Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton

Martin Van Creveld provides an interesting overview of how logistics influenced the outcome of miltitary operations. The first part of the book deatils warfare during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the armies had to keep advancing in order in replemish their supplies. If the army stayed in the same area over a large amount of time such as Napoleon's army in Moscow, than the army would run out of supplies. This situation did not change during the Franco-Prussian War in which the Prussian army had to scrounge for food at the outskirts of Paris. All though food remained a problem for the armies there was always a plentiful supply of ammunition since armies of the 18th and 19th centuries expended very little of it. Martin Van Creveld makes some surprising claims in the later part of the book describing twentieth century warfare. Martin Van Creveld believes that the Schlieffen Plan was doomed to failure because of the logistical constraints of the German army. Because most of supplies delivered to the German army were by rail, the desturuction of the railways impeded their advance. Also German planners made no plans to deal with the massive traffic jams in Belgum. The next chapter Van Creveld has an revisionist appraisal of the Germany invasion of Russia in 1941. Van Creveld believes that Germany had the supplies to deal with winter warfare but the inability to transport them across Russia. Due to the difference between German and Russian rail tracks and maintance problems of German engines the supplies never reached the front. Van Creveld strongly criticizes Rommel's handling of the North Africam campaign. Rommel advance to far for his supplies to be replenished. The problem of supply duirng the North African War was that the supplies had to be delivered by trucks that were highly vulnerable to air attack. When Rommel tried to solve the problem by taking Tobruk, he only made matters worse. The ships that arrived at Tobruk were in range of Allied aircraft and as a result sunk. The final Chapter, Van Creveld evaluates Allied operations in Western Europe. Van Creveld believes that Patton's success had to due with the fact that Patton ignored logistic officer's plan for a slow a orderly pace but instead took advantage of the situation to advance quickly. Van Creveld theorizes that Montgomery's narrow front approach could have logistically reached Northwest Germany but were have not captured Berlin. I would highly reccomend this book for anyone who wants a new and interesting perspective about operations during the First and Second World Wars.

This is really a number of books in one. It is not very long some 240 pages but it is easy to read and challenging. It is the first book that I have ever seen published on logistics and it is fascinating. First and foremost it is a picture of the changing pattern of war. It describes in the first chapter the sorts of campaigns which were run until the time of Napoleon. In those days ammunition would be the most minor problem for an army. Most soldiers could carry enough ammunition in their back pack for a campaign and in a major battle they would fire perhaps twenty or thirty times. In a siege a cannon might fire four or five times a day. The major problem was the provision of food for men and horses. Generally an army could take from the country enough to feed itself. Problems arose if an army stayed in place for any time. A siege would have the power to destroy an area of country by stripping it of everything edible. For these reason there developed a system of magazine storage for siege campaigns. The next chapter discusses the Napoleonic period and the failure to set up a logistics system in Russia despite careful planning. This led to enormous French casualties and the collapse of the campaign.The rest of the book looks at the Franco-Prussian War, the Schlieffen Plan , the German operations on the Eastern Front in the Second World War, the African Campaign and the operations in France following the break out from the initial beach heads. In discussing these campaigns the author charts the gradual change in logistics. The development of railway systems and integrating them into providing supplies. The development of modern weapons and the increase in the demand for ammunition and for fuel. The importance of motorised transport and the problems created in providing oil and spare parts. Each of the campaigns discussed is done so in a way that brings new light onto the mechanics of the campaign and in our ability to understand what happened. The Russian campaign is fascinating as it shows how tough was the problem faced by the Germans. They were able to cobble together large numbers of trucks to supply their troops but were never in the position to replace them once they began to wear out. The amount of ammunition stockpiled was also barely enough for a campaign of four weeks. The German effort in doing as well as they did was incredible but once the Soviets were able to hang on through the initial period then the odds started to swing their way. Germany's supply problems were shown by their in ability to supply winter uniforms and this led to massive casualties from frost bite.One of the most fascinating chapters is on Rommel and his campaigns. The material in the book has been quoted elsewhere. In previous times it has been thought that Rommel failed in Africa because of the allies intercepted supply conveys and sunk material on route. The book shows that supplies to Africa were not the problem. The problem in supplying Rommel related moving t

The sheer volume of customer reviews for a book on such a seemingly arcane topic as the history of logistics gives you an idea of how surprisingly thought provoking van Crevald's book is. As van Crevald describes how army after army "hit the wall" for lack of supplies, the reader realizes how crucial logistics are to the understanding and successful conduct of military operations. Along the way, a number of popular myths are put to bed as to why certain historical strategic decisions were made. Example: A common misconception is that if Erwin Rommel had been given enough men and material he would have beaten the Britsh in North Africa, but the German High Command was too pre-occupied with the campaign in Russia. Van Crevald points out that another German General, Ritter von Thoma, had surveyed the North African ports and road system before Rommel had even arrived and concluded (correctly) that no more than 4 mechanized divisions could be practically supported with the local infrastructure. Since Rommel operated with 7 divisions, including the Italian ones, he suffered a chronic supply shortage during his offensives, even though there was often an abundance of material sitting on the dock in Tripoli 600 miles to his rear. If Rommel, a master of tactics, had done his logistical homework, he would have realized that his existing force structure could not sprint all the way to Egypt while trying to breath through a 1000-mile long straw and be in any sort of condition to fight a decisive battle once he got there. Too late, Rommel himself realized "the battle is fought and decided by the quartermaster before the shooting begins".Van Crevald's book is full of such insights. Now, as I read other accounts of military operations, I try to visualize that invisible but dominant logistical tether reining in the scope of the possible. A thought provoking book indeed.

I never realized the importance of supplies in war and the difficulty in obtaining them. Not just food, ammunition, POL, and equipment, but the small over looked things that are critical.The book touches on a wide range of topics and is a must for the student of military history. For example the author covers baking of bread for 17th+18th century armies, the effects of weather (freezing rivers), the use of trains (you can't just dump supplies off a train, you need a depot).Its a little dry, but worth reading and inexpensive as well.

Traditional books on military history provide only a superficial study of the role logistics played in history's most noted campaigns. In Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, Martin Van Creveld examines war from a much deeper logistical perspective, offering a fascinating new view on the lessons to be learned from these campaigns. After an introductory chapter on the logistics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Van Creveld analyzes Napoleon's success against Austria in 1805 and his failure against Russia in 1812. This chapter explores the use of magazines and the common practice of "living off of the land." Successive chapters explore the use of horse-drawn convoys by the Prussians in the late 1800's, the use of trains by the Germans in World War I, and the "modern" logistical planning of the Allies in Europe during World War II. The common approach to each period is the attempt to determine how the success or failure of the logistics planning influenced the leader's ability to execute his strategic plan. Most impressive about this book is the volume of detailed research that Van Creveld accomplished in preparing to write it. The bibliography documents the use of more than 300 sources, including original working papers and notes from the actual planning of the wars studied. The use of actual source documents allows Van Creveld to draw unique conclusions, unbiased by traditional military writings. Supplying War appears on the Commandant's Reading List and other lists of recommended reading for military professionals. It gives leaders a solid historical perspective on the need to support the warriors they lead into battle. While it can in no way be considered "light reading", Supplying War is an essential part of any good military leader's library.