Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections

Jacobson and Kernel take issue with traditional models of vote choice, particularly, economic voting models. Economic voting models have examined both voting behavior in the aggregate, and individual levels. Aggregate models contend that national, politically relevant economic conditions, - inflation, unemployment, etc. - at the time of the election, affect election results. Scholars have also examined economic perceptions - personal finance - of individuals and the affect on vote choice. In both cases, Jacobson and Kernel contend that economic conditions - both at the individual and the aggregate level - are not the root cause of vote choice. There are other variables involved. Jacobson and Kernel contend that national events and congressional elections have become less connected. In part, they contend that this si the result of "Weakening partisanship, candidate-centered mass-media campaigns... [and] the lack of structure in public attitudes on important political issues" (13). They contend that what really matters is the voter's perception of the two candidates that they can vote for. National issues have limited influence on their vote choice. Jacobson and Kernel propose an alternative theory. They write, "politically active elites - candidates and those who recruit and finance them - provide a crucial connecting link between national-level phenomena and individual voting decisions. National political conditions systematically shape elite decisions about running for office or contributing to campaigns. These decisions determine the alternatives presented to voters" (2-3). When political conditions are favorable, a party (favored by the national political environment) is likely to find, and run quality candidates with a high probability of winning. When conditions are poor, finding a good, competitive candidate will be difficult. This is the result of rational decision making on the party of politicians and donors. Politicians weigh their probability of winning office based on costs and benefits. The authors develop a rational actor model weighs their odds of winning. This is especially important due to the stratified nature of the US political system. A candidate may have to risk his seat at a lower position in order to run, and potentially lose, the election for a higher seat. As such, the candidate will not run, and risk losing if the national conditions are not significantly favorable for his or her winning. The most qualified candidate - usually the incumbent of a lower position - will not run. Rather, a much less qualified candidate - with a much lower chance of winning - will run. As such, the voter does not have two qualified candidates to pick from. The national conditions are such that there really is only one viable, qualified candidate. Jacobson and Kernel also examine the strategic behavior of campaign donors - parties, individuals, and interest groups. A donor takes in short-term partial political co