I'm not sure what our goals were...ahh, but I get ahead of myself), and having ascribed that failure to this nation's civilian leadership, I, too, espoused this theory. Cohen has turned me around.Cohen keeps a narrow focus: civil-military relations at the highest levels. Each case study deals with a head of state's involvement with the conduct of a war for national survival (in Lincoln's case, national unity). He makes the point, "The odds in each of these cases were so finely balanced that leadership could and did make the difference. Take away each leader, and one can easily imagine a very different outcome to 'his' conflict." In the process, he describes the leadership style that made these statesmen great:· None dictated to subordinates.· Each tolerated, even advanced, men who strongly disagreed with them.· Intuition and judgment, based on an ability to observe, make sense of, and use a huge amount of information.· An ability to understand the larger picture, yet master military details.· Skilled communicators, deeply read.· Moderation - the ability to discipline passions, and an understanding of when and how to counteract trends.· Ruthlessness, with their nation's enemies as well as with "wavering allies or internal opposition."· Courage to see things as they are.In his closing chapters he compares these case studies (which are as interesting purely as readings in history as they are to build and support his thesis) with civil-military relations during the Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War. He shows that the Johnson Administration did, in fact, manage the Vietnam War, but in the wrong areas; moreover, the Johnson Administration abrogated its role by not defining the goal(s) of the conflict, not defining victory, and not providing adequate strategic guidance. He faults the first Bush Administration for not becoming more involved with war planning and not providing sound strategic guidance.Cohen's is the quintessential Clausewitzian argument. Clausewitz's most famous dictum is, "War is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means." It's often read out of co

Eliot Cohen shows that the Pentagon's preferred model of civil-military relations--namely that the civilian leadership should leave war to the generals--does not make for a successful policy. By profiling four supremely successful war leaders--Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben Gurion--he demonstrates that they all took a very active hand in the conduct of war, and that they were often right, and the generals were often wrong. Whereas when political leaders have deferred to the generals--for instance in the original Bush administration's determination, made at the urging of Gen. Powell, to end the ground war in the Gulf after 100 hours--the results have often been far from satisfying. Not only is this an important argument, highly relevant to today's policy debates, but Cohen also offers interesting profiles of four very different leaders. I was particularly interested in the discussion of Clemenceau and Ben Gurion, since I know less about them than about Churchill and Lincoln. This is a book that all our leaders should read.

This is Eliot Cohen's most intriguing and accomplished work to date. As one who has disagreed with Professor Cohen almost as often as I have agreed with him in the past, I must acknowledge the immediate (and likely enduring) value of this very well-done study of the relationships between heads of state and the military men working for them. While this book will not end the debate over "Who's on first?", it certainly deepens it. And it's simply good reading. I'm still not convinced that civilian leaders always know best--especially given their often-willful ignorance of the military experience--but I certainly believe that the civilians must always be firmly in charge, and Cohen makes that case indisputably along the way. It would have been interesting to bookend these studies with a look at the relationship between Bismarck and the elder Moltke, who enjoyed perhaps the most suspicion-laden symbiotic relationship in history--and whose grand successes illustrate Cohen's thesis with something near perfection--and the relationship, so very different, between President Clinton and his generals, all of whom were hobbled by fear, though of very different things. But this is Professor Cohen's book, not mine. I recommend this book highly--especially to military officers, not all of whom will be pleased by it. Intellectually engaging in the best sense.