Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War

This book is well written, and enjoyable to read. It presents a convincing, if not complete argument for the Air Force. The work of the Air Force is well detailed and the author presents a huge amount of information about tactics that are not commonly known. All of this in a language that anyone can understand.Even so, one can not help but feel that the book is presenting the Gulf War as the first war won by air power alone.A strong read, if you accept the prejudices, and realize that the land forces, and sea forces, and special forces also have a legitimate claim to the Gulf War victory.

Richard Hallion has produced a book which provides one of the best overviews available on the evolution of US air power and strategy in general, and in the 1990-91 Gulf war in particular.Previous reviewers' comments on the rather sterile text that Hallion uses are not without truth, although I didn't find this a particularly important shortcoming of the book.One of the book's key strengths is that it places the 1990-91 Gulf war into a detailed, well-explained context. He fully describes how US air power and military strategy reached the position it was in in 1990, and how this affected the ability of the US to fight the Gulf war.The main shortcoming of the book - and this is a serious problem, in my view - is when Hallion tries to talk about Middle East politics and the arguments for and against Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm. These issues are peripheral to the subject of his book, and he displays a serious lack of knowledge about them (or an unwillingness to discuss and acknowledge them). Hallion talks about matters such as Iraqi aggression, its WMD program, its relations with its neighbours pre-August 1990, and the like, in simplistic terms. If he really thought that these subjects needed mention, he should have included some discussion of Iraq's claims against Kuwait, of Iraq's domestic political situation in the period 1988-1990 and how this may have influenced Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait, and of allied objectives in the region (ie: political economy factors other than oil - the US's desire to see and protect free markets, the UK's need to protect Kuwaiti investments in the UK lest the Pound plummet if Iraq 'cashed in' Kuwaiti assets abroad etc).Worst of all, he seems to have fallen for the 'Sadddam as another Hitler' theory. If he wanted to look at the political phychology of Saddam, mention should also have been made of the 'Saddam as another Bismark', or 'Saddam as another Napoleon' or 'Saddam caught in a power vacuum' theories as well - these are all important explanations behind Saddam's political behaviour. Mr Hallion, stick to the subject of air power, strategy, theory, and history - for which you have an flair and knowledge. Having said all of this, it is the role of a book reviewer to be critical of the work he or she is reviewing. Overall, this book is excellent, and highly recommended for readers looking for an introduction to the history, strategy, and tactics of air power.

Richard Hallion's work isn't a blow-by-blow account of the events of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Rather, its a very well-documented study of the changes in U.S. military and political thinking since World War One with a particular focus on the period following the Vietnam War. The author chronicles the changes in leadership and policy as the veterans of Vietnam were promoted up through the ranks into command positions, how they changed the way the military is utilized in political crisis, and the decisions which affect military weapons procurement. For example, the workhorse of the Vietnam air campaign was the F4 Phantom II, a supersonic missile platform that wasn't particularly maneuverable, that was developed by the US Navy and thrust upon the US Air Force by a budget-conscious Robert McNamara, head of the Department of Defense at the time. The Phantom became the darling of the services over the skies of North Vietnam, succeeding in just about every role assigned to it. Buoyed by this success, McNamara tried to apply the converse theory - take a land-based US Air Force aircraft and apply it to the Navy - which resulted in the failure of the F-111A. It was this failure which prompted the Navy to develop its own jet fighter - the F-14 Tomcat. This touched off a long line of fighter aircraft which controlled the skies of Kuwait and Iraq some 20 years after their introduction into the US military: the F-15 Eagle, the F-16 Falcon, and the F-117 stealth strike fighter. The F-117, by its deployment in a single battle, managed to render 50 years of Soviet military technology development obsolete. It may have indirectly contributed to the fall of the Soviet regime. Until I read Mr. Hallion's book, I was not aware of the facts surrounding the development of these fine fighters. I think the reader will be just as much surprised and educated by the events described in the book as I was. Although originally published in 1992, the concepts described in this book are still very much current as we watch arguments unfold around the F-22 stealth air superiority fighter. Questions concerning the need for a new military aircraft and the expense of a single unit when more units of a lesser quality weapon could be purchased for the same money are reminiscent of the arguments which arose during the development of the F-14 at the end of the Phantom's career. Mr. Hallion's book lays the groundwork for readers to develop their own opinions concerning military spending - he avoids the trap of forcing his own opinions upon the reader - and he documents his sources liberally throughout the text. I found it necessary to keep two bookmarks: one for the main text and the second for the notes at the end of the book. Accompanying the text are a series of brief essays which discuss particular elements of modern combat theory, such as air power, battlefield, and missile technologies. I truly enjoyed reading them following the education I received from the main

This is not a nail biting, edge of your seat story, nor does it claim to be. It is a well documented and well thought out military treatise on air power. This is not a book filled with anecdotes and accounts of particular battles during the Gulf War. Although I found it informative and interesting, I couldn't take a steady diet of this style of writing.